GHSA-fvhj-4qfh-q2hm CVE-2023-47106 GO-2023-2376
Traefik incorrectly processes fragment in the URL, leads to Authorization Bypass
- Severity
- 6.5 / 10
- Medium · CVSS 3.1
- Exploit chance (EPSS)
- 0.62%
- Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 50.00% of scored vulnerabilities.
- Known exploited
- No
- Not in CISA's catalog
- Fix
- Available
- 2 packages have a fixed version
Description
Summary
When a request is sent to Traefik with a URL fragment, Traefik automatically URL encodes and forwards the fragment to the backend server. This violates the RFC because in the origin-form the URL should only contain the absolute path and the query.
When this is combined with another frontend proxy like Nginx, it can be used to bypass frontend proxy URI-based access control restrictions.
Details
For example, we have this Nginx configuration:
location /admin {
deny all;
return 403;
}
This can be bypassed when the attacker is requesting to /#/../admin
This won’t be vulnerable if the backend server follows the RFC and ignores any characters after the fragment.
However, if Nginx is chained with another reverse proxy which automatically URL encode the character # (Traefik) the URL will become
/%23/../admin
And allow the attacker to completely bypass the Access Restriction from the Nginx Front-End proxy.
Here is a diagram to summarize the attack:
PoC
This is the POC docker I've set up. It contains Nginx, Traefik proxies and a backend server running PHP.
https://drive.google.com/file/d/1vLnA0g7N7ZKhLNmHmuJ4JJjV_J2akNMt/view?usp=sharing
Impact
This allows the attacker to completely bypass the Access Restriction from Front-End proxy.
Affected versions
Go
| Package | Vulnerable | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| github.com/traefik/traefik | all versions |
No fix yet |
| github.com/traefik/traefik/v2 | < 2.10.6 |
2.10.6 |
| github.com/traefik/traefik/v3 | < 3.0.0-beta5 |
3.0.0-beta5 |
How to fix
Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.
github.com/traefik/traefik/v2 Go → 2.10.6
- go
go get github.com/traefik/traefik/v2@v2.10.6 && go mod tidy
github.com/traefik/traefik/v3 Go → 3.0.0-beta5
- go
go get github.com/traefik/traefik/v3@v3.0.0-beta5 && go mod tidy
Severity breakdown
CVSS 3.1 6.5
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Privileges required
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- Low
- Integrity
- Low
- Availability
- None
Weakness
CWE-177: Improper Handling of URL Encoding (Hex Encoding)
The product does not properly handle when all or part of an input has been URL encoded.
How to prevent it
- Architecture and Design: Avoid making decisions based on names of resources (e.g. files) if those resources can have alternate names.
- Implementation: Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does. When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue." Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
- Implementation: Inputs should be decoded and canonicalized to the application's current internal representation before being validated (CWE-180). Make sure that the application does not decode the same input twice (CWE-174). Such errors could be used to bypass allowlist validation schemes by introducing dangerous inputs after they have been checked.
CWE-20: Improper Input Validation
The product receives input or data, but it does not validate or incorrectly validates that the input has the properties that are required to process the data safely and correctly.
How to prevent it
- Architecture and Design: Consider using language-theoretic security (LangSec) techniques that characterize inputs using a formal language and build "recognizers" for that language. This effectively requires parsing to be a distinct layer that effectively enforces a boundary between raw input and internal data representations, instead of allowing parser code to be scattered throughout the program, where it could be subject to errors or inconsistencies that create weaknesses. [REF-1109] [REF-1110] [REF-1111]
- Architecture and Design: Use an input validation framework such as Struts or the OWASP ESAPI Validation API. Note that using a framework does not automatically address all input validation problems; be mindful of weaknesses that could arise from misusing the framework itself (CWE-1173).
- Architecture and Design, Implementation: Understand all the potential areas where untrusted inputs can enter the product, including but not limited to: parameters or arguments, cookies, anything read from the network, environment variables, reverse DNS lookups, query results, request headers, URL components, e-mail, files, filenames, databases, and any external systems that provide data to the application. Remember that such inputs may be obtained indirectly through API calls.
- Implementation: Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does. When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue." Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
- Architecture and Design: For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server. Even though client-side checks provide minimal benefits with respect to server-side security, they are still useful. First, they can support intrusion detection. If the server receives input that should have been rejected by the client, then it may be an indication of an attack. Second, client-side error-checking can provide helpful feedback to the user about the expectations for valid input. Third, there may be a reduction in server-side processing time for accidental input errors, although this is typically a small savings.
- Implementation: When your application combines data from multiple sources, perform the validation after the sources have been combined. The individual data elements may pass the validation step but violate the intended restrictions after they have been combined.
- Implementation: Be especially careful to validate all input when invoking code that crosses language boundaries, such as from an interpreted language to native code. This could create an unexpected interaction between the language boundaries. Ensure that you are not violating any of the expectations of the language with which you are interfacing. For example, even though Java may not be susceptible to buffer overflows, providing a large argument in a call to native code might trigger an overflow.
- Implementation: Directly convert your input type into the expected data type, such as using a conversion function that translates a string into a number. After converting to the expected data type, ensure that the input's values fall within the expected range of allowable values and that multi-field consistencies are maintained.
- Implementation: Inputs should be decoded and canonicalized to the application's current internal representation before being validated (CWE-180, CWE-181). Make sure that your application does not inadvertently decode the same input twice (CWE-174). Such errors could be used to bypass allowlist schemes by introducing dangerous inputs after they have been checked. Use libraries such as the OWASP ESAPI Canonicalization control. Consider performing repeated canonicalization until your input does not change any more. This will avoid double-decoding and similar scenarios, but it might inadvertently modify inputs that are allowed to contain properly-encoded dangerous content.
- Implementation: When exchanging data between components, ensure that both components are using the same character encoding. Ensure that the proper encoding is applied at each interface. Explicitly set the encoding you are using whenever the protocol allows you to do so.
References
Advisories
Packages
Other links
Timeline
- Published
- Last updated by the source
- Latest EPSS score
Related advisories
| Advisory | Severity | Why it's related |
|---|---|---|
| GO-2026-6558 Traefik: BasicAuth singleflight coalescing reintroduces an unauthenticated username-enumeration timing oracle | Medium | Also affects github.com/traefik/traefik |
| GHSA-f52w-8j3h-j724 Traefik: Rootless HTTP/1 request-target routes as "/" but is forwarded verbatim, bypassing path-scoped routing, middleware guards and access logging | High | Also affects github.com/traefik/traefik |
| GHSA-w4v4-9rw7-5326 Traefik: Inconsistent Interpretation of HTTP Requests ('HTTP Request/Response Smuggling') and Incorrect Authorization | Critical | Also affects github.com/traefik/traefik |
| GHSA-qqjf-53cj-pwvv Traefik HTTP/3 Backend NTLM Connection Reuse | Critical | Also affects github.com/traefik/traefik |
| GO-2026-6467 Traefik entrypoint header-name sanitization bypassed via request trailers | High | Also affects github.com/traefik/traefik |
| GHSA-rf44-j88r-hh8c Traefik: ForwardAuth identity spoofing via dot-form header alias | High | Also affects github.com/traefik/traefik |
| GHSA-7ghq-v6jf-g56c Traefik: respondingTimeouts.readTimeout is not applied to HTTP/3, leaving slow-body uploads unbounded | Medium | Also affects github.com/traefik/traefik |
| GHSA-62fc-8686-hfmq Traefik: `allowCrossNamespace=false` bypass via `@kubernetescrd` TraefikService backendRef | Medium | Also affects github.com/traefik/traefik |
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