GHSA-chf8-4hv6-8pg6 CVE-2026-46612 GO-2026-5323

Fission StorageSvc /v1/archive endpoint exposes unauthenticated CRUD over all function archives

High Go

Severity: 8.8 / 10; High · CVSS 3.1
Exploit chance (EPSS): 0.34%; Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 27.97% of scored vulnerabilities.
Known exploited: No; Not in CISA's catalog
Weakness: CWE-306 Missing Authentication for Critical Function
Fix: 1.23.0; Upgrade github.com/fission/fission to this version or later

Description

Summary

The Fission storagesvc component registers archive CRUD handlers (/v1/archive GET / POST / DELETE and /v1/archives list) directly on its HTTP router without performing any authentication or authorization. Any caller able to reach the storagesvc ClusterIP — including any other workload in the same Kubernetes cluster — could enumerate archive IDs, download archives belonging to other tenants, upload arbitrary archive content, and delete archives.

Affected component

pkg/storagesvc/storagesvc.go — handler registration and per-route handler logic at lines 72-95 (list), 167-199 (download/delete), and 263-270 (route wiring).

Impact

A workload elsewhere in the cluster (e.g. a compromised function pod, a noisy-neighbour tenant in a multi-tenant deployment, or any pod whose egress is not constrained by NetworkPolicy) could:

Enumerate every function deployment archive in the cluster.
Download the deployment archive of any function in any namespace, exposing the function's source code and any embedded secrets.
Delete archives, causing the next function specialization or rebuild to fail.
Upload arbitrary archives that subsequent function specializations would fetch and execute.

In multi-tenant Fission deployments this completely breaks the tenant boundary for function code.

Root cause

pkg/storagesvc/storagesvc.go mounts the handlers without an authentication middleware. Network-layer controls (NetworkPolicy) were the only line of defence before this fix, and the chart shipped no NetworkPolicy for storagesvc by default, so reachability was open.

Fix

Released in v1.23.0:

PR #3368 (commit 2455fc0c) wraps the storagesvc archive routes with the application-layer HMAC verifier from pkg/auth/hmac using the ServiceStoragesvc derived key. Callers (executor, fetcher, builder, CLI) sign their requests using a shared cluster master secret derived per-service via HKDF. Mismatched signatures are rejected with 401.
Defence in depth: PR #3365 added a NetworkPolicy for storagesvc so only the executor/fetcher/builder pods can reach it network-layer (independent of authentication).

Mitigation (until upgrade)

Enable the Helm chart's per-service NetworkPolicy (set networkPolicy.enabled=true).
Restrict storagesvc egress/ingress to the executor, builder, and fetcher pods only.
Avoid running untrusted workloads in the cluster that hosts Fission.

Affected versions

Go

Package	Vulnerable	Fixed in
github.com/fission/fission	`< 1.23.0`	`1.23.0`

How to fix

Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.

github.com/fission/fission Go → `1.23.0`

go

go get github.com/fission/fission@v1.23.0 && go mod tidy

Severity breakdown

CVSS 3.1 8.8

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Attack vector: Network
Attack complexity: Low
Privileges required: Low
User interaction: None
Scope: Unchanged
Confidentiality: High
Integrity: High
Availability: High

Weakness

CWE-306: Missing Authentication for Critical Function

The product does not perform any authentication for functionality that requires a provable user identity or consumes a significant amount of resources.

How to prevent it

Architecture and Design: Divide the software into anonymous, normal, privileged, and administrative areas. Identify which of these areas require a proven user identity, and use a centralized authentication capability. Identify all potential communication channels, or other means of interaction with the software, to ensure that all channels are appropriately protected, including those channels that are assumed to be accessible only by authorized parties. Developers sometimes perform authentication at the primary channel, but open up a secondary channel that is assumed to be private. For example, a login mechanism may be listening on one network port, but after successful authentication, it may open up a second port where it waits for the connection, but avoids authentication because it assumes that only the authenticated party will connect to the port. In general, if the software or protocol allows a single session or user state to persist across multiple connections or channels, authentication and appropriate credential management need to be used throughout.
Architecture and Design: For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
Architecture and Design: Where possible, avoid implementing custom, "grow-your-own" authentication routines and consider using authentication capabilities as provided by the surrounding framework, operating system, or environment. These capabilities may avoid common weaknesses that are unique to authentication; support automatic auditing and tracking; and make it easier to provide a clear separation between authentication tasks and authorization tasks. In environments such as the World Wide Web, the line between authentication and authorization is sometimes blurred. If custom authentication routines are required instead of those provided by the server, then these routines must be applied to every single page, since these pages could be requested directly.
Architecture and Design: Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid. For example, consider using libraries with authentication capabilities such as OpenSSL or the ESAPI Authenticator [REF-45].
Implementation, System Configuration, Operation: When storing data in the cloud (e.g., S3 buckets, Azure blobs, Google Cloud Storage, etc.), use the provider's controls to require strong authentication for users who should be allowed to access the data [REF-1297] [REF-1298] [REF-1302].

References

Advisories

nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-46612

Packages

github.com/fission/fission

Timeline

May 21, 2026 Published
Jul 21, 2026 Last updated by the source
Nov 1, 2026 Latest EPSS score

Advisory	Severity	Why it's related
GHSA-7m8x-qg2j-4m3v Fission: MessageQueueTrigger scaler manager materializes Secret values into Deployment envvars and accepts arbitrary user PodSpec	High	Also affects github.com/fission/fission
GHSA-qf5v-m7p4-95rp Fission: Incomplete capability denylist in Environment/Function PodSpec validation allows tenant-added CAP_SYS_TIME and cross-tenant node wall-clock corruption	High	Also affects github.com/fission/fission
GHSA-vchh-r53j-8mpw Fission: HTTPTrigger admission omits RelativeURL / Prefix validation; kubectl apply bypasses CLI checks	Medium	Also affects github.com/fission/fission
GHSA-r5jh-q2mw-gcx4 Fission: SanitizeFilePath lexical HasPrefix bypass permits sibling-directory escape	Low	Also affects github.com/fission/fission
GHSA-q6vm-xqc9-v3ff Fission: Zip Slip in pkg/utils/zip.go:Unarchive allows fetcher to write outside the destination directory	High	Also affects github.com/fission/fission
GHSA-m63v-2g9w-2w6v Fission: Environment Runtime.Container and Builder.Container SecurityContext bypass allows privileged pod creation	Critical	Also affects github.com/fission/fission
GHSA-8wcj-mfrc-jx5q Fission builder pods auto-mount the fission-builder ServiceAccount token in the user-supplied builder container	Medium	Also affects github.com/fission/fission
GHSA-gx55-f84r-v3r7 Fission Environment CRD podspec passthrough enables hostPID/hostNetwork/privileged pods, node escape	Critical	Also affects github.com/fission/fission

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