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GHSA-cfg2-mxfj-j6pw CVE-2026-40112 PYSEC-2026-2910

PraisonAI Vulnerable to Stored XSS via Unsanitized Agent Output in HTML Rendering (nh3 Not a Required Dependency)

Medium PyPI
Severity
5.4 / 10
Medium · CVSS 3.1
Exploit chance (EPSS)
0.22%
Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 12.00% of scored vulnerabilities.
Known exploited
No
Not in CISA's catalog
Weakness
CWE-79 Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation ('Cross-site Scripting')
Fix
4.5.128
Upgrade praisonai to this version or later

Description

Summary

The Flask API endpoint in src/praisonai/api.py renders agent output as HTML without effective sanitization. The _sanitize_html function relies on the nh3 library, which is not listed as a required or optional dependency in pyproject.toml. When nh3 is absent (the default installation), the sanitizer is a no-op that returns HTML unchanged. An attacker who can influence agent input (via RAG data poisoning, web scraping results, or prompt injection) can inject arbitrary JavaScript that executes in the browser of anyone viewing the API output.

Details

In src/praisonai/api.py, lines 6-14 define the sanitizer with a try/except ImportError fallback:

try:
    import nh3
    def _sanitize_html(html: str) -> str:
        return nh3.clean(html)
except ImportError:
    def _sanitize_html(html: str) -> str:
        """Fallback: no nh3, return as-is (install nh3 for XSS protection)."""
        return html

The home() route at lines 21-25 converts agent output to HTML via markdown.markdown() (which preserves raw HTML tags by default) and embeds it in an HTML response using an f-string — bypassing Flask's Jinja2 auto-escaping:

@app.route('/')
def home():
    output = basic()
    html_output = _sanitize_html(markdown.markdown(str(output)))
    return f'<html><body>{html_output}</body></html>'

Since nh3 is not in any dependency list (pyproject.toml core deps, optional deps, or requirements files), a standard installation will always hit the fallback path. The markdown library's default behavior passes through raw HTML tags in input text, so any <script> or event handler attributes in the agent output flow directly into the response.

Additionally, deploy.py:76-91 generates a deployment version of api.py that has no sanitization at all — it directly calls markdown.markdown(output) without any _sanitize_html wrapper.

PoC

  1. Set up a PraisonAI instance with an agent that processes external content (e.g., web scraping or RAG retrieval):
# agents.yaml
framework: crewai
topic: test
roles:
  researcher:
    role: Researcher
    goal: Process user-provided content
    backstory: You process content exactly as given
    tasks:
      process:
        description: "Return this exact text: <img src=x onerror=alert(document.cookie)>"
        expected_output: The text as-is
  1. Verify nh3 is not installed (default):
pip show nh3 2>&1 | grep -c "not found"
# Returns 1 (not installed)
  1. Start the API:
python src/praisonai/api.py
  1. Access the endpoint:
curl http://localhost:5000/
  1. Response contains unsanitized HTML:
<html><body><p><img src=x onerror=alert(document.cookie)></p></body></html>
  1. Opening this in a browser executes the JavaScript payload.

Impact

  • Session hijacking: An attacker can steal cookies or session tokens from users viewing the API output.
  • Credential theft: Injected scripts can present fake login forms or exfiltrate data to attacker-controlled servers.
  • Actions on behalf of users: Malicious JavaScript can perform actions in the context of the victim's browser session.

The attack surface includes any scenario where agent output contains attacker-influenced content: RAG retrieval from poisoned documents, web scraping of malicious pages, processing of adversarial user prompts, or multi-agent communication where one agent's output is tainted.

Recommended Fix

Make nh3 a required dependency when using the API, and remove the silent fallback:

# Option 1: Make nh3 required in pyproject.toml under the "api" optional dependency
# In pyproject.toml:
# api = [
#     "flask>=3.0.0",
#     ...
#     "nh3>=0.2.14",
# ]

# Option 2: Use markdown's built-in HTML stripping as a safe default
import markdown

def _sanitize_html(html: str) -> str:
    try:
        import nh3
        return nh3.clean(html)
    except ImportError:
        import re
        return re.sub(r'<[^>]+>', '', html)  # Strip all HTML tags as fallback

# Option 3 (preferred): Use Flask's Jinja2 templating with auto-escaping
# instead of f-string interpolation, or use markupsafe.escape()
from markupsafe import Markup

@app.route('/')
def home():
    output = basic()
    # Use markdown with safe extensions only
    html_output = markdown.markdown(str(output), extensions=[])
    try:
        import nh3
        html_output = nh3.clean(html_output)
    except ImportError:
        raise RuntimeError("nh3 is required for safe HTML rendering. Install with: pip install nh3")
    return f'<html><body>{html_output}</body></html>'

Also fix deploy.py:76-91 to include sanitization in the generated api.py.

Affected versions

PyPI

PackageVulnerableFixed in
praisonai
< 4.5.128
4.5.128

How to fix

Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.

praisonai PyPI → 4.5.128

pip
pip install --upgrade "praisonai>=4.5.128"
poetry
poetry add "praisonai>=4.5.128"
uv
uv add "praisonai>=4.5.128"

Severity breakdown

CVSS 3.1 5.4

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N

Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Privileges required
None
User interaction
Required
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
Low
Integrity
Low
Availability
None

Weakness

CWE-79: Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation ('Cross-site Scripting')

The product does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes user-controllable input before it is placed in output that is used as a web page that is served to other users.

How to prevent it
  • Architecture and Design: Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid [REF-1482]. Examples of libraries and frameworks that make it easier to generate properly encoded output include Microsoft's Anti-XSS library, the OWASP ESAPI Encoding module, and Apache Wicket.
  • Implementation, Architecture and Design: Understand the context in which your data will be used and the encoding that will be expected. This is especially important when transmitting data between different components, or when generating outputs that can contain multiple encodings at the same time, such as web pages or multi-part mail messages. Study all expected communication protocols and data representations to determine the required encoding strategies. For any data that will be output to another web page, especially any data that was received from external inputs, use the appropriate encoding on all non-alphanumeric characters. Parts of the same output document may require different encodings, which will vary depending on whether the output is in the: HTML body Element attributes (such as src="XYZ") URIs JavaScript sections Cascading Style Sheets and style property etc. Note that HTML Entity Encoding is only appropriate for the HTML body. Consult the XSS Prevention Cheat Sheet [REF-724] for more details on the types of encoding and escaping that are needed.
  • Architecture and Design, Implementation: Understand all the potential areas where untrusted inputs can enter your software: parameters or arguments, cookies, anything read from the network, environment variables, reverse DNS lookups, query results, request headers, URL components, e-mail, files, filenames, databases, and any external systems that provide data to the application. Remember that such inputs may be obtained indirectly through API calls.
  • Architecture and Design: For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
  • Architecture and Design: If available, use structured mechanisms that automatically enforce the separation between data and code. These mechanisms may be able to provide the relevant quoting, encoding, and validation automatically, instead of relying on the developer to provide this capability at every point where output is generated.
  • Implementation: Use and specify an output encoding that can be handled by the downstream component that is reading the output. Common encodings include ISO-8859-1, UTF-7, and UTF-8. When an encoding is not specified, a downstream component may choose a different encoding, either by assuming a default encoding or automatically inferring which encoding is being used, which can be erroneous. When the encodings are inconsistent, the downstream component might treat some character or byte sequences as special, even if they are not special in the original encoding. Attackers might then be able to exploit this discrepancy and conduct injection attacks; they even might be able to bypass protection mechanisms that assume the original encoding is also being used by the downstream component. The problem of inconsistent output encodings often arises in web pages. If an encoding is not specified in an HTTP header, web browsers often guess about which encoding is being used. This can open up the browser to subtle XSS attacks.
  • Implementation: With Struts, write all data from form beans with the bean's filter attribute set to true.
  • Implementation: To help mitigate XSS attacks against the user's session cookie, set the session cookie to be HttpOnly. In browsers that support the HttpOnly feature (such as more recent versions of Internet Explorer and Firefox), this attribute can prevent the user's session cookie from being accessible to malicious client-side scripts that use document.cookie. This is not a complete solution, since HttpOnly is not supported by all browsers. More importantly, XmlHttpRequest and other powerful browser technologies provide read access to HTTP headers, including the Set-Cookie header in which the HttpOnly flag is set.
  • Implementation: Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does. When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue." Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright. When dynamically constructing web pages, use stringent allowlists that limit the character set based on the expected value of the parameter in the request. All input should be validated and cleansed, not just parameters that the user is supposed to specify, but all data in the request, including hidden fields, cookies, headers, the URL itself, and so forth. A common mistake that leads to continuing XSS vulnerabilities is to validate only fields that are expected to be redisplayed by the site. It is common to see data from the request that is reflected by the application server or the application that the development team did not anticipate. Also, a field that is not currently reflected may be used by a future developer. Therefore, validating ALL parts of the HTTP request is recommended. Note that proper output encoding, escaping, and quoting is the most ef
  • Architecture and Design: When the set of acceptable objects, such as filenames or URLs, is limited or known, create a mapping from a set of fixed input values (such as numeric IDs) to the actual filenames or URLs, and reject all other inputs.
  • Operation: Use an application firewall that can detect attacks against this weakness. It can be beneficial in cases in which the code cannot be fixed (because it is controlled by a third party), as an emergency prevention measure while more comprehensive software assurance measures are applied, or to provide defense in depth [REF-1481].
  • Operation, Implementation: When using PHP, configure the application so that it does not use register_globals. During implementation, develop the application so that it does not rely on this feature, but be wary of implementing a register_globals emulation that is subject to weaknesses such as CWE-95, CWE-621, and similar issues.

References

Timeline

  1. Published
  2. Last updated by the source
  3. Latest EPSS score
AdvisorySeverityWhy it's related
GHSA-26mh-57q7-jfvr
PraisonAI vulnerable to Remote Code Execution via Broken AST Sandbox
High Also affects praisonai
GHSA-6g6r-q6gw-w8fg
PraisonAI has a Browser Server WebSocket origin validation bypass via unanchored regex (patch bypass of CVE-2026-40289 / GHSA-8x8f-54wf-vv92)
Critical Also affects praisonai
GHSA-pvph-5j39-v8qc
PraisonAI: Origin-validation bypass (startswith prefix match) enables unauthenticated cross-site request forgery against the PraisonAI MCP HTTP server
High Also affects praisonai
GHSA-gfq8-hmph-9gjv
PraisonAI: Authentication fail-open in Recipe server allows unauthenticated access when API key or JWT auth is configured without a secret
High Also affects praisonai
GHSA-2jgc-f764-c5r2
PraisonAI: [Auth Bypass] PraisonAI async Jobs API (`/api/v1/runs`) has no authentication — unauthenticated job execution, result theft, cancel and delete
High Also affects praisonai
GHSA-pvxx-r596-f5qj
PraisonAI: `--api-key` flag on `praisonai serve` is not properly enforced
High Also affects praisonai
GHSA-hmfx-4v44-9qw9
PraisonAI vulnerable to Server-Side Request Forgery via DNS rebinding bypass in webhook_url validation
Medium Also affects praisonai
GHSA-rg5q-pp8p-f7jm
PraisonAI: Webhook SSRF via DNS fail-open in `JobSubmitRequest.validate_webhook_url()` — bypass of CVE-2026-40114
High Also affects praisonai
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