Skip to content

GHSA-cc8w-r4qh-3v65 CVE-2026-28744 GO-2026-5321

Gitea: Git Smart HTTP Skips Repository Token Scopes for Bearer Tokens

High Go
Severity
8.1 / 10
High · CVSS 3.1
Exploit chance (EPSS)
0.43%
Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 37.05% of scored vulnerabilities.
Known exploited
No
Not in CISA's catalog
Weakness
CWE-863 Incorrect Authorization
Fix
1.26.2
Upgrade code.gitea.io/gitea to this version or later

Description

Summary

Gitea v1.26.1 enforces repository-scoped access-token permissions on repository operations. In the Git Smart HTTP path, however, this check runs only when the token is presented via HTTP Basic authentication — CheckRepoScopedToken() returns early unless ctx.IsBasicAuth is true — so the same token sent as Authorization: Bearer <token> bypasses the scope check entirely.

As a result, a PAT or OAuth2 token presented as a Bearer credential can clone or fetch private repositories without the read:repository scope, and likewise reach the Git push without write:repository.

Details

Git Smart HTTP routes allow both Basic auth and OAuth2/Bearer auth:

// routers/web/web.go
addOwnerRepoGitHTTPRouters(
	m,
	repo.HTTPGitEnabledHandler,
	webAuth.AllowBasic,
	webAuth.AllowOAuth2,
	repo.CorsHandler(),
	optSignInFromAnyOrigin,
	context.UserAssignmentWeb(),
)

The Git HTTP authorization path calls CheckRepoScopedToken() before falling through to normal repository RBAC:

// routers/web/repo/githttp.go
if askAuth {
	if !ctx.IsSigned {
		ctx.HTTPError(http.StatusUnauthorized)
		return nil
	}

	context.CheckRepoScopedToken(ctx, repo, auth_model.GetScopeLevelFromAccessMode(accessMode))
	if ctx.Written() {
		return nil
	}

	// normal repository RBAC follows
}

However, CheckRepoScopedToken() only enforces token scopes for Basic-authenticated requests:

// services/context/permission.go
func CheckRepoScopedToken(ctx *Context, repo *repo_model.Repository, level auth_model.AccessTokenScopeLevel) {
	if !ctx.IsBasicAuth || ctx.Data["IsApiToken"] != true {
		return
	}

	scope, ok := ctx.Data["ApiTokenScope"].(auth_model.AccessTokenScope)
	if ok {
		requiredScopes := auth_model.GetRequiredScopes(level, auth_model.AccessTokenScopeCategoryRepository)
		// public-only and required repository scope checks follow
	}
}

The Bearer/OAuth2 auth path still records the token scope:

// services/auth/oauth2.go
accessTokenScope, uid := GetOAuthAccessTokenScopeAndUserID(ctx, tokenSHA)
if uid != 0 {
	store.GetData()["IsApiToken"] = true
	store.GetData()["ApiTokenScope"] = accessTokenScope
}

Bearer PATs also set IsApiToken=true and ApiTokenScope, but ctx.IsBasicAuth remains false because the selected auth method is OAuth2/Bearer rather than Basic. The scope is therefore available but ignored.

PoC

This test creates a token for user2 with only read:notification, then requests Git Smart HTTP refs for user2/repo2, which is private. The same token is rejected over Basic auth, but succeeds over Bearer auth.

func TestPOCGitSmartHTTPBearerTokenBypassesRepositoryScope(t *testing.T) {
	defer tests.PrepareTestEnv(t)()

	repo := unittest.AssertExistsAndLoadBean(t, &repo_model.Repository{ID: 2, OwnerName: "user2", Name: "repo2"})
	assert.True(t, repo.IsPrivate)

	session := loginUser(t, "user2")
	token := getTokenForLoggedInUser(t, session, auth_model.AccessTokenScopeReadNotification)
	url := "/user2/repo2/info/refs?service=git-upload-pack"

	basicReq := NewRequest(t, "GET", url)
	basicReq.SetBasicAuth(token, "x-oauth-basic")
	MakeRequest(t, basicReq, http.StatusForbidden)

	bearerReq := NewRequest(t, "GET", url).AddTokenAuth(token)
	resp := MakeRequest(t, bearerReq, http.StatusOK)
	assert.Contains(t, resp.Body.String(), "refs/heads/master")
}

Impact

Any Gitea instance exposing Git Smart HTTP is affected when users use PATs or OAuth2 tokens as Bearer tokens. The attacker still needs a token for a user who has normal repository RBAC, so this does not grant access to repositories the token owner could not otherwise access.

The vulnerability breaks the access-token scope boundary. A token intended only for unrelated scopes, such as read:notification, can clone or fetch private repository contents over Git Smart HTTP. The same root cause can affect write flows because git-receive-pack also calls the same repository scope check before normal write RBAC.

Affected versions

Go

PackageVulnerableFixed in
code.gitea.io/gitea
< 1.26.2
1.26.2

How to fix

Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.

code.gitea.io/gitea Go → 1.26.2

go
go get code.gitea.io/gitea@v1.26.2 && go mod tidy

Severity breakdown

CVSS 3.1 8.1

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N

Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Privileges required
Low
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
High
Integrity
High
Availability
None

Weakness

CWE-863: Incorrect Authorization

The product performs an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action, but it does not correctly perform the check.

How to prevent it
  • Architecture and Design: Divide the product into anonymous, normal, privileged, and administrative areas. Reduce the attack surface by carefully mapping roles with data and functionality. Use role-based access control (RBAC) [REF-229] to enforce the roles at the appropriate boundaries. Note that this approach may not protect against horizontal authorization, i.e., it will not protect a user from attacking others with the same role.
  • Architecture and Design: Ensure that access control checks are performed related to the business logic. These checks may be different than the access control checks that are applied to more generic resources such as files, connections, processes, memory, and database records. For example, a database may restrict access for medical records to a specific database user, but each record might only be intended to be accessible to the patient and the patient's doctor [REF-7].
  • Architecture and Design: Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid. For example, consider using authorization frameworks such as the JAAS Authorization Framework [REF-233] and the OWASP ESAPI Access Control feature [REF-45].
  • Architecture and Design: For web applications, make sure that the access control mechanism is enforced correctly at the server side on every page. Users should not be able to access any unauthorized functionality or information by simply requesting direct access to that page. One way to do this is to ensure that all pages containing sensitive information are not cached, and that all such pages restrict access to requests that are accompanied by an active and authenticated session token associated with a user who has the required permissions to access that page.
  • System Configuration, Installation: Use the access control capabilities of your operating system and server environment and define your access control lists accordingly. Use a "default deny" policy when defining these ACLs.

References

Timeline

  1. Published
  2. Last updated by the source
  3. Latest EPSS score
AdvisorySeverityWhy it's related
GHSA-rcr6-4jqh-j84m
Gitea: Remote Code Execution via diffpatch Git Hook Installation
Critical Known exploited Also affects code.gitea.io/gitea
GHSA-fq2p-5p22-8g6j
Gitea: Public-Only Personal access tokens scope bypass in Organization and Permission Endpoints
Medium Also affects code.gitea.io/gitea
GHSA-2wm4-vwp6-v7xc
Gitea: SSRF via Migration Asset Downloads Bypasses hostmatcher — Reads Internal Files and Cloud Metadata
High Also affects code.gitea.io/gitea
GHSA-3r5c-2xxx-h872
Gitea: Webhook Authorization Header Returned in Plaintext via API
Low Also affects code.gitea.io/gitea
GHSA-frpw-3h2q-4jj6
Gitea: Cross-Repo Information Disclosure via Org-Level Actions Run/Job APIs
Medium Also affects code.gitea.io/gitea
GHSA-q423-49rw-g9mh
Gitea: GHSA-8fwc-qjw5-rvgp ClearRepoWatches fix not applied to API EditRepo path — sister code path retains stale watches on public->private
Medium Also affects code.gitea.io/gitea
GHSA-2fcr-jfvc-vgg2
Gitea: Two SSRF findings
High Also affects code.gitea.io/gitea
GHSA-fw57-jgch-pgf3
Gitea: ParseAcceptLanguage quadratic-time DoS via Locale middleware on unauthenticated requests
High Also affects code.gitea.io/gitea
Is this in your code?

MergeHarbor checks every repository's dependencies against this database, ranks what matters by exploitability and reachability, routes it to the owning team and opens the fix pull request.

Check your repos with MergeHarbor