GHSA-cc5p-54x3-hcf8

Duplicate Advisory: Picklescan (scan_pytorch) Bypass via dynamic eval MAGIC_NUMBER

High Withdrawn Jun 18, 2026 PyPI

Severity: 0.0 / 10; High · CVSS 4.0
Exploit chance (EPSS): —; No score published
Known exploited: No; Not in CISA's catalog
Weakness: CWE-95 Improper Neutralization of Directives in Dynamically Evaluated Code ('Eval Injection')
Fix: None yet; No fixed version published

Description

Duplicate Advisory

This advisory has been withdrawn because it is a duplicate of GHSA-97f8-7cmv-76j2. This link is maintained to preserve external references.

Original Description

picklescan before 1.0.3 contains a scanning bypass vulnerability in the scan_pytorch function that allows attackers to embed malicious magic numbers via dynamic eval using the reduce trick. Attackers can craft malicious PyTorch payloads that evade picklescan detection while remaining executable, enabling arbitrary code execution when loaded with torch.load().

Affected versions

PyPI

Package	Vulnerable	Fixed in
picklescan	`all versions`	No fix yet

How to fix

No fixed version has been published yet. Until one is, remove or replace the package, or turn off or isolate the affected feature. This page updates when a fix ships.

Severity breakdown

CVSS 4.0 0.0

CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:P/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X

Attack vector: Network
Attack complexity: Low
Attack requirements: None
Privileges required: None
User interaction: Passive
Confidentiality (vulnerable system): None
Integrity (vulnerable system): High
Availability (vulnerable system): None
Confidentiality (subsequent systems): None
Integrity (subsequent systems): None
Availability (subsequent systems): None
Exploit maturity: Not defined
Scope: X

Weakness

CWE-95: Improper Neutralization of Directives in Dynamically Evaluated Code ('Eval Injection')

The product receives input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes code syntax before using the input in a dynamic evaluation call (e.g. "eval").

How to prevent it

Architecture and Design, Implementation: If possible, refactor your code so that it does not need to use eval() at all.
Implementation: Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does. When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue." Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
Implementation: Inputs should be decoded and canonicalized to the application's current internal representation before being validated (CWE-180, CWE-181). Make sure that your application does not inadvertently decode the same input twice (CWE-174). Such errors could be used to bypass allowlist schemes by introducing dangerous inputs after they have been checked. Use libraries such as the OWASP ESAPI Canonicalization control. Consider performing repeated canonicalization until your input does not change any more. This will avoid double-decoding and similar scenarios, but it might inadvertently modify inputs that are allowed to contain properly-encoded dangerous content.
Implementation: For Python programs, it is frequently encouraged to use the ast.literal_eval() function instead of eval, since it is intentionally designed to avoid executing code. However, an adversary could still cause excessive memory or stack consumption via deeply nested structures [REF-1372], so the python documentation discourages use of ast.literal_eval() on untrusted data [REF-1373].

References

Advisories

nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-53875

Timeline

Jun 17, 2026 Published
Jun 18, 2026 Withdrawn
Sep 10, 2026 Last updated by the source

Advisory	Severity	Why it's related
GHSA-g38g-8gr9-h9xp PickleScan has multiple stdlib modules with direct RCE not in blocklist	Critical	Also affects picklescan
GHSA-vvpj-8cmc-gx39 PickleScan's pkgutil.resolve_name has a universal blocklist bypass	Critical	Also affects picklescan
GHSA-7wx9-6375-f5wh PickleScan's profile.run blocklist mismatch allows exec() bypass	Critical	Also affects picklescan
GHSA-97f8-7cmv-76j2 Picklescan (scan_pytorch) Bypass via dynamic eval MAGIC_NUMBER	High	Also affects picklescan
GHSA-m7j5-r2p5-c39r picklescan vulnerable to arbitrary file create using logging.FileHandler	Medium	Also affects picklescan
GHSA-9m3x-qqw2-h32h picklescan missing detection by simple obfuscation of a `builtins.eval` call	Critical	Also affects picklescan
GHSA-9726-w42j-3qjr picklescan has Arbitrary file read using `io.FileIO`	High	Also affects picklescan
GHSA-46h3-79wf-xr6c Picklescan is vulnerable to RCE via missing detection when calling built-in python _operator.attrgetter	High	Also affects picklescan

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