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GHSA-c647-pxm2-c52w CVE-2023-42443 PYSEC-2023-306

Vyper vulnerable to memory corruption in certain builtins utilizing `msize`

High PyPI
Severity
8.1 / 10
High · CVSS 3.1
Exploit chance (EPSS)
0.83%
Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 57.63% of scored vulnerabilities.
Known exploited
No
Not in CISA's catalog
Weakness
CWE-787 Out-of-bounds Write
Fix
0.3.10
Upgrade vyper to this version or later

Description

Impact

In certain conditions, the memory used by the builtins raw_call, create_from_blueprint and create_copy_of can be corrupted.

  • For raw_call, the argument buffer of the call can be corrupted, leading to incorrect calldata in the sub-context.
  • For create_from_blueprint and create_copy_of, the buffer for the to-be-deployed bytecode can be corrupted, leading to deploying incorrect bytecode.

Below are the conditions that must be fulfilled for the corruption to happen for each builtin:

raw_call

  • memory is not fully initialized, ex. all parameters to an external function live in calldata and
  • The data argument of the builtin is msg.data. and
  • The to, value or gas passed to the builtin is some complex expression that results in writing to uninitialized memory (e.g. calling an internal function)

create_copy_of

  • memory is not fully initialized, ex. all parameters to an external function live in calldata and
  • The value or salt passed to the builtin is some complex expression that results in writing to uninitialized memory (e.g. calling an internal function)

create_from_blueprint

  • memory is not fully initialized, ex. all parameters to an external function live in calldata and
  • Either no constructor parameters are passed to the builtin or raw_args is set to True. and
  • The value or salt passed to the builtin is some complex expression that results in writing to uninitialized memory (e.g. calling an internal function)

Note: When the builtin is being called from an internal function f from a function g, the issue is not present provided that g has written to memory before calling f.

Examples

raw_call

In the following contract, calling bar(1,1) will return:

ae42e95100000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff00000001

instead of:

ae42e95100000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000010000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000001
identity: constant(address) = 0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000004

@external
def foo():
    pass

@internal
@view
def get_address()->address:
    a:uint256 = max_value(uint256) # 0xfff...fff
    return identity
@external
def bar(f:uint256, u:uint256) -> Bytes[100]:
    a: Bytes[100] = raw_call(self.get_address(), msg.data, max_outsize=100)
    return a
create_copy_of

In the following contract, after calling test(), the code deployed at self.created_address does not match the bytecode at target.

created_address: public(address)

@external
def test(target: address) -> address:
    # The expression in salt= is complex and will require to store to memory
    self.created_address = create_copy_of(target, salt = keccak256(_abi_encode(target)))
    return self.created_address
create_from_blueprint

In the following contract, after calling test(), the init bytecode used to create the contract deployed at the address self.created_address will not match the blueprint bytecode stored at target.

created_address: public(address)

salt: constant(bytes32) = keccak256("kebab")

@external
@payable
def test(target: address):
    # The expression in salt= is complex and will require to store to memory
    self.created_address = create_from_blueprint(target, code_offset=0, salt=keccak256(_abi_encode(target)))

Patches

issue tracking in https://github.com/vyperlang/vyper/issues/3609, patched in #3610

Workarounds

The complex expressions that are being passed as kwargs to the builtin should be cached in memory prior to the call to the builtin. For the last example above, it would be:

created_address: public(address)

salt: constant(bytes32) = keccak256("kebab")

@external
@payable
def test(target: address):
    salt: bytes32 = keccak256(_abi_encode(target))
    self.created_address = create_from_blueprint(target, code_offset=0, salt=salt)

References

Are there any links users can visit to find out more?

Affected versions

PyPI

PackageVulnerableFixed in
vyper
>= 0.3.4, < 0.3.10
0.3.10
vyper
< 0.3.10
0.3.10

How to fix

Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.

vyper PyPI → 0.3.10

pip
pip install --upgrade "vyper>=0.3.10"
poetry
poetry add "vyper>=0.3.10"
uv
uv add "vyper>=0.3.10"

Severity breakdown

CVSS 3.1 8.1

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
High
Privileges required
None
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
High
Integrity
High
Availability
High

Weakness

CWE-787: Out-of-bounds Write

The product writes data past the end, or before the beginning, of the intended buffer.

How to prevent it
  • Requirements: Use a language that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid. For example, many languages that perform their own memory management, such as Java and Perl, are not subject to buffer overflows. Other languages, such as Ada and C#, typically provide overflow protection, but the protection can be disabled by the programmer. Be wary that a language's interface to native code may still be subject to overflows, even if the language itself is theoretically safe.
  • Architecture and Design: Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid. Examples include the Safe C String Library (SafeStr) by Messier and Viega [REF-57], and the Strsafe.h library from Microsoft [REF-56]. These libraries provide safer versions of overflow-prone string-handling functions.
  • Operation, Build and Compilation: Use automatic buffer overflow detection mechanisms that are offered by certain compilers or compiler extensions. Examples include: the Microsoft Visual Studio /GS flag, Fedora/Red Hat FORTIFY_SOURCE GCC flag, StackGuard, and ProPolice, which provide various mechanisms including canary-based detection and range/index checking. D3-SFCV (Stack Frame Canary Validation) from D3FEND [REF-1334] discusses canary-based detection in detail.
  • Implementation: Consider adhering to the following rules when allocating and managing an application's memory: Double check that the buffer is as large as specified. When using functions that accept a number of bytes to copy, such as strncpy(), be aware that if the destination buffer size is equal to the source buffer size, it may not NULL-terminate the string. Check buffer boundaries if accessing the buffer in a loop and make sure there is no danger of writing past the allocated space. If necessary, truncate all input strings to a reasonable length before passing them to the copy and concatenation functions.
  • Operation, Build and Compilation: Run or compile the software using features or extensions that randomly arrange the positions of a program's executable and libraries in memory. Because this makes the addresses unpredictable, it can prevent an attacker from reliably jumping to exploitable code. Examples include Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) [REF-58] [REF-60] and Position-Independent Executables (PIE) [REF-64]. Imported modules may be similarly realigned if their default memory addresses conflict with other modules, in a process known as "rebasing" (for Windows) and "prelinking" (for Linux) [REF-1332] using randomly generated addresses. ASLR for libraries cannot be used in conjunction with prelink since it would require relocating the libraries at run-time, defeating the whole purpose of prelinking. For more information on these techniques see D3-SAOR (Segment Address Offset Randomization) from D3FEND [REF-1335].
  • Operation: Use a CPU and operating system that offers Data Execution Protection (using hardware NX or XD bits) or the equivalent techniques that simulate this feature in software, such as PaX [REF-60] [REF-61]. These techniques ensure that any instruction executed is exclusively at a memory address that is part of the code segment. For more information on these techniques see D3-PSEP (Process Segment Execution Prevention) from D3FEND [REF-1336].
  • Implementation: Replace unbounded copy functions with analogous functions that support length arguments, such as strcpy with strncpy. Create these if they are not available.

References

Timeline

  1. Published
  2. Last updated by the source
  3. Latest EPSS score
AdvisorySeverityWhy it's related
GHSA-2r3x-4mrv-mcxf
Vyper: Memory corruption using function calls within tuples / nested calls
Medium Also affects vyper
GHSA-4v7v-gqf9-ww2g
Vyper: Call stack corruption when passing complex type containing non-base type members as argument
Medium Also affects vyper
GHSA-vg88-3v92-rjx2
Vyper: Return inside for loop more than 1 level deep
Low Also affects vyper
GHSA-3vcg-j39x-cwfm
Vyper's `slice()` may elide side-effects when output length is 0
Low Also affects vyper
GHSA-qhr6-mgqr-mchm
Vyper's `concat()` builtin may elide side-effects for zero-length arguments
Low Also affects vyper
GHSA-h33q-mhmp-8p67
Vyper has a double eval in For List Iter
High Also affects vyper
GHSA-4w26-8p97-f4jp
AugAssign evaluation order causing OOB write within the object in Vyper
Critical Also affects vyper
GHSA-2p94-8669-xg86
Vyper's sqrt doesn't define rounding behavior
High Also affects vyper
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