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GHSA-9fqc-9cpr-w73q CVE-2023-0671

froxlor is vulnerable to privilege escalation from customer to root via directory-options

High Packagist
Severity
8.8 / 10
High · CVSS 3.1
Exploit chance (EPSS)
1.12%
Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 66.15% of scored vulnerabilities.
Known exploited
No
Not in CISA's catalog
Weakness
CWE-94 Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection')
Fix
2.0.10
Upgrade froxlor/froxlor to this version or later

Description

Code Injection in GitHub repository froxlor/froxlor prior to 2.0.10.

Affected versions

Packagist

PackageVulnerableFixed in
froxlor/froxlor
< 2.0.10
2.0.10

How to fix

Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.

froxlor/froxlor Packagist → 2.0.10

composer
composer require froxlor/froxlor:^2.0.10

Severity breakdown

CVSS 3.1 8.8

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Privileges required
Low
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
High
Integrity
High
Availability
High

Weakness

CWE-94: Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection')

The product constructs all or part of a code segment using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the syntax or behavior of the intended code segment.

How to prevent it
  • Architecture and Design: Refactor your program so that you do not have to dynamically generate code.
  • Architecture and Design: Run your code in a "jail" or similar sandbox environment that enforces strict boundaries between the process and the operating system. This may effectively restrict which code can be executed by your product. Examples include the Unix chroot jail and AppArmor. In general, managed code may provide some protection. This may not be a feasible solution, and it only limits the impact to the operating system; the rest of your application may still be subject to compromise. Be careful to avoid CWE-243 and other weaknesses related to jails.
  • Implementation: Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does. When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue." Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright. To reduce the likelihood of code injection, use stringent allowlists that limit which constructs are allowed. If you are dynamically constructing code that invokes a function, then verifying that the input is alphanumeric might be insufficient. An attacker might still be able to reference a dangerous function that you did not intend to allow, such as system(), exec(), or exit().
  • Testing: Use dynamic tools and techniques that interact with the product using large test suites with many diverse inputs, such as fuzz testing (fuzzing), robustness testing, and fault injection. The product's operation may slow down, but it should not become unstable, crash, or generate incorrect results.
  • Operation: Run the code in an environment that performs automatic taint propagation and prevents any command execution that uses tainted variables, such as Perl's "-T" switch. This will force the program to perform validation steps that remove the taint, although you must be careful to correctly validate your inputs so that you do not accidentally mark dangerous inputs as untainted (see CWE-183 and CWE-184).
  • Operation: Run the code in an environment that performs automatic taint propagation and prevents any command execution that uses tainted variables, such as Perl's "-T" switch. This will force the program to perform validation steps that remove the taint, although you must be careful to correctly validate your inputs so that you do not accidentally mark dangerous inputs as untainted (see CWE-183 and CWE-184).
  • Implementation: For Python programs, it is frequently encouraged to use the ast.literal_eval() function instead of eval, since it is intentionally designed to avoid executing code. However, an adversary could still cause excessive memory or stack consumption via deeply nested structures [REF-1372], so the python documentation discourages use of ast.literal_eval() on untrusted data [REF-1373].

References

Timeline

  1. Published
  2. Last updated by the source
  3. Latest EPSS score
AdvisorySeverityWhy it's related
GHSA-7788-ghfq-c6mh
Froxlor: Credential and 2FA secret disclosure via Froxlor API endpoints
Critical Also affects froxlor/froxlor
GHSA-xpr4-8vp6-c87j
Froxlor has CSRF Vulnerability in AJAX Endpoint — Missing Cross-Site Request Forgery Protection
Medium Also affects froxlor/froxlor
GHSA-5rw4-4665-cvwf
Froxlor DomainZones.add allows DNS zone-file RR injection via record/type fields
Medium Also affects froxlor/froxlor
GHSA-w27m-rmmf-g5w4
Froxlor: Second-Order SQL Injection via `Admins.add` `ipaddress` Parameter Allows Full Database Exfiltration
High Also affects froxlor/froxlor
GHSA-43gm-9rr3-cx7g
Froxlor: Stored XSS in DNS TXT Record Content Allows Customer-to-Admin Account Takeover
High Also affects froxlor/froxlor
GHSA-q4rm-m6xh-5pv7
Froxlor customer can create MySQL databases on disallowed servers via Mysqls.add API
Medium Also affects froxlor/froxlor
GHSA-mr9h-45p9-fg8h
Froxlor: Authenticated customers can read other customers' allowed sender aliases
Medium Also affects froxlor/froxlor
GHSA-f9rx-7wf7-jr36
Froxlor's API Authentication bypasses 2FA Authentication
High Also affects froxlor/froxlor
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