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GHSA-9cg9-4h4f-j6fg CVE-2025-69200

phpMyFAQ has unauthenticated config backup download via /api/setup/backup

High Packagist
Severity
7.5 / 10
High · CVSS 3.1
Exploit chance (EPSS)
2.14%
Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 82.05% of scored vulnerabilities.
Known exploited
No
Not in CISA's catalog
Weakness
CWE-202 Exposure of Sensitive Information Through Data Queries
Fix
4.0.16
Upgrade thorsten/phpmyfaq to this version or later

Description

Summary

An unauthenticated remote attacker can trigger generation of a configuration backup ZIP via POST /api/setup/backup and then download the generated ZIP from a web-accessible location. The ZIP contains sensitive configuration files (e.g., database.php with database credentials), leading to high-impact information disclosure and potential follow-on compromise.

Details

The endpoint /api/setup/backup is reachable via default rewrite rules and does not enforce authentication/authorization or API token verification. When called with any non-empty body (used as an “installed version” string), the server creates a ZIP archive inside the configuration directory and returns a direct URL to the generated ZIP file.

Relevant code paths:

  • Rewrite rule exposing the endpoint:
    • phpmyfaq/.htaccess: RewriteRule ^api/setup/(check|backup|update-database) api/index.php [L,QSA]
  • Controller implementation:
    • phpmyfaq/src/phpMyFAQ/Controller/Api/SetupController.php → backup()
      • No call to hasValidToken(), userIsAuthenticated(), or any permission check
  • Backup creation:
    • phpmyfaq/src/phpMyFAQ/Setup/Update.php → createConfigBackup()
      • Writes the ZIP into the config directory and returns a public URL under content/core/config/

PoC

Replace BASE_URL with your instance URL.

  1. Trigger config backup generation without authentication:
BASE_URL="http://localhost"
curl -i -X POST "${BASE_URL}/api/setup/backup" \
  -H "Content-Type: text/plain" \
  --data "4.1.0-RC"

Expected result: 200 OK with JSON containing backupFile.

  1. Copy the backupFile URL from the JSON response and download it (still without authentication):
# Example (replace with the exact URL returned in step 1)
curl -i "http://localhost/content/core/config/phpmyfaq-config-backup.YYYY-MM-DD.zip" -o phpmyfaq-config-backup.zip
  1. Verify sensitive content exists in the ZIP:
unzip -l phpmyfaq-config-backup.zip
unzip -p phpmyfaq-config-backup.zip database.php

Observed: database.php is included and contains DB host/user/password.

Impact

  • Vulnerability class: Missing authentication/authorization for a sensitive function + sensitive information exposure.
  • Who is impacted: Any internet-exposed phpMyFAQ installation where the default .htaccess rewrite rules are active and the endpoint is reachable.
  • Security impact: Disclosure of configuration secrets (DB credentials, integration config, etc.), enabling follow-on attacks such as database takeover and data exfiltration.

Affected versions

Packagist

PackageVulnerableFixed in
thorsten/phpmyfaq
< 4.0.16
4.0.16
thorsten/phpmyfaq
>= 4.1.0-alpha, <= 4.1.0-beta.2
No fix yet

How to fix

Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.

thorsten/phpmyfaq Packagist → 4.0.16

composer
composer require thorsten/phpmyfaq:^4.0.16

Severity breakdown

CVSS 3.1 7.5

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N

Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Privileges required
None
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
High
Integrity
None
Availability
None

Weakness

CWE-202: Exposure of Sensitive Information Through Data Queries

When trying to keep information confidential, an attacker can often infer some of the information by using statistics.

How to prevent it
  • Architecture and Design: This is a complex topic. See the [REF-1492] for a good discussion of best practices.

References

Timeline

  1. Published
  2. Last updated by the source
  3. Latest EPSS score
AdvisorySeverityWhy it's related
GHSA-rw77-vq4g-x3hp
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GHSA-8gpw-xvpf-hvx5
phpMyFAQ's two-factor authentication login bypasses the password factor
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GHSA-pgwp-vc7q-cvj3
phpMyFAQ has Stored XSS in Admin FAQ Editor via HTML Entity Bypass in Frontend FAQ Submission
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GHSA-6pvm-2vjj-rx4w
phpMyFAQ: SQL LIKE Wildcard Injection in Chat User Search Allows Authenticated User Enumeration
Medium Also affects thorsten/phpmyfaq
GHSA-mf8r-wm2w-f8c5
phpMyFAQ public FAQ APIs expose inactive FAQ content
Medium Also affects thorsten/phpmyfaq
GHSA-88g4-74f3-63x9
phpMyFAQ has Potential Authenticated Path Traversal in PDF Export
Medium Also affects thorsten/phpmyfaq
GHSA-pg62-f8g4-4wqh
phpMyFAQ privilege escalation: GroupController::updatePermissions lets a GROUP_EDIT admin grant rights they do not hold
High Also affects thorsten/phpmyfaq
GHSA-985r-q3qp-299h
phpMyFAQ has an incomplete fix for GHSA-xvp4-phqj-cjr3 — editUser() and updateUserRights() lack authorization guards
High Also affects thorsten/phpmyfaq
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