GHSA-9cg9-4h4f-j6fg CVE-2025-69200
phpMyFAQ has unauthenticated config backup download via /api/setup/backup
- Severity
- 7.5 / 10
- High · CVSS 3.1
- Exploit chance (EPSS)
- 2.14%
- Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 82.05% of scored vulnerabilities.
- Known exploited
- No
- Not in CISA's catalog
- Weakness
- CWE-202 Exposure of Sensitive Information Through Data Queries
- Fix
4.0.16- Upgrade thorsten/phpmyfaq to this version or later
Description
Summary
An unauthenticated remote attacker can trigger generation of a configuration backup ZIP via POST /api/setup/backup and then download the generated ZIP from a web-accessible location. The ZIP contains sensitive configuration files (e.g., database.php with database credentials), leading to high-impact information disclosure and potential follow-on compromise.
Details
The endpoint /api/setup/backup is reachable via default rewrite rules and does not enforce authentication/authorization or API token verification. When called with any non-empty body (used as an “installed version” string), the server creates a ZIP archive inside the configuration directory and returns a direct URL to the generated ZIP file.
Relevant code paths:
- Rewrite rule exposing the endpoint:
phpmyfaq/.htaccess:RewriteRule ^api/setup/(check|backup|update-database) api/index.php [L,QSA]
- Controller implementation:
phpmyfaq/src/phpMyFAQ/Controller/Api/SetupController.php→backup()- No call to
hasValidToken(),userIsAuthenticated(), or any permission check
- No call to
- Backup creation:
phpmyfaq/src/phpMyFAQ/Setup/Update.php→createConfigBackup()- Writes the ZIP into the config directory and returns a public URL under
content/core/config/
- Writes the ZIP into the config directory and returns a public URL under
PoC
Replace BASE_URL with your instance URL.
- Trigger config backup generation without authentication:
BASE_URL="http://localhost"
curl -i -X POST "${BASE_URL}/api/setup/backup" \
-H "Content-Type: text/plain" \
--data "4.1.0-RC"
Expected result: 200 OK with JSON containing backupFile.
- Copy the
backupFileURL from the JSON response and download it (still without authentication):
# Example (replace with the exact URL returned in step 1)
curl -i "http://localhost/content/core/config/phpmyfaq-config-backup.YYYY-MM-DD.zip" -o phpmyfaq-config-backup.zip
- Verify sensitive content exists in the ZIP:
unzip -l phpmyfaq-config-backup.zip
unzip -p phpmyfaq-config-backup.zip database.php
Observed: database.php is included and contains DB host/user/password.
Impact
- Vulnerability class: Missing authentication/authorization for a sensitive function + sensitive information exposure.
- Who is impacted: Any internet-exposed phpMyFAQ installation where the default
.htaccessrewrite rules are active and the endpoint is reachable. - Security impact: Disclosure of configuration secrets (DB credentials, integration config, etc.), enabling follow-on attacks such as database takeover and data exfiltration.
Affected versions
Packagist
| Package | Vulnerable | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| thorsten/phpmyfaq | < 4.0.16 |
4.0.16 |
| thorsten/phpmyfaq | >= 4.1.0-alpha, <= 4.1.0-beta.2 |
No fix yet |
How to fix
Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.
thorsten/phpmyfaq Packagist → 4.0.16
- composer
composer require thorsten/phpmyfaq:^4.0.16
Severity breakdown
CVSS 3.1 7.5
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Privileges required
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- None
- Availability
- None
Weakness
CWE-202: Exposure of Sensitive Information Through Data Queries
When trying to keep information confidential, an attacker can often infer some of the information by using statistics.
How to prevent it
- Architecture and Design: This is a complex topic. See the [REF-1492] for a good discussion of best practices.
References
Advisories
Packages
Other links
Timeline
- Published
- Last updated by the source
- Latest EPSS score
Related advisories
| Advisory | Severity | Why it's related |
|---|---|---|
| GHSA-rw77-vq4g-x3hp phpMyFAQ has SQL Injection in `StopWords::add()` — Unescaped Stop Word Insertion | High | Also affects thorsten/phpmyfaq |
| GHSA-8gpw-xvpf-hvx5 phpMyFAQ's two-factor authentication login bypasses the password factor | High | Also affects thorsten/phpmyfaq |
| GHSA-pgwp-vc7q-cvj3 phpMyFAQ has Stored XSS in Admin FAQ Editor via HTML Entity Bypass in Frontend FAQ Submission | High | Also affects thorsten/phpmyfaq |
| GHSA-6pvm-2vjj-rx4w phpMyFAQ: SQL LIKE Wildcard Injection in Chat User Search Allows Authenticated User Enumeration | Medium | Also affects thorsten/phpmyfaq |
| GHSA-mf8r-wm2w-f8c5 phpMyFAQ public FAQ APIs expose inactive FAQ content | Medium | Also affects thorsten/phpmyfaq |
| GHSA-88g4-74f3-63x9 phpMyFAQ has Potential Authenticated Path Traversal in PDF Export | Medium | Also affects thorsten/phpmyfaq |
| GHSA-pg62-f8g4-4wqh phpMyFAQ privilege escalation: GroupController::updatePermissions lets a GROUP_EDIT admin grant rights they do not hold | High | Also affects thorsten/phpmyfaq |
| GHSA-985r-q3qp-299h phpMyFAQ has an incomplete fix for GHSA-xvp4-phqj-cjr3 — editUser() and updateUserRights() lack authorization guards | High | Also affects thorsten/phpmyfaq |
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