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GHSA-8p2x-5cpm-qrqw CVE-2026-33690

AVideo vulnerable to IP Address Spoofing via Untrusted HTTP Headers in getRealIpAddr()

Medium Packagist
Severity
5.3 / 10
Medium · CVSS 3.1
Exploit chance (EPSS)
0.18%
Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 7.42% of scored vulnerabilities.
Known exploited
No
Not in CISA's catalog
Weakness
CWE-348 Use of Less Trusted Source
Fix
None yet
No fixed version published

Description

Summary

The getRealIpAddr() function in objects/functions.php trusts user-controlled HTTP headers to determine the client's IP address. An attacker can spoof their IP address by sending forged headers, bypassing any IP-based access controls or audit logging.

Vulnerable Code

File: objects/functions.php

$headers = [
    'HTTP_X_REAL_IP',      
    'HTTP_CLIENT_IP',    
    'HTTP_X_FORWARDED_FOR',
    'REMOTE_ADDR'
];

foreach ($headers as $header) {
    if (!empty($_SERVER[$header])) {
        $ips = explode(',', $_SERVER[$header]);
        foreach ($ips as $ipCandidate) {
            $ipCandidate = trim($ipCandidate);
            if (filter_var($ipCandidate, FILTER_VALIDATE_IP, 
                           FILTER_FLAG_IPV4)) {
                return $ipCandidate; 
            }
        }
    }
}

Attack Scenario

  1. Attacker sends request with forged header:
X-Client-IP: 127.0.0.1

or

X-Real-IP: 192.168.1.1
  1. getRealIpAddr() returns the forged IP
  2. Any IP-based rate limiting, access control, or audit log that relies on this function is bypassed

Proof of Concept

curl -H "X-Client-IP: 127.0.0.1" \
     https://target.com/any_endpoint.php

The server now believes the request came from localhost.

Impact

  • Bypass IP-based rate limiting
  • Bypass IP-based access controls
  • Forge audit log entries
  • Potential privilege escalation if localhost is trusted

Affected versions

Packagist

PackageVulnerableFixed in
wwbn/avideo
<= 26.0
No fix yet

How to fix

No fixed version has been published yet. Until one is, remove or replace the package, or turn off or isolate the affected feature. This page updates when a fix ships.

Severity breakdown

CVSS 3.1 5.3

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N

Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Privileges required
None
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
None
Integrity
Low
Availability
None

Weakness

CWE-348: Use of Less Trusted Source

The product has two different sources of the same data or information, but it uses the source that has less support for verification, is less trusted, or is less resistant to attack.

References

Timeline

  1. Published
  2. Last updated by the source
  3. Latest EPSS score
AdvisorySeverityWhy it's related
GHSA-7cqp-7cfv-6c3q
AVideo Meet plugin: anonymous-to-admin stored XSS via unescaped participant User-Agent in getMeetInfo.json.php Participants panel
Medium Also affects wwbn/avideo
GHSA-wc3f-xc32-435f
AVideo has an incomplete fix of CVE-2026-33482: sanitizeFFmpegCommand still allows a single '&' (background operator), giving OS command execution at the same execAsync sh -c sink
High Also affects wwbn/avideo
GHSA-95jh-7r58-xmxw
AVideo has an Authorize.Net Webhook Signature Bypass that Enables Wallet Balance Inflation via Forged Payment Data
Medium Also affects wwbn/avideo
GHSA-wf69-r4mx-43rr
AVideo Vulnerable to Unauthenticated .env File Exposure via Official Docker Compose Configuration
High Also affects wwbn/avideo
GHSA-8j8m-p79x-g4jm
AVideo's Privilege Escalation via Unguarded Permission Parameters in signUp API Allows Self-Granting Upload/Stream/Meet Permissions
Medium Also affects wwbn/avideo
GHSA-8whc-2wmv-ww35
WWBN AVideo: Unauthenticated Stored DOM Cross-Site Scripting via Per-Client Metadata Broadcast in YPTSocket Plugin
Critical Also affects WWBN/AVideo
GHSA-66q5-cj5g-wrfx
WWBN AVideo: Stored XSS via Hostile YouTube Video Title in AVideo YouTubeAPI Gallery Section
Medium Also affects WWBN/AVideo
GHSA-hgjh-6wj8-gcgf
WWBN AVideo: Unauthenticated Reflected XSS via $_GET['search'] in AVideo YouTubeAPI Gallery Pagination
Medium Also affects WWBN/AVideo
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