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GHSA-8mc5-7w9m-fqv6

Duplicate Advisory: Picklescan is missing detection when calling built-in python idlelib.pyshell.ModifiedInterpreter.runcommand

High Withdrawn Sep 11, 2026 PyPI
Severity
0.0 / 10
High · CVSS 4.0
Exploit chance (EPSS)
—
No score published
Known exploited
No
Not in CISA's catalog
Weakness
CWE-502 Deserialization of Untrusted Data
Fix
0.0.30
Upgrade picklescan to this version or later

Description

Duplicate Advisory

This advisory has been withdrawn because it is a duplicate of GHSA-j343-8v2j-ff7w. This link is maintained to preserve external references.

Original Description

picklescan before 0.0.30 fails to detect malicious pickle files using idlelib.pyshell.ModifiedInterpreter.runcommand in reduce methods. Attackers can embed undetected code in pickle files that executes remote commands when loaded by victims.

Affected versions

PyPI

PackageVulnerableFixed in
picklescan
< 0.0.30
0.0.30

How to fix

Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.

picklescan PyPI → 0.0.30

pip
pip install --upgrade "picklescan>=0.0.30"
poetry
poetry add "picklescan>=0.0.30"
uv
uv add "picklescan>=0.0.30"

Severity breakdown

CVSS 4.0 0.0

CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:P/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Attack requirements
Present
Privileges required
None
User interaction
Passive
Confidentiality (vulnerable system)
High
Integrity (vulnerable system)
High
Availability (vulnerable system)
None
Confidentiality (subsequent systems)
None
Integrity (subsequent systems)
None
Availability (subsequent systems)
None

CVSS 3.1 8.1

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N

Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Privileges required
None
User interaction
Required
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
High
Integrity
High
Availability
None

Weakness

CWE-502: Deserialization of Untrusted Data

The product deserializes untrusted data without sufficiently ensuring that the resulting data will be valid.

How to prevent it
  • Architecture and Design, Implementation: If available, use the signing/sealing features of the programming language to assure that deserialized data has not been tainted. For example, a hash-based message authentication code (HMAC) could be used to ensure that data has not been modified.
  • Implementation: When deserializing data, populate a new object rather than just deserializing. The result is that the data flows through safe input validation and that the functions are safe.
  • Implementation: Explicitly define a final object() to prevent deserialization.
  • Architecture and Design, Implementation: Make fields transient to protect them from deserialization. An attempt to serialize and then deserialize a class containing transient fields will result in NULLs where the transient data should be. This is an excellent way to prevent time, environment-based, or sensitive variables from being carried over and used improperly.
  • Implementation: Avoid having unnecessary types or gadgets (a sequence of instances and method invocations that can self-execute during the deserialization process, often found in libraries) available that can be leveraged for malicious ends. This limits the potential for unintended or unauthorized types and gadgets to be leveraged by the attacker. Add only acceptable classes to an allowlist. Note: new gadgets are constantly being discovered, so this alone is not a sufficient mitigation.
  • Architecture and Design, Implementation: Employ cryptography of the data or code for protection. However, it's important to note that it would still be client-side security. This is risky because if the client is compromised then the security implemented on the client (the cryptography) can be bypassed.
  • Operation: Use an application firewall that can detect attacks against this weakness. It can be beneficial in cases in which the code cannot be fixed (because it is controlled by a third party), as an emergency prevention measure while more comprehensive software assurance measures are applied, or to provide defense in depth [REF-1481].

References

Timeline

  1. Published
  2. Withdrawn
  3. Last updated by the source
AdvisorySeverityWhy it's related
GHSA-g38g-8gr9-h9xp
PickleScan has multiple stdlib modules with direct RCE not in blocklist
Critical Also affects picklescan
GHSA-vvpj-8cmc-gx39
PickleScan's pkgutil.resolve_name has a universal blocklist bypass
Critical Also affects picklescan
GHSA-7wx9-6375-f5wh
PickleScan's profile.run blocklist mismatch allows exec() bypass
Critical Also affects picklescan
GHSA-97f8-7cmv-76j2
Picklescan (scan_pytorch) Bypass via dynamic eval MAGIC_NUMBER
High Also affects picklescan
GHSA-m7j5-r2p5-c39r
picklescan vulnerable to arbitrary file create using logging.FileHandler
Medium Also affects picklescan
GHSA-9m3x-qqw2-h32h
picklescan missing detection by simple obfuscation of a `builtins.eval` call
Critical Also affects picklescan
GHSA-9726-w42j-3qjr
picklescan has Arbitrary file read using `io.FileIO`
High Also affects picklescan
GHSA-46h3-79wf-xr6c
Picklescan is vulnerable to RCE via missing detection when calling built-in python _operator.attrgetter
High Also affects picklescan
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