Skip to content

GHSA-7m55-2hr4-pw78 CVE-2026-5774 GO-2026-5228

Juju: In-Memory Token Store for Discharge Tokens Lacks Concurrency Safety and Persistence

Medium Go
Severity
0.0 / 10
Medium · CVSS 4.0
Exploit chance (EPSS)
0.24%
Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 15.56% of scored vulnerabilities.
Known exploited
No
Not in CISA's catalog
Weakness
CWE-362 Concurrent Execution using Shared Resource with Improper Synchronization ('Race Condition')
Fix
0.0.0-20260408003526-d395054dc2c3
Upgrade github.com/juju/juju to this version or later

Description

Summary

The localLoginHandlers struct in the Juju API server maintains an in-memory map to store discharge tokens following successful local authentication. This map is accessed concurrently from multiple HTTP handler goroutines without any synchronization primitive protecting it. The absence of a mutex or equivalent mechanism means that concurrent reads, writes, and deletes on the map can trigger Go runtime panics and may allow a discharge token to be consumed more than once before deletion completes.

Details

When a user authenticates through the local login flow, a discharge token is generated and stored in a plain map[string]string field named userTokens. The form handler writes to this map when authentication succeeds, and the third-party caveat checker reads from and deletes from the same map when a discharge request arrives. Both code paths execute inside goroutines dispatched by the HTTP server, meaning concurrent requests will access the map simultaneously.

Go's runtime detects concurrent map access and will terminate the process with a fatal error when a write races with another write or read. This makes the API server susceptible to a denial-of-service attack from any authenticated user who can trigger simultaneous discharge requests. Beyond the crash scenario, the read-then-delete sequence in the caveat checker is not atomic. Two goroutines processing the same token concurrently may both pass the existence check before either executes the deletion, allowing a single-use discharge token to be accepted more than once and effectively replaying authentication.

The struct definition that introduces the unsafe field is shown below.

type localLoginHandlers struct {
    authCtxt   *authContext
    userTokens map[string]string
}

The concurrent access originates from the caveat checker calling username, ok := h.userTokens[tokenString] followed by delete(h.userTokens, tokenString) with no lock held, while formHandler concurrently executes h.userTokens[token] = username in a separate goroutine.

PoC

package main

import (
    "net/http"
    "sync"
)

func main() {
    token := "acquired-discharge-token"
    endpoint := "https://target-juju-api:17070/local-login/discharge"

    var wg sync.WaitGroup
    for i := 0; i < 20; i++ {
        wg.Add(1)
        go func() {
            defer wg.Done()
            req, _ := http.NewRequest("GET", endpoint+"?token="+token, nil)
            http.DefaultClient.Do(req)
        }()
    }
    wg.Wait()
}

Impact

Any authenticated user who obtains a valid discharge token can send a burst of concurrent requests to the discharge endpoint. The most reliable outcome is a Go runtime panic caused by concurrent map access, which terminates the Juju API server process and denies service to all connected clients and agents. Under favorable timing conditions the same token may be accepted by multiple goroutines before deletion, bypassing the single-use enforcement and allowing repeated authentication with a token that should have been invalidated after first use.

Affected versions

Go

PackageVulnerableFixed in
github.com/juju/juju
< 0.0.0-20260408003526-d395054dc2c3
0.0.0-20260408003526-d395054dc2c3

How to fix

Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.

github.com/juju/juju Go → 0.0.0-20260408003526-d395054dc2c3

go
go get github.com/juju/juju@v0.0.0-20260408003526-d395054dc2c3 && go mod tidy

Severity breakdown

CVSS 4.0 0.0

CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
High
Attack requirements
Present
Privileges required
Low
User interaction
None
Confidentiality (vulnerable system)
Low
Integrity (vulnerable system)
Low
Availability (vulnerable system)
High
Confidentiality (subsequent systems)
None
Integrity (subsequent systems)
None
Availability (subsequent systems)
None

CVSS 3.1 6.4

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:H

Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
High
Privileges required
Low
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
Low
Integrity
Low
Availability
High

Weakness

CWE-362: Concurrent Execution using Shared Resource with Improper Synchronization ('Race Condition')

The product contains a concurrent code sequence that requires temporary, exclusive access to a shared resource, but a timing window exists in which the shared resource can be modified by another code sequence operating concurrently.

How to prevent it
  • Architecture and Design: In languages that support it, use synchronization primitives. Only wrap these around critical code to minimize the impact on performance.
  • Architecture and Design: Use thread-safe capabilities such as the data access abstraction in Spring.
  • Architecture and Design: Minimize the usage of shared resources in order to remove as much complexity as possible from the control flow and to reduce the likelihood of unexpected conditions occurring. Additionally, this will minimize the amount of synchronization necessary and may even help to reduce the likelihood of a denial of service where an attacker may be able to repeatedly trigger a critical section (CWE-400).
  • Implementation: When using multithreading and operating on shared variables, only use thread-safe functions.
  • Implementation: Use atomic operations on shared variables. Be wary of innocent-looking constructs such as "x++". This may appear atomic at the code layer, but it is actually non-atomic at the instruction layer, since it involves a read, followed by a computation, followed by a write.
  • Implementation: Use a mutex if available, but be sure to avoid related weaknesses such as CWE-412.
  • Implementation: Avoid double-checked locking (CWE-609) and other implementation errors that arise when trying to avoid the overhead of synchronization.
  • Implementation: Disable interrupts or signals over critical parts of the code, but also make sure that the code does not go into a large or infinite loop.
  • Implementation: Use the volatile type modifier for critical variables to avoid unexpected compiler optimization or reordering. This does not necessarily solve the synchronization problem, but it can help.
  • Architecture and Design, Operation: Run your code using the lowest privileges that are required to accomplish the necessary tasks [REF-76]. If possible, create isolated accounts with limited privileges that are only used for a single task. That way, a successful attack will not immediately give the attacker access to the rest of the software or its environment. For example, database applications rarely need to run as the database administrator, especially in day-to-day operations.

References

Timeline

  1. Published
  2. Last updated by the source
  3. Latest EPSS score
AdvisorySeverityWhy it's related
GHSA-w5fq-8965-c969
Juju: CloudSpec method leaking cloud credentials
Medium Also affects github.com/juju/juju
GHSA-245v-p8fj-vwm2
Juju has a resource poisoning vulnerability
Medium Also affects github.com/juju/juju
GHSA-j6f6-jp3p-53mw
Juju: Read All Controller Logs From Compromised Workload
Medium Also affects github.com/juju/juju
GHSA-gvrj-cjch-728p
Juju has Improper TLS Client/Server authentication and certificate verification on Database Cluster
Critical Also affects github.com/juju/juju
GHSA-5cj2-rqqf-hx9p
Juju affected by Confused Deputy IDOR attack via Predictable user specified ID in Juju Secrets
Medium Also affects github.com/juju/juju
GHSA-439w-v2p7-pggc
Juju has unauthorized access to out-of-scope Kubernetes secrets
High Also affects github.com/juju/juju
GHSA-89x7-5m5m-mcmm
Juju has unauthorized update of out-of-scope Vault secrets
Medium Also affects github.com/juju/juju
GHSA-gfgr-6hrj-85ww
Juju affected by timing ownership claim attack on new external back-end secrets
Medium Also affects github.com/juju/juju
Is this in your code?

MergeHarbor checks every repository's dependencies against this database, ranks what matters by exploitability and reachability, routes it to the owning team and opens the fix pull request.

Check your repos with MergeHarbor