GHSA-6vg3-hgrw-p5gf

SurrealDB has an Authorization Bypass via Composite Record-id Paths

Medium crates.io

Severity: 5.4 / 10; Medium · CVSS 3.1
Exploit chance (EPSS): —; No score published
Known exploited: No; Not in CISA's catalog
Weakness: CWE-639 Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key; CWE-863 Incorrect Authorization
Fix: 3.1.0; Upgrade surrealdb to this version or later

Description

An authenticated user could bypass permission rules that gated access on parts of a record's id — most commonly tenant-isolation rules of the form PERMISSIONS FOR select WHERE id.tenant = $auth.id.tenant. The same defect also let UNIQUE constraints defined on parts of an id admit duplicate entries.

When a query referenced part of a composite record id (id.tenant, id.uid, …), SurrealDB read the value from the record's editable body fields instead of from the immutable id key. Because the body is editable but the id is fixed at creation, an attacker with write access could set the body field to any value and have permission checks read that spoofed value.

Impact

What an attacker can do:

Read records hidden by permission rules of the form id.<field> = $auth.<...> (typically tenant- or scope-isolation boundaries) by writing the same-named field on a record they control to the spoofed value.
Cause UNIQUE constraints defined on id.<field> to silently admit duplicate entries, leaving the database with rows that violate the constraint.

What it can't do:

Cross namespace or database isolation boundaries. -Bypass field-level PERMISSIONS FOR update clauses that don't reference id.<field> paths.
Affect availability or crash the server.

Patches

The value-path resolver now special-cases Part::Field and Part::Value against RecordIdKey::Object, reading the named component directly from the id key without ever entering select_document. The Array-keyed special case (id[0], id[1], …) is unchanged.

Versions 3.1.0 and later are not affected.

Workarounds

Users unable to patch are advised to consider the following workarounds:

Avoid permission expressions that read id.<field> on Object-keyed record ids; gate on the full record id (id = $auth.id) or on a server-derived session value instead.
Avoid UNIQUE indexes on id.<field> until 3.1.0; use DEFINE INDEX ... ON FIELDS id UNIQUE (the full id) where possible.

Affected versions

crates.io

Package	Vulnerable	Fixed in
surrealdb	`< 3.1.0`	`3.1.0`

How to fix

Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.

surrealdb crates.io → `3.1.0`

cargo

cargo update -p surrealdb --precise 3.1.0

Severity breakdown

CVSS 3.1 5.4

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N

Attack vector: Network
Attack complexity: Low
Privileges required: Low
User interaction: None
Scope: Unchanged
Confidentiality: Low
Integrity: Low
Availability: None

Weakness

CWE-639: Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key

The system's authorization functionality does not prevent one user from gaining access to another user's data or record by modifying the key value identifying the data.

How to prevent it

Architecture and Design: For each and every data access, ensure that the user has sufficient privilege to access the record that is being requested.
Architecture and Design, Implementation: Make sure that the key that is used in the lookup of a specific user's record is not controllable externally by the user or that any tampering can be detected.
Architecture and Design: Use encryption in order to make it more difficult to guess other legitimate values of the key or associate a digital signature with the key so that the server can verify that there has been no tampering.

CWE-863: Incorrect Authorization

The product performs an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action, but it does not correctly perform the check.

How to prevent it

Architecture and Design: Divide the product into anonymous, normal, privileged, and administrative areas. Reduce the attack surface by carefully mapping roles with data and functionality. Use role-based access control (RBAC) [REF-229] to enforce the roles at the appropriate boundaries. Note that this approach may not protect against horizontal authorization, i.e., it will not protect a user from attacking others with the same role.
Architecture and Design: Ensure that access control checks are performed related to the business logic. These checks may be different than the access control checks that are applied to more generic resources such as files, connections, processes, memory, and database records. For example, a database may restrict access for medical records to a specific database user, but each record might only be intended to be accessible to the patient and the patient's doctor [REF-7].
Architecture and Design: Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid. For example, consider using authorization frameworks such as the JAAS Authorization Framework [REF-233] and the OWASP ESAPI Access Control feature [REF-45].
Architecture and Design: For web applications, make sure that the access control mechanism is enforced correctly at the server side on every page. Users should not be able to access any unauthorized functionality or information by simply requesting direct access to that page. One way to do this is to ensure that all pages containing sensitive information are not cached, and that all such pages restrict access to requests that are accompanied by an active and authenticated session token associated with a user who has the required permissions to access that page.
System Configuration, Installation: Use the access control capabilities of your operating system and server environment and define your access control lists accordingly. Use a "default deny" policy when defining these ACLs.

References

Packages

github.com/surrealdb/surrealdb

Timeline

Jul 1, 2026 Published
Jul 1, 2026 Last updated by the source

Advisory	Severity	Why it's related
GHSA-8rw6-p7m8-63jp SurrealDB: Array element-level (field.*) SELECT permissions leak denied elements to record users	High	Also affects surrealdb
GHSA-848m-r628-vrxw SurrealDB: Custom API route lets authenticated callers override namespace/database scope via URL path	High	Also affects surrealdb
GHSA-m3c3-78fh-w3w7 SurrealDB allows bypass of deny-net flags via DNS resolution	High	Also affects SurrealDB
GHSA-whwg-vh4f-pmmf SurrealDB: Edge PERMISSIONS FOR delete bypassed when a connected node is deleted	Medium	Also affects surrealdb
GHSA-fwg2-gr34-q3w8 SurrealDB: ES512 silently downgraded to ES384 due to jsonwebtoken crate limitation	Medium	Also affects surrealdb
GHSA-c8jx-96c9-8xrp SurrealDB: Field-level SELECT permissions bypassed via indexed COUNT fast paths	Medium	Also affects surrealdb
GHSA-wp87-mgvq-5j93 SurrealDB: USE NS/DB implicit creation bypasses DEFINE authorization	Medium	Also affects surrealdb
GHSA-97vg-427p-8hx5 SurrealDB: Port-specific --deny-net rules silently bypassed on HTTP redirect	Medium	Also affects surrealdb

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