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GHSA-6g9v-7gq3-p2c6 CVE-2026-63748

SurrealDB: Authenticated callers can read fields hidden by field-level SELECT permissions via error messages

Medium crates.io
Severity
5.3 / 10
Medium · CVSS 4.0
Exploit chance (EPSS)
0.33%
Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 25.75% of scored vulnerabilities.
Known exploited
No
Not in CISA's catalog
Weakness
CWE-209 Generation of Error Message Containing Sensitive Information
Fix
3.1.0
Upgrade surrealdb to this version or later

Description

A record user with UPDATE access could read field values that field-level SELECT permissions hid from them. Arithmetic operators and extend embedded the raw operand into their error messages, and UPDATE permission checks evaluate against the unreduced document — so triggering such an error against a hidden field returned its value in the resulting error.

Impact

A record user issues an UPDATE that performs an incompatible operation against a hidden field — e.g. UPDATE person:me SET probe = email + 1 when email is a string — and reads the value from the returned error (Tried to compute "alice@example.com" + 1 …). One field per operation, but the attacker can repeat against any field on any record they can UPDATE.

Patches

A patch has been introduced that replaces the raw operand in every try_* operator and in extend with the operand's type name ("string", "int", "array", etc.).

  • Versions 3.1.0 and later are not affected by this issue.

Workarounds

Affected users who are unable to update should not grant UPDATE permission on records whose field-level SELECT permissions are expected to hide values from the same caller.

Affected versions

crates.io

PackageVulnerableFixed in
surrealdb
< 3.1.0
3.1.0

How to fix

Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.

surrealdb crates.io → 3.1.0

cargo
cargo update -p surrealdb --precise 3.1.0

Severity breakdown

CVSS 4.0 5.3

CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X

Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Attack requirements
None
Privileges required
Low
User interaction
None
Confidentiality (vulnerable system)
Low
Integrity (vulnerable system)
None
Availability (vulnerable system)
None
Confidentiality (subsequent systems)
None
Integrity (subsequent systems)
None
Availability (subsequent systems)
None
Exploit maturity
Not defined
Scope
X

CVSS 3.1 4.3

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N

Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Privileges required
Low
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
Low
Integrity
None
Availability
None

Weakness

CWE-209: Generation of Error Message Containing Sensitive Information

The product generates an error message that includes sensitive information about its environment, users, or associated data.

How to prevent it
  • Implementation: Ensure that error messages only contain minimal details that are useful to the intended audience and no one else. The messages need to strike the balance between being too cryptic (which can confuse users) or being too detailed (which may reveal more than intended). The messages should not reveal the methods that were used to determine the error. Attackers can use detailed information to refine or optimize their original attack, thereby increasing their chances of success. If errors must be captured in some detail, record them in log messages, but consider what could occur if the log messages can be viewed by attackers. Highly sensitive information such as passwords should never be saved to log files. Avoid inconsistent messaging that might accidentally tip off an attacker about internal state, such as whether a user account exists or not.
  • Implementation: Handle exceptions internally and do not display errors containing potentially sensitive information to a user.
  • Implementation: Use naming conventions and strong types to make it easier to spot when sensitive data is being used. When creating structures, objects, or other complex entities, separate the sensitive and non-sensitive data as much as possible.
  • Implementation, Build and Compilation: Debugging information should not make its way into a production release.
  • Implementation, Build and Compilation: Debugging information should not make its way into a production release.
  • System Configuration: Where available, configure the environment to use less verbose error messages. For example, in PHP, disable the display_errors setting during configuration, or at runtime using the error_reporting() function.
  • System Configuration: Create default error pages or messages that do not leak any information.

References

Timeline

  1. Published
  2. Last updated by the source
  3. Latest EPSS score
AdvisorySeverityWhy it's related
GHSA-8rw6-p7m8-63jp
SurrealDB: Array element-level (field.*) SELECT permissions leak denied elements to record users
High Also affects surrealdb
GHSA-848m-r628-vrxw
SurrealDB: Custom API route lets authenticated callers override namespace/database scope via URL path
High Also affects surrealdb
GHSA-m3c3-78fh-w3w7
SurrealDB allows bypass of deny-net flags via DNS resolution
High Also affects SurrealDB
GHSA-whwg-vh4f-pmmf
SurrealDB: Edge PERMISSIONS FOR delete bypassed when a connected node is deleted
Medium Also affects surrealdb
GHSA-fwg2-gr34-q3w8
SurrealDB: ES512 silently downgraded to ES384 due to jsonwebtoken crate limitation
Medium Also affects surrealdb
GHSA-c8jx-96c9-8xrp
SurrealDB: Field-level SELECT permissions bypassed via indexed COUNT fast paths
Medium Also affects surrealdb
GHSA-wp87-mgvq-5j93
SurrealDB: USE NS/DB implicit creation bypasses DEFINE authorization
Medium Also affects surrealdb
GHSA-97vg-427p-8hx5
SurrealDB: Port-specific --deny-net rules silently bypassed on HTTP redirect
Medium Also affects surrealdb
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