GHSA-6g59-gm2v-qhvq CVE-2026-61429 PYSEC-2026-4269
PraisonAI: Crawl4AI/Chromium backend is also affected by the `web_crawl` SSRF validation bypass
- Severity
- 8.4 / 10
- High · CVSS 4.0
- Exploit chance (EPSS)
- 0.27%
- Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 18.95% of scored vulnerabilities.
- Known exploited
- No
- Not in CISA's catalog
- Weakness
- CWE-200 Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor
- CWE-367 Time-of-check Time-of-use (TOCTOU) Race Condition
- CWE-918 Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)
- Fix
1.6.78- Upgrade praisonaiagents to this version or later
Description
Summary
The DNS-rebinding / redirect SSRF bypass in PRAI-05 is not limited to the httpx/urllib backend. When crawl4ai (headless Chromium via Playwright) is installed, web_crawl auto-selects provider=crawl4ai, and the headless browser re-resolves DNS and follows redirects on its own — with no per-connection SSRF guard. Runtime-confirmed read-back of the internal canary via both DNS rebinding and redirect (provider: "crawl4ai"). Status: runtime-confirmed addendum to PRAI-05.
Details
Affected component
- Package
praisonaiagents4.6.63. Backend selected whencrawl4ai+Playwright are installed. - Files:
src/praisonai-agents/praisonaiagents/tools/web_crawl_tools.py(_crawl_with_crawl4ai) andsrc/praisonai-agents/praisonaiagents/tools/crawl4ai_tools.py(standalone crawl wrappers).
Vulnerable code / root cause
Path:
src/praisonai-agents/praisonaiagents/tools/web_crawl_tools.py
Function:
_crawl_with_crawl4ai
Snippet:
async with AsyncWebCrawler() as crawler:
for url in urls:
result = await crawler.arun(url=url) # headless browser: re-resolves DNS, follows redirects
Path:
src/praisonai-agents/praisonaiagents/tools/crawl4ai_tools.py
Function:
Crawl4AITools.crawl / crawl4ai
Snippet:
result = await crawler.arun(url=url, config=config) # no _is_safe_crawl_url / no per-connect validation
Issue: the only SSRF check is the single pre-fetch _is_safe_crawl_url() on the initial URL string in web_crawl() (see PRAI-05). The headless browser then resolves and connects independently and follows redirects in-browser — no resolved-IP pinning, no per-hop/per-connect validation. Input (urls) is attacker/agent-controlled; the sink is crawler.arun(url=...); the guard is bypassed by DNS rebinding (TOCTOU) and by redirects (followed in-browser).
Attack flow / Why bypassed / Security boundary
Identical to PRAI-05: TOCTOU between the guard's resolution and the browser's connection; redirects followed in-browser; internal response returned as crawl content. See PRAI-05.
Proof of Concept
Environment
crawl4ai + Playwright Chromium installed in a dedicated runtime container (127.0.0.1:18081), same controlled internal canary + rebinding DNS. Runnable assets: PraisonAI-Runtime-Repro\runtime-files\ (docker-compose.crawl.yml).
Steps to reproduce
SSRF-04-01-Crawl4AI-DNS-Rebind-Trigger→127.0.0.1:18081:
POST /tool/web_crawl HTTP/1.1
Host: 127.0.0.1:18081
Content-Type: application/json
{"url":"http://rebind.lab:8081/secret"}
- Redirect variant
SSRF-04-03-Crawl4AI-Redirect-Readback:{"url":"http://redirector:8082/redirect-to-internal"}.
Expected result
The crawl backend refuses internal destinations regardless of DNS timing/redirects.
Actual result
HTTP 200, "provider":"crawl4ai", response content contains PRAISONAI_INTERNAL_SECRET_CANARY_7f3a91 + FAKE_INTERNAL_TOKEN_DO_NOT_USE_7f3a91 for both the DNS-rebinding and the redirect payload.
Screenshots
Crawl4AI DNS rebinding read-back
The attacker-controlled rebind.lab URL is accepted by the Crawl4AI-backed web_crawl endpoint. PraisonAI returns the internal canary response body containing PRAISONAI_INTERNAL_SECRET_CANARY_7f3a91.
<img width="1542" height="763" alt="01-Crawl4AI-Burp-Readback" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/a03b3a1c-e382-4f67-8ea6-b766dceb4a69" />
Crawl4AI DNS rebinding runtime evidence
The runtime log shows the Crawl4AI/Chromium backend resolving rebind.lab to an internal Docker IP during the fetch phase. The internal canary receives GET /secret from a headless Chrome user agent.
<img width="1659" height="946" alt="02-Crawl4AI-DNS-Log-And-Internal-Hit" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/d93db090-3e39-43d0-af3b-5d1d8f614db8" />
Crawl4AI redirect read-back
The attacker-controlled redirector URL is accepted by the Crawl4AI-backed endpoint. PraisonAI follows the redirect and returns the internal canary response body.
<img width="1544" height="771" alt="03-Crawl4AI-Redirect-Readback" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/7d05c8aa-5bda-45bc-b94c-bef0bdcf055c" />
Crawl4AI redirect runtime evidence
The controlled redirector returns 302 -> http://internal-canary:8081/secret, and the internal canary receives GET /secret from the Crawl4AI/Chromium backend.
<img width="1590" height="920" alt="04-Crawl4AI-Redirect-Internal-Hit-Log" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/dd9c0fec-3583-43ab-b83c-4470fa6aa409" />
Impact
Same class as PRAI-05: read-back SSRF to internal/metadata services, now on the crawl4ai backend. Broadens the affected surface (the flaw is in the shared validate-without-pinning design, not one backend).
Suggested remediation
Resolve-once + IP-pin + per-connect validation must also cover the crawl4ai backend (constrain the headless browser to the validated IP, or allowlist crawl destinations).
Affected versions
PyPI
| Package | Vulnerable | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| praisonaiagents | < 1.6.78 |
1.6.78 |
How to fix
Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.
praisonaiagents PyPI → 1.6.78
- pip
pip install --upgrade "praisonaiagents>=1.6.78"- poetry
poetry add "praisonaiagents>=1.6.78"- uv
uv add "praisonaiagents>=1.6.78"
Severity breakdown
CVSS 4.0 8.4
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:L/VA:N/SC:H/SI:L/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Attack requirements
- None
- Privileges required
- Low
- User interaction
- None
- Confidentiality (vulnerable system)
- High
- Integrity (vulnerable system)
- Low
- Availability (vulnerable system)
- None
- Confidentiality (subsequent systems)
- High
- Integrity (subsequent systems)
- Low
- Availability (subsequent systems)
- None
- Exploit maturity
- Not defined
- Scope
- X
CVSS 3.1 8.5
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:N
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Privileges required
- Low
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Changed
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- Low
- Availability
- None
Weakness
CWE-200: Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor
The product exposes sensitive information to an actor that is not explicitly authorized to have access to that information.
How to prevent it
- Architecture and Design: Compartmentalize the system to have "safe" areas where trust boundaries can be unambiguously drawn. Do not allow sensitive data to go outside of the trust boundary and always be careful when interfacing with a compartment outside of the safe area. Ensure that appropriate compartmentalization is built into the system design, and the compartmentalization allows for and reinforces privilege separation functionality. Architects and designers should rely on the principle of least privilege to decide the appropriate time to use privileges and the time to drop privileges.
CWE-367: Time-of-check Time-of-use (TOCTOU) Race Condition
The product checks the state of a resource before using that resource, but the resource's state can change between the check and the use in a way that invalidates the results of the check.
How to prevent it
- Implementation: The most basic advice for TOCTOU vulnerabilities is to not perform a check before the use. This does not resolve the underlying issue of the execution of a function on a resource whose state and identity cannot be assured, but it does help to limit the false sense of security given by the check.
- Implementation: When the file being altered is owned by the current user and group, set the effective gid and uid to that of the current user and group when executing this statement.
- Architecture and Design: Limit the interleaving of operations on files from multiple processes.
- Implementation, Architecture and Design: If you cannot perform operations atomically and you must share access to the resource between multiple processes or threads, then try to limit the amount of time (CPU cycles) between the check and use of the resource. This will not fix the problem, but it could make it more difficult for an attack to succeed.
- Implementation: Recheck the resource after the use call to verify that the action was taken appropriately.
- Architecture and Design: Ensure that some environmental locking mechanism can be used to protect resources effectively.
- Implementation: Ensure that locking occurs before the check, as opposed to afterwards, such that the resource, as checked, is the same as it is when in use.
CWE-918: Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)
The web server receives a URL or similar request from an upstream component and retrieves the contents of this URL, but it does not sufficiently ensure that the request is being sent to the expected destination.
References
Advisories
Packages
Other links
Timeline
- Published
- Last updated by the source
- Latest EPSS score
Related advisories
| Advisory | Severity | Why it's related |
|---|---|---|
| GHSA-gxmw-5f7x-6g22 praisonaiagents vulnerable to arbitrary file write via unsanitized `user_id` in `FileMemory.__init__()` — path traversal to any writable location | High | Also affects praisonaiagents |
| GHSA-cfxv-8fw8-rwpv praisonaiagents: ast_grep_rewrite rewrites arbitrary files without the @require_approval gate enforced on every sibling mutation tool | Medium | Also affects praisonaiagents |
| GHSA-x44h-65qv-cw74 praisonaiagents has an SSRF protection bypass in `spider_tools._host_is_blocked()` via DNS-resolved hostnames (`127.0.0.1.nip.io`) | High | Also affects praisonaiagents |
| GHSA-7g3p-92qq-8wvh praisonaiagents: AgentServer declares auth_token but never enforces it on any route | High | Also affects praisonaiagents |
| GHSA-5r34-2g38-6569 praisonaiagents web_crawl vulnerable to SSRF via redirect-following | High | Also affects praisonaiagents |
| GHSA-vg6p-v9vm-6fgj praisonaiagents vulnerable to SSRF in web_crawl tool via redirect-following and DNS rebinding (validate-then-fetch gap) | High | Also affects praisonaiagents |
| GHSA-8hjw-25cg-g52h praisonaiagents has a `web_crawl` SSRF protection bypass via unchecked redirect targets | High | Also affects praisonaiagents |
| GHSA-hxmv-c4g6-5fqc PraisonAI workflow include bypasses tools.py autoload opt-in and executes included recipe code | High | Also affects praisonaiagents |
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