GHSA-69x8-hrgq-fjj8
LiteLLM: Password hash exposure and pass-the-hash authentication bypass
High
PyPI
- Severity
- 0.0 / 10
- High · CVSS 4.0
- Exploit chance (EPSS)
- —
- No score published
- Known exploited
- No
- Not in CISA's catalog
- Weakness
- CWE-200 Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor
- CWE-327 Use of a Broken or Risky Cryptographic Algorithm
- CWE-916 Use of Password Hash With Insufficient Computational Effort
- Fix
1.83.0- Upgrade litellm to this version or later
Description
Impact
Three issues combine into a full authentication bypass chain:
- Weak hashing: User passwords are stored as unsalted SHA-256 hashes, making them vulnerable to rainbow table attacks and trivially identifying users with identical passwords.
- Hash exposure: Multiple API endpoints (/user/info, /user/update, /spend/users) return the password hash field in responses to any authenticated user regardless of role. Plaintext passwords could also potentially be exposed in certain scenarios.
- Pass-the-hash: The /v2/login endpoint accepts the raw SHA-256 hash as a valid password without re-hashing, allowing direct login with a stolen
An already authenticated user can retrieve another user's password hash from the API and use it to log in as that user. This enables full privilege escalation in three HTTP requests.
Patches
Fixed in v1.83.0. Passwords are now hashed with scrypt (random 16-byte salt, n=16384, r=8, p=1). Password hashes are stripped from all API responses. Existing SHA-256 hashes are transparently migrated on next login.
Affected versions
PyPI
| Package | Vulnerable | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| litellm | < 1.83.0 |
1.83.0 |
How to fix
Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.
litellm PyPI → 1.83.0
- pip
pip install --upgrade "litellm>=1.83.0"- poetry
poetry add "litellm>=1.83.0"- uv
uv add "litellm>=1.83.0"
Severity breakdown
CVSS 4.0 0.0
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Attack requirements
- None
- Privileges required
- Low
- User interaction
- None
- Confidentiality (vulnerable system)
- High
- Integrity (vulnerable system)
- High
- Availability (vulnerable system)
- None
- Confidentiality (subsequent systems)
- None
- Integrity (subsequent systems)
- None
- Availability (subsequent systems)
- None
Weakness
CWE-200: Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor
The product exposes sensitive information to an actor that is not explicitly authorized to have access to that information.
How to prevent it
- Architecture and Design: Compartmentalize the system to have "safe" areas where trust boundaries can be unambiguously drawn. Do not allow sensitive data to go outside of the trust boundary and always be careful when interfacing with a compartment outside of the safe area. Ensure that appropriate compartmentalization is built into the system design, and the compartmentalization allows for and reinforces privilege separation functionality. Architects and designers should rely on the principle of least privilege to decide the appropriate time to use privileges and the time to drop privileges.
CWE-327: Use of a Broken or Risky Cryptographic Algorithm
The product uses a broken or risky cryptographic algorithm or protocol.
How to prevent it
- Architecture and Design: When there is a need to store or transmit sensitive data, use strong, up-to-date cryptographic algorithms to encrypt that data. Select a well-vetted algorithm that is currently considered to be strong by experts in the field, and use well-tested implementations. As with all cryptographic mechanisms, the source code should be available for analysis. For example, US government systems require FIPS 140-2 certification [REF-1192]. Do not develop custom or private cryptographic algorithms. They will likely be exposed to attacks that are well-understood by cryptographers. Reverse engineering techniques are mature. If the algorithm can be compromised if attackers find out how it works, then it is especially weak. Periodically ensure that the cryptography has not become obsolete. Some older algorithms, once thought to require a billion years of computing time, can now be broken in days or hours. This includes MD4, MD5, SHA1, DES, and other algorithms that were once regarded as strong. [REF-267]
- Architecture and Design: Ensure that the design allows one cryptographic algorithm to be replaced with another in the next generation or version. Where possible, use wrappers to make the interfaces uniform. This will make it easier to upgrade to stronger algorithms. With hardware, design the product at the Intellectual Property (IP) level so that one cryptographic algorithm can be replaced with another in the next generation of the hardware product.
- Architecture and Design: Carefully manage and protect cryptographic keys (see CWE-320). If the keys can be guessed or stolen, then the strength of the cryptography itself is irrelevant.
- Architecture and Design: Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid [REF-1482]. Industry-standard implementations will save development time and may be more likely to avoid errors that can occur during implementation of cryptographic algorithms. Consider the ESAPI Encryption feature.
- Implementation, Architecture and Design: When using industry-approved techniques, use them correctly. Don't cut corners by skipping resource-intensive steps (CWE-325). These steps are often essential for preventing common attacks.
CWE-916: Use of Password Hash With Insufficient Computational Effort
The product generates a hash for a password, but it uses a scheme that does not provide a sufficient level of computational effort that would make password cracking attacks infeasible or expensive.
How to prevent it
- Architecture and Design: Use an adaptive hash function that can be configured to change the amount of computational effort needed to compute the hash, such as the number of iterations ("stretching") or the amount of memory required. Some hash functions perform salting automatically. These functions can significantly increase the overhead for a brute force attack compared to intentionally-fast functions such as MD5. For example, rainbow table attacks can become infeasible due to the high computing overhead. Finally, since computing power gets faster and cheaper over time, the technique can be reconfigured to increase the workload without forcing an entire replacement of the algorithm in use. Some hash functions that have one or more of these desired properties include bcrypt [REF-291], scrypt [REF-292], and PBKDF2 [REF-293]. While there is active debate about which of these is the most effective, they are all stronger than using salts with hash functions with very little computing overhead. Note that using these functions can have an impact on performance, so they require special consideration to avoid denial-of-service attacks. However, their configurability provides finer control over how much CPU and memory is used, so it could be adjusted to suit the environment's needs.
- Implementation, Architecture and Design: When using industry-approved techniques, use them correctly. Don't cut corners by skipping resource-intensive steps (CWE-325). These steps are often essential for preventing common attacks.
References
Packages
Other links
Timeline
- Published
- Last updated by the source
Related advisories
| Advisory | Severity | Why it's related |
|---|---|---|
| GHSA-7488-6r32-c95q LiteLLM: MCP Authentication Bypass via OAuth2 Passthrough Fallback | High Known exploited | Also affects litellm |
| GHSA-v4p8-mg3p-g94g LiteLLM: Authenticated command execution via MCP stdio test endpoints | High Known exploited | Also affects litellm |
| GHSA-r75f-5x8p-qvmc LiteLLM has SQL Injection in Proxy API key verification | Critical Known exploited | Also affects litellm |
| GHSA-g5ff-637f-6q2m LiteLLM: internal_user_viewer arbitrary local file read via `vertex_ai_credentials` | High | Also affects litellm |
| GHSA-hhww-mrg2-969h LiteLLM vulnerable to reflected XSS in /sso/debug/callback | Medium | Also affects litellm |
| GHSA-7hp6-4w63-5g45 LiteLLM: Privilege Escalation to Proxy Admin via Cross-Domain Reuse of the Salt Key | Critical | Also affects litellm |
| GHSA-hx8v-g79f-8w5f LiteLLM Proxy has server-side request forgery via the `user_config` request parameter | Medium | Also affects litellm |
| GHSA-3cv6-jpf6-8222 LiteLLM: Authenticated SSRF and provider-credential exfiltration via unvalidated request-body routing parameters | Medium | Also affects litellm |
MergeHarbor checks every repository's dependencies against this database, ranks what matters by exploitability and reachability, routes it to the owning team and opens the fix pull request.
Check your repos with MergeHarbor