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GHSA-63wg-wjjj-7cp8 CVE-2026-52829

Zebra Address Book Aborted by IPv4-Mapped Mempool Misbehavior Update

High crates.io
Severity
7.5 / 10
High · CVSS 3.1
Exploit chance (EPSS)
0.61%
Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 49.17% of scored vulnerabilities.
Known exploited
No
Not in CISA's catalog
Weakness
CWE-617 Reachable Assertion
CWE-843 Access of Resource Using Incompatible Type ('Type Confusion')
Fix
Available
2 packages have a fixed version

Description

Am I affected

You are affected if:

  1. You run zebrad up to and including v4.4.1.
  2. Your node listens on the default [::] address on a Linux host (the standard deployment configuration — net.ipv6.bindv6only=0 is the default on all common Linux distributions).
  3. Your node is synced near the chain tip (the expected production state for any node participating in the network).

Summary

An address normalization mismatch between the handshake path and the mempool misbehavior path causes a deterministic assertion panic when a peer connects via IPv4 to a dual-stack IPv6 listener and then triggers a mempool misbehavior penalty.

The handshake path canonicalizes IPv4-mapped IPv6 addresses to plain IPv4 when storing the peer in the address book via MetaAddr::new_connected. The mempool misbehavior path forwards the raw transient socket address (IPv4-mapped IPv6 form) when sending MetaAddrChange::UpdateMisbehavior to the address book. The address book looks up the canonical IPv4 entry but then asserts that the previous entry's address matches the change's address. The mismatch between the canonical IPv4 address and the raw IPv4-mapped IPv6 address triggers the assertion, and panic = "abort" terminates the process.

Details

On Linux with net.ipv6.bindv6only=0, an IPv4 connection accepted by a [::] listener is represented internally as an IPv4-mapped IPv6 socket address (e.g., ::ffff:127.0.0.1:8233). Zebra's canonical_peer_addr helper converts these to plain IPv4 (e.g., 127.0.0.1:8233).

The handshake path uses MetaAddr::new_connected, which canonicalizes the address before storing in the address book. However, inbound inventory registration uses connected_addr.get_transient_addr(), preserving the raw IPv4-mapped form. When the mempool later downloads an invalid transaction from this peer and generates a misbehavior penalty, the raw transient address is forwarded through the misbehavior channel to MetaAddrChange::UpdateMisbehavior, which does not canonicalize.

After the 30-second misbehavior batch flush, AddressBook::update retrieves the canonical IPv4 entry but MetaAddrChange::apply_to_meta_addr asserts that previous.addr == self.addr(), which fails because one is IPv4 and the other is IPv4-mapped IPv6.

The attacker needs only to complete a P2P handshake over IPv4 to a dual-stack listener and advertise an invalid mempool transaction (such as a coinbase transaction). The assertion fires after the 30-second misbehavior batch flush.

Patches

Patched in Zebra 4.5.0. The fix canonicalizes the address in the misbehavior update path via a new MetaAddr::new_misbehavior constructor that applies canonical_peer_addr before creating the UpdateMisbehavior change.

Workarounds

Configuring listen_addr to an IPv4-only address (e.g., 0.0.0.0:8233) avoids the IPv4-mapped IPv6 representation and prevents this specific assertion. Alternatively, setting net.ipv6.bindv6only=1 on Linux prevents dual-stack acceptance.

Impact

A remote unauthenticated peer can deterministically crash any synced Zebra node running the default Linux dual-stack configuration with a single invalid mempool transaction advertisement, followed by a 30-second wait. The attack requires no mining capability, no RPC access, no funds, and no special privileges. The crash can be repeated after each restart, causing persistent downtime. Linux dual-stack sockets and mempool activation are the default production state, not special preconditions.

Credit

Reported by @Haxatron.

Affected versions

crates.io

PackageVulnerableFixed in
zebra-network
< 7.0.0
7.0.0
zebrad
< 4.5.0
4.5.0

How to fix

Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.

zebra-network crates.io → 7.0.0

cargo
cargo update -p zebra-network --precise 7.0.0

zebrad crates.io → 4.5.0

cargo
cargo update -p zebrad --precise 4.5.0

Severity breakdown

CVSS 3.1 7.5

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Privileges required
None
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
None
Integrity
None
Availability
High

Weakness

CWE-617: Reachable Assertion

The product contains an assert() or similar statement that can be triggered by an attacker, which leads to an application exit or other behavior that is more severe than necessary.

How to prevent it
  • Implementation: Make sensitive open/close operation non reachable by directly user-controlled data (e.g. open/close resources)
  • Implementation: Perform input validation on user data.

CWE-843: Access of Resource Using Incompatible Type ('Type Confusion')

The product allocates or initializes a resource such as a pointer, object, or variable using one type, but it later accesses that resource using a type that is incompatible with the original type.

References

Timeline

  1. Published
  2. Last updated by the source
  3. Latest EPSS score
AdvisorySeverityWhy it's related
GHSA-ww9q-8r59-xv46
Zebra: Missing copy constraint in halo2_gadgets variable-base scalar multiplication allows under-constrained base, breaking Orchard Action circuit soundness
Critical Also affects zebrad
GHSA-65jj-fmw8-468q
zebrad has unbounded memory leak in mempool download pipeline via timeout path cancel_handles retention
Medium Also affects zebrad
GHSA-2gf8-q9rr-jq3h
zebrad has persistent on-disk corruption of Sapling/Orchard subtree roots after chain fork via pop_tip
Medium Also affects zebrad
GHSA-hhm7-qrv5-h4r6
Zebra: Repeated Non-Finalized Shielded Transaction Aborts Zebra Before Duplicate-Nullifier Rejection
Medium Also affects zebrad
GHSA-w834-cf6p-9m9w
Zebra: Finalized address balance credit-first overflow on consensus-valid blocks
Medium Also affects zebrad
GHSA-gvjc-3w7c-92jx
Zebra has sync restart poisoning from single unauthenticated peer via above-lookahead block
Medium Also affects zebrad
GHSA-gf9r-m956-97qx
zebrad has consensus divergence via P2SH sigop undercount in pure-Rust disabled-opcode parser
Critical Also affects zebrad
GHSA-4m69-67m6-prqp
Zebra has block suppression via NU5 same-header body poisoning of sent-hash cache
High Also affects zebrad
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