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GHSA-63hf-3vf5-4wqf CVE-2026-34520 PYSEC-2026-2102

AIOHTTP's C parser (llhttp) accepts null bytes and control characters in response header values - header injection/security bypass

Critical PyPI
Severity
0.0 / 10
Critical · CVSS 4.0
Exploit chance (EPSS)
0.48%
Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 41.34% of scored vulnerabilities.
Known exploited
No
Not in CISA's catalog
Weakness
CWE-113 Improper Neutralization of CRLF Sequences in HTTP Headers ('HTTP Request/Response Splitting')
Fix
3.13.4
Upgrade aiohttp to this version or later

Description

Summary

The C parser (the default for most installs) accepted null bytes and control characters in request headers.

Impact

An attacker could send header values that are interpreted differently than expected due to the presence of control characters. For example, request.url.origin() may return a different value than the raw Host header, or what a reverse proxy interpreted it as., potentially resulting in some kind of security bypass.


Patch: https://github.com/aio-libs/aiohttp/commit/9370b9714a7a56003cacd31a9b4ae16eab109ba4

Affected versions

PyPI

PackageVulnerableFixed in
aiohttp
< 3.13.4
3.13.4

How to fix

Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.

aiohttp PyPI → 3.13.4

pip
pip install --upgrade "aiohttp>=3.13.4"
poetry
poetry add "aiohttp>=3.13.4"
uv
uv add "aiohttp>=3.13.4"

Severity breakdown

CVSS 4.0 0.0

CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:U

Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Attack requirements
None
Privileges required
None
User interaction
None
Confidentiality (vulnerable system)
None
Integrity (vulnerable system)
Low
Availability (vulnerable system)
None
Confidentiality (subsequent systems)
None
Integrity (subsequent systems)
None
Availability (subsequent systems)
None
Exploit maturity
Unreported

CVSS 3.1 9.1

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H

Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Privileges required
None
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
None
Integrity
High
Availability
High

Weakness

CWE-113: Improper Neutralization of CRLF Sequences in HTTP Headers ('HTTP Request/Response Splitting')

The product receives data from an HTTP agent/component (e.g., web server, proxy, browser, etc.), but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes CR and LF characters before the data is included in outgoing HTTP headers.

How to prevent it
  • Implementation: Construct HTTP headers very carefully, avoiding the use of non-validated input data.
  • Implementation: Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. If an input does not strictly conform to specifications, reject it or transform it into something that conforms. When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue." Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
  • Implementation: Use and specify an output encoding that can be handled by the downstream component that is reading the output. Common encodings include ISO-8859-1, UTF-7, and UTF-8. When an encoding is not specified, a downstream component may choose a different encoding, either by assuming a default encoding or automatically inferring which encoding is being used, which can be erroneous. When the encodings are inconsistent, the downstream component might treat some character or byte sequences as special, even if they are not special in the original encoding. Attackers might then be able to exploit this discrepancy and conduct injection attacks; they even might be able to bypass protection mechanisms that assume the original encoding is also being used by the downstream component.
  • Implementation: Inputs should be decoded and canonicalized to the application's current internal representation before being validated (CWE-180). Make sure that the application does not decode the same input twice (CWE-174). Such errors could be used to bypass allowlist validation schemes by introducing dangerous inputs after they have been checked.

References

Timeline

  1. Published
  2. Last updated by the source
  3. Latest EPSS score
AdvisorySeverityWhy it's related
GHSA-pqxq-w44r-73xw
AIOHTTP: Pure-Python parser request smuggling
Medium Also affects aiohttp
GHSA-gx76-c99x-2c96
AIOHTTP: Cookie from subdomain can remove Host-Only Scope from existing cookies
Low Also affects aiohttp
GHSA-f9xw-jh8m-3mwq
AIOHTTP: Absolute-form request targets can spoof Request.scheme
Medium Also affects aiohttp
GHSA-9xw5-w5jj-pvcg
AIOHTTP: File descriptor exhaustion in multipart requests
High Also affects aiohttp
GHSA-6cjc-53gc-5rqm
AIOHTTP: Connector pool exhaustion via Max-Age overflow
Medium Also affects aiohttp
GHSA-5wr8-gcqf-gqf3
aiohttp server lacks an initial request/header timeout
High Also affects aiohttp
GHSA-494j-54xm-rwp3
AIOHTTP: Secure attribute not enforced for shared cookie
Medium Also affects aiohttp
GHSA-2g87-pp6c-29x5
aiohttp: Multiple instances of excessive or unbounded memory/CPU use
High Also affects aiohttp
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