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GHSA-5xv2-q475-rwrh CVE-2012-3503

Katello uses hard coded credential

Critical RubyGems
Severity
9.8 / 10
Critical · CVSS 3.1
Exploit chance (EPSS)
3.00%
Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 87.38% of scored vulnerabilities.
Known exploited
No
Not in CISA's catalog
Weakness
CWE-798 Use of Hard-coded Credentials
Fix
1.0.6
Upgrade katello to this version or later

Description

The installation script in Katello 1.0 and earlier does not properly generate the Application.config.secret_token value, which causes each default installation to have the same secret token, and allows remote attackers to authenticate to the CloudForms System Engine web interface as an arbitrary user by creating a cookie using the default secret_token.

Affected versions

RubyGems

PackageVulnerableFixed in
katello
< 1.0.6
1.0.6
katello
>= 1.1.0, < 1.1.7
1.1.7

How to fix

Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.

katello RubyGems → 1.0.6

bundler
bundle update katello # Gemfile: gem "katello", ">= 1.0.6"

Severity breakdown

CVSS 3.1 9.8

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Privileges required
None
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
High
Integrity
High
Availability
High

Weakness

CWE-798: Use of Hard-coded Credentials

The product contains hard-coded credentials, such as a password or cryptographic key.

How to prevent it
  • Architecture and Design: For outbound authentication: store passwords, keys, and other credentials outside of the code in a strongly-protected, encrypted configuration file or database that is protected from access by all outsiders, including other local users on the same system. Properly protect the key (CWE-320). If you cannot use encryption to protect the file, then make sure that the permissions are as restrictive as possible [REF-7]. In Windows environments, the Encrypted File System (EFS) may provide some protection.
  • Architecture and Design: For inbound authentication: Rather than hard-code a default username and password, key, or other authentication credentials for first time logins, utilize a "first login" mode that requires the user to enter a unique strong password or key.
  • Architecture and Design: If the product must contain hard-coded credentials or they cannot be removed, perform access control checks and limit which entities can access the feature that requires the hard-coded credentials. For example, a feature might only be enabled through the system console instead of through a network connection.
  • Architecture and Design: For inbound authentication using passwords: apply strong one-way hashes to passwords and store those hashes in a configuration file or database with appropriate access control. That way, theft of the file/database still requires the attacker to try to crack the password. When handling an incoming password during authentication, take the hash of the password and compare it to the saved hash. Use randomly assigned salts for each separate hash that is generated. This increases the amount of computation that an attacker needs to conduct a brute-force attack, possibly limiting the effectiveness of the rainbow table method.
  • Architecture and Design: For front-end to back-end connections: Three solutions are possible, although none are complete. The first suggestion involves the use of generated passwords or keys that are changed automatically and must be entered at given time intervals by a system administrator. These passwords will be held in memory and only be valid for the time intervals. Next, the passwords or keys should be limited at the back end to only performing actions valid for the front end, as opposed to having full access. Finally, the messages sent should be tagged and checksummed with time sensitive values so as to prevent replay-style attacks.

References

Timeline

  1. Published
  2. Last updated by the source
  3. Latest EPSS score
AdvisorySeverityWhy it's related
GHSA-c43c-rf7g-5xpg
katello: missing repository authorization in content_uploads exposes cross-product content existence
Medium Also affects katello
GHSA-fwj4-6wgp-mpxm
Katello: Denial of Service and potential information disclosure via SQL injection
Medium Also affects katello
GHSA-m4wh-848j-9w2r
Katello cleartext password storage issue
Low Also affects katello
GHSA-527r-mfmj-prqf
Katello SQL Injection vulnerabilities
High Also affects katello
GHSA-mhhc-r88h-2qrm
katello Cross-site Scripting vulnerability
Medium Also affects katello
GHSA-cpv6-pfq6-j2v7
katello Improper Privilege Management vulnerability
Medium Also affects katello
GHSA-jx5v-788g-qw58
katello SQL Injection vulnerability
Medium Also affects katello
PYSEC-2026-3768
openssl_encrypt versions before 1.4.0 contain hardcoded default JWT signing secrets in config.py that pass validation checks.
High Same weakness, CWE-798
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