GHSA-4g5m-c9r5-49xf CVE-2026-59819 PYSEC-2026-3476
LiteLLM: Local file read via request-supplied OIDC file references
Medium
PyPI
- Severity
- 0.0 / 10
- Medium · CVSS 4.0
- Exploit chance (EPSS)
- 0.57%
- Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 47.33% of scored vulnerabilities.
- Known exploited
- No
- Not in CISA's catalog
- Weakness
- CWE-73 External Control of File Name or Path
- Fix
1.83.10- Upgrade litellm to this version or later
Description
Impact
LiteLLM's /health/test_connection endpoint resolved request-supplied environment and OIDC file references in litellm_params. A proxy administrator, or another privileged caller with permission to test model connections, could cause LiteLLM to read files from the local filesystem via an oidc/file/ reference.
Because exploitation requires privileged proxy access, this is treated as a defense-in-depth issue rather than a cross-tenant privilege bypass.
Patches
The issue is fixed in 1.83.10-stable.
LiteLLM recommend upgrading to 1.83.10-stable or later.
Workarounds
Restrict /health/test_connection access to trusted administrators only.
Affected versions
PyPI
How to fix
Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.
litellm PyPI → 1.83.10
- pip
pip install --upgrade "litellm>=1.83.10"- poetry
poetry add "litellm>=1.83.10"- uv
uv add "litellm>=1.83.10"
Severity breakdown
CVSS 4.0 0.0
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:H/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Attack requirements
- Present
- Privileges required
- High
- User interaction
- None
- Confidentiality (vulnerable system)
- Low
- Integrity (vulnerable system)
- None
- Availability (vulnerable system)
- None
- Confidentiality (subsequent systems)
- None
- Integrity (subsequent systems)
- None
- Availability (subsequent systems)
- None
CVSS 3.1 4.9
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Privileges required
- High
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- None
- Availability
- None
Weakness
CWE-73: External Control of File Name or Path
The product allows user input to control or influence paths or file names that are used in filesystem operations.
How to prevent it
- Architecture and Design: When the set of filenames is limited or known, create a mapping from a set of fixed input values (such as numeric IDs) to the actual filenames, and reject all other inputs. For example, ID 1 could map to "inbox.txt" and ID 2 could map to "profile.txt". Features such as the ESAPI AccessReferenceMap provide this capability.
- Architecture and Design, Operation: Run your code in a "jail" or similar sandbox environment that enforces strict boundaries between the process and the operating system. This may effectively restrict all access to files within a particular directory. Examples include the Unix chroot jail and AppArmor. In general, managed code may provide some protection. This may not be a feasible solution, and it only limits the impact to the operating system; the rest of your application may still be subject to compromise. Be careful to avoid CWE-243 and other weaknesses related to jails.
- Architecture and Design: For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
- Implementation: Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does. When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue." Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright. When validating filenames, use stringent allowlists that limit the character set to be used. If feasible, only allow a single "." character in the filename to avoid weaknesses such as CWE-23, and exclude directory separators such as "/" to avoid CWE-36. Use a list of allowable file extensions, which will help to avoid CWE-434. Do not rely exclusively on a filtering mechanism that removes potentially dangerous characters. This is equivalent to a denylist, which may be incomplete (CWE-184). For example, filtering "/" is insufficient protection if the filesystem also supports the use of "\" as a directory separator. Another possible error could occur when the filtering is applied in a way that still produces dangerous data (CWE-182). For example, if "../" sequences are removed from the ".../...//" string in a sequential fashion, two instances of "../" would b
- Implementation: Use a built-in path canonicalization function (such as realpath() in C) that produces the canonical version of the pathname, which effectively removes ".." sequences and symbolic links (CWE-23, CWE-59).
- Installation, Operation: Use OS-level permissions and run as a low-privileged user to limit the scope of any successful attack.
- Operation, Implementation: If you are using PHP, configure your application so that it does not use register_globals. During implementation, develop your application so that it does not rely on this feature, but be wary of implementing a register_globals emulation that is subject to weaknesses such as CWE-95, CWE-621, and similar issues.
- Testing: Use tools and techniques that require manual (human) analysis, such as penetration testing, threat modeling, and interactive tools that allow the tester to record and modify an active session. These may be more effective than strictly automated techniques. This is especially the case with weaknesses that are related to design and business rules.
References
Advisories
Packages
Other links
Timeline
- Published
- Last updated by the source
- Latest EPSS score
Related advisories
| Advisory | Severity | Why it's related |
|---|---|---|
| GHSA-7488-6r32-c95q LiteLLM: MCP Authentication Bypass via OAuth2 Passthrough Fallback | High Known exploited | Also affects litellm |
| GHSA-v4p8-mg3p-g94g LiteLLM: Authenticated command execution via MCP stdio test endpoints | High Known exploited | Also affects litellm |
| GHSA-r75f-5x8p-qvmc LiteLLM has SQL Injection in Proxy API key verification | Critical Known exploited | Also affects litellm |
| GHSA-g5ff-637f-6q2m LiteLLM: internal_user_viewer arbitrary local file read via `vertex_ai_credentials` | High | Also affects litellm |
| GHSA-hhww-mrg2-969h LiteLLM vulnerable to reflected XSS in /sso/debug/callback | Medium | Also affects litellm |
| GHSA-7hp6-4w63-5g45 LiteLLM: Privilege Escalation to Proxy Admin via Cross-Domain Reuse of the Salt Key | Critical | Also affects litellm |
| GHSA-hx8v-g79f-8w5f LiteLLM Proxy has server-side request forgery via the `user_config` request parameter | Medium | Also affects litellm |
| GHSA-3cv6-jpf6-8222 LiteLLM: Authenticated SSRF and provider-credential exfiltration via unvalidated request-body routing parameters | Medium | Also affects litellm |
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