GHSA-49m9-pgww-9vq6 CVE-2026-42236
n8n Vulnerable to Unauthenticated Denial of Service via MCP Client Registration
- Severity
- 0.0 / 10
- High · CVSS 4.0
- Exploit chance (EPSS)
- 0.49%
- Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 41.94% of scored vulnerabilities.
- Known exploited
- No
- Not in CISA's catalog
- Weakness
- CWE-770 Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling
- Fix
1.123.32- Upgrade n8n to this version or later
Description
Impact
The MCP OAuth client registration endpoint accepted unauthenticated requests and stored client data without adequate resource controls. An unauthenticated remote attacker could exhaust server memory resources by sending large registration payloads, rendering the n8n instance unavailable. The MCP enable/disable toggle gates MCP access but did not restrict client registrations, meaning the endpoint is reachable regardless of whether MCP access is enabled on the instance.
The patches address the unbound registration with an upper bound of registered clients and disabling creation when MCP is disabled on the instance. Mean to restrict the payload size of requests already exist and can be used to control additional risks.
Patches
The issue has been fixed in n8n versions 1.123.32, 2.17.4, and 2.18.1. Users should upgrade to one of these versions or later to remediate the vulnerability.
Workarounds
If upgrading is not immediately possible, administrators should consider the following temporary mitigations:
- Restrict network access to the n8n instance to prevent requests from untrusted sources.
- Reduce the maximum accepted payload size by lowering the
N8N_PAYLOAD_SIZE_MAXenvironment variable from its default value.
These workarounds do not fully remediate the risk and should only be used as short-term mitigation measures.
Affected versions
npm
| Package | Vulnerable | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| n8n | < 1.123.32 |
1.123.32 |
| n8n | >= 2.18.0, < 2.18.1 |
2.18.1 |
| n8n | >= 2.0.0, < 2.17.4 |
2.17.4 |
How to fix
Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.
n8n npm → 1.123.32
- npm
npm install n8n@1.123.32- yarn
yarn add n8n@1.123.32- pnpm
pnpm add n8n@1.123.32
Severity breakdown
CVSS 4.0 0.0
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Attack requirements
- None
- Privileges required
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Confidentiality (vulnerable system)
- None
- Integrity (vulnerable system)
- None
- Availability (vulnerable system)
- High
- Confidentiality (subsequent systems)
- None
- Integrity (subsequent systems)
- None
- Availability (subsequent systems)
- None
CVSS 3.1 7.5
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Privileges required
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- None
- Integrity
- None
- Availability
- High
Weakness
CWE-770: Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling
The product allocates a reusable resource or group of resources on behalf of an actor without imposing any intended restrictions on the size or number of resources that can be allocated.
How to prevent it
- Requirements: Clearly specify the minimum and maximum expectations for capabilities, and dictate which behaviors are acceptable when resource allocation reaches limits.
- Architecture and Design: Limit the amount of resources that are accessible to unprivileged users. Set per-user limits for resources. Allow the system administrator to define these limits. Be careful to avoid CWE-410.
- Architecture and Design: Design throttling mechanisms into the system architecture. The best protection is to limit the amount of resources that an unauthorized user can cause to be expended. A strong authentication and access control model will help prevent such attacks from occurring in the first place, and it will help the administrator to identify who is committing the abuse. The login application should be protected against DoS attacks as much as possible. Limiting the database access, perhaps by caching result sets, can help minimize the resources expended. To further limit the potential for a DoS attack, consider tracking the rate of requests received from users and blocking requests that exceed a defined rate threshold.
- Implementation: Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does. When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue." Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
- Architecture and Design: For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
- Architecture and Design: Mitigation of resource exhaustion attacks requires that the target system either: recognizes the attack and denies that user further access for a given amount of time, typically by using increasing time delays uniformly throttles all requests in order to make it more difficult to consume resources more quickly than they can again be freed. The first of these solutions is an issue in itself though, since it may allow attackers to prevent the use of the system by a particular valid user. If the attacker impersonates the valid user, they may be able to prevent the user from accessing the server in question. The second solution can be difficult to effectively institute -- and even when properly done, it does not provide a full solution. It simply requires more resources on the part of the attacker.
- Architecture and Design: Ensure that protocols have specific limits of scale placed on them.
- Architecture and Design, Implementation: If the program must fail, ensure that it fails gracefully (fails closed). There may be a temptation to simply let the program fail poorly in cases such as low memory conditions, but an attacker may be able to assert control before the software has fully exited. Alternately, an uncontrolled failure could cause cascading problems with other downstream components; for example, the program could send a signal to a downstream process so the process immediately knows that a problem has occurred and has a better chance of recovery. Ensure that all failures in resource allocation place the system into a safe posture.
- Operation, Architecture and Design: Use quotas or other resource-limiting settings provided by the operating system or environment. For example, when managing system resources in POSIX, setrlimit() can be used to set limits for certain types of resources, and getrlimit() can determine how many resources are available. However, these functions are not available on all operating systems. When the current levels get close to the maximum that is defined for the application (see CWE-770), then limit the allocation of further resources to privileged users; alternately, begin releasing resources for less-privileged users. While this mitigation may protect the system from attack, it will not necessarily stop attackers from adversely impacting other users. Ensure that the application performs the appropriate error checks and error handling in case resources become unavailable (CWE-703).
References
Advisories
Packages
Other links
Timeline
- Published
- Last updated by the source
- Latest EPSS score
Related advisories
| Advisory | Severity | Why it's related |
|---|---|---|
| GHSA-v98v-ff95-f3cp n8n Vulnerable to Remote Code Execution via Expression Injection | High Known exploited | Also affects n8n |
| GHSA-qgpw-8g46-w95v n8n: Git Node branch.<name>.remote Config Key Bypasses Sandbox Path Restriction, Enabling Local Git Repository Read | Medium | Also affects n8n |
| GHSA-65xw-2v52-jhxc n8n: Cross-User Active Workflow ID and Lifecycle Event Disclosure via Missing userId Filter | Medium | Also affects n8n |
| GHSA-pq6c-vh67-xpm3 n8n: Log Streaming Event Destinations Decrypt Generic-Auth Credentials Without Ownership Check | Medium | Also affects n8n |
| GHSA-cqr2-h44g-v75v n8n: Cross-Tenant Project-Member PII Disclosure via Missing Per-Project Scope Check on Role Assignment Endpoints | Medium | Also affects n8n |
| GHSA-pf83-w3f9-8m37 n8n: Disabled OIDC SSO Endpoints Remain Active and Issue Valid Sessions | Medium | Also affects n8n |
| GHSA-6xcw-7xm6-48c6 n8n: Expression Sandbox Escape via Shared Builtin Tampering and Code-Printer Injection Leads to Code Execution | High | Also affects n8n |
| GHSA-34ff-336r-5q23 n8n: Domain-Restriction Bypass via Unguarded Model-Search Endpoint in OpenAI Chat Model Node | Medium | Also affects n8n |
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