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GHSA-45c6-75p6-83cc CVE-2026-44664

fast-xml-builder Comment Value regex can be bypassed

Medium npm
Severity
6.1 / 10
Medium · CVSS 3.1
Exploit chance (EPSS)
0.19%
Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 9.11% of scored vulnerabilities.
Known exploited
No
Not in CISA's catalog
Weakness
CWE-91 XML Injection (aka Blind XPath Injection)
Fix
1.1.6
Upgrade fast-xml-builder to this version or later

Description

Summary

The fix for https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-gh4j-gqv2-49f6 in fast-xml-parser sanitizes -- sequences in XML comment content using .replace(/--/g, '- -'). This skip the values containing three consecutive dashes (e.g., --->...), allowing an attacker to break out of an XML comment and inject arbitrary XML/HTML content.

Impact

Any application with comment property enabled allow attacker to inject malicious or unwanted code like JS script tag in the XML/HTML output.

Workarounds

Check for the presence of 3 consecutive dashes externally in the property value used for comment tag.

Affected versions

npm

PackageVulnerableFixed in
fast-xml-builder 1 listed versions No fix yet
fast-xml-builder
>= 1.1.5, < 1.1.6
1.1.6

How to fix

Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.

fast-xml-builder npm → 1.1.6

npm
npm install fast-xml-builder@1.1.6
yarn
yarn add fast-xml-builder@1.1.6
pnpm
pnpm add fast-xml-builder@1.1.6

Severity breakdown

CVSS 3.1 6.1

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N

Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Privileges required
None
User interaction
Required
Scope
Changed
Confidentiality
Low
Integrity
Low
Availability
None

Weakness

CWE-91: XML Injection (aka Blind XPath Injection)

The product does not properly neutralize special elements that are used in XML, allowing attackers to modify the syntax, content, or commands of the XML before it is processed by an end system.

How to prevent it
  • Implementation: Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does. When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue." Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.

References

Timeline

  1. Published
  2. Last updated by the source
  3. Latest EPSS score
AdvisorySeverityWhy it's related
GHSA-5wm8-gmm8-39j9
fast-xml-builder allows attribute values with unwanted quotes to bypass malicious or unwanted attributes
High Also affects fast-xml-builder
GHSA-vr34-hp96-76pp
xmldom: requireWellFormed DocType publicId/systemId validation is bypassable via an embedded line terminator
High Same weakness, CWE-91
GHSA-jxjr-3g7g-3944
xmldom: requireWellFormed element/attribute name validation is bypassable via an embedded line terminator
High Same weakness, CWE-91
GHSA-c7q8-3ch8-vqpv
xmldom: Processing Instruction Target Injection Bypasses requireWellFormed
High Same weakness, CWE-91
GHSA-3px3-54cx-rmw9
xmldom: Creation-time XML Name/QName validation is bypassable via an embedded line terminator, allowing injection on the default serialization path
High Same weakness, CWE-91
GHSA-27p8-2357-5qqv
xmldom: DocType `name` Injection Bypasses requireWellFormed
High Same weakness, CWE-91
GHSA-w2rr-34g9-rvrj
xmldom: Element name injection via createElement() bypasses requireWellFormed
High Same weakness, CWE-91
GHSA-4w3w-2rp5-g8jm
xmldom: Attribute name injection via setAttribute() bypasses requireWellFormed
High Same weakness, CWE-91

Credits: amitguptagwl

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