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GHSA-3px3-54cx-rmw9 CVE-2026-83609

xmldom: Creation-time XML Name/QName validation is bypassable via an embedded line terminator, allowing injection on the default serialization path

High npm
Severity
0.0 / 10
High · CVSS 4.0
Exploit chance (EPSS)
0.54%
Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 45.62% of scored vulnerabilities.
Known exploited
No
Not in CISA's catalog
Weakness
CWE-625 Permissive Regular Expression
CWE-91 XML Injection (aka Blind XPath Injection)
Fix
0.9.12
Upgrade @xmldom/xmldom to this version or later

Description

Summary

An embedded line terminator bypasses xmldom's always-on, WHATWG-mandated creation-time name validation. createElementNS, createAttributeNS, createDocumentType, and createAttribute should reject a malformed qualified name with InvalidCharacterError, but a name whose first line is well-formed slips through and enters the DOM. On serialization it is emitted verbatim, so the characters after the line terminator inject markup into the output. The injection reaches the default serialization path, and enabling requireWellFormed does not prevent it.

Details

createElementNS, createAttributeNS, and createDocumentType route through validateQualifiedName, and createAttribute performs the analogous check; each validates the name with g.QName_exact.test(name). QName_exact = reg('^', QName, '$') inherits the m flag from xmldom's shared regexp builder, so the matcher accepts any name whose first line is a valid QName and leaves the remaining lines unconstrained (see Root Cause).

Root Cause

  1. A shared regexp builder compiles anchored productions with the m flag.
  2. ^…$ under m are line anchors, not string anchors.
  3. validateQualifiedName / createAttribute validate with .test() against such a production, so a line terminator followed by breakout markup passes and the malformed name is stored.

The triggering line terminators are the ECMAScript LineTerminator set: U+000A, U+000D, U+2028, U+2029.

Proof of Concept

const { DOMImplementation, XMLSerializer } = require('@xmldom/xmldom');
const impl = new DOMImplementation();

const doc = impl.createDocument('urn:x', 'root', null);
const el = doc.createElementNS('urn:x', 'a\n><script>x</script');  // ACCEPTED (no throw)
doc.documentElement.appendChild(el);

// DEFAULT serialization — requireWellFormed NOT set:
console.log(new XMLSerializer().serializeToString(doc));
// Observed: <root xmlns="urn:x"><a
// ><script>x</script/></root>          <-- injected element on the default path
// Control: createElementNS('urn:x', 'bad>name') throws InvalidCharacterError, confirming the check is
// active and specifically bypassed by the line terminator.

Impact

  • Bypass of the always-on WHATWG creation-time name validation (InvalidCharacterError): a malformed name the standard requires be rejected at creation is instead admitted to the DOM.
  • Markup / structure injection. An application relying on the create* APIs to reject malformed names (the standard behavior) as a trust boundary is exposed; where the serialized output reaches an HTML context, downstream XSS.
  • No serializer option mitigates it. The admitted name is emitted verbatim under both the default path and requireWellFormed: true — the strict serializer shares the same m-flagged blind spot (the subject of the sibling serializer advisories) — so the bypassed creation-time check was the only layer that could have stopped it. Demonstrated for all four create* sites in poc_creation_strict_serialization_bypass.cjs.

Fix Applied

createElementNS, createAttributeNS, createDocumentType, and createAttribute now reject a name containing a line terminator with InvalidCharacterError — the same result they already give for other malformed names — because name validation now applies to the whole string. The requireWellFormed serializer's name checks are corrected by the same change. The fix is non-breaking: such a name was already invalid, and no previously-accepted well-formed name is affected.

Affected versions

npm

PackageVulnerableFixed in
@xmldom/xmldom
>= 0.9.0, < 0.9.12
0.9.12

How to fix

Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.

@xmldom/xmldom npm → 0.9.12

npm
npm install @xmldom/xmldom@0.9.12
yarn
yarn add @xmldom/xmldom@0.9.12
pnpm
pnpm add @xmldom/xmldom@0.9.12

Severity breakdown

CVSS 4.0 0.0

CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Attack requirements
None
Privileges required
None
User interaction
None
Confidentiality (vulnerable system)
None
Integrity (vulnerable system)
High
Availability (vulnerable system)
None
Confidentiality (subsequent systems)
None
Integrity (subsequent systems)
None
Availability (subsequent systems)
None

Weakness

CWE-625: Permissive Regular Expression

The product uses a regular expression that does not sufficiently restrict the set of allowed values.

How to prevent it
  • Implementation: When applicable, ensure that the regular expression marks beginning and ending string patterns, such as "/^string$/" for Perl.

CWE-91: XML Injection (aka Blind XPath Injection)

The product does not properly neutralize special elements that are used in XML, allowing attackers to modify the syntax, content, or commands of the XML before it is processed by an end system.

How to prevent it
  • Implementation: Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does. When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue." Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.

References

Timeline

  1. Published
  2. Last updated by the source
  3. Latest EPSS score
AdvisorySeverityWhy it's related
GHSA-x4fp-j954-r2f4
xmldom: End-tag Whitespace-Trim Regex ReDoS — quadratic backtracking in the 0.8.x end-tag parser
High Also affects @xmldom/xmldom
GHSA-vr34-hp96-76pp
xmldom: requireWellFormed DocType publicId/systemId validation is bypassable via an embedded line terminator
High Also affects @xmldom/xmldom
GHSA-jxjr-3g7g-3944
xmldom: requireWellFormed element/attribute name validation is bypassable via an embedded line terminator
High Also affects @xmldom/xmldom
GHSA-c7q8-3ch8-vqpv
xmldom: Processing Instruction Target Injection Bypasses requireWellFormed
High Also affects @xmldom/xmldom
GHSA-965w-775f-mr7g
xmldom: Quadratic-memory consumption
High Also affects @xmldom/xmldom
GHSA-93r5-fhx6-vmg9
xmldom: Quadratic-time parsing via the malformed-input recovery path — `parseElementStartPart` re-scan and `normalize()` adjacent-text merge
High Also affects @xmldom/xmldom
GHSA-8344-3jmq-59r6
xmldom: Quadratic-time attribute deduplication
High Also affects @xmldom/xmldom
GHSA-6mj3-qw4j-hgrw
xmldom: HTML raw-text closing-tag case mismatch causes output amplification
High Also affects @xmldom/xmldom
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