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GHSA-4565-r4x7-hg8j CVE-2026-52804 GO-2026-5110

Gogs Vulnerable to Privilege Escalation via Collaboration Access Mode Validation

Medium Go
Severity
0.0 / 10
Medium · CVSS 4.0
Exploit chance (EPSS)
0.50%
Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 42.80% of scored vulnerabilities.
Known exploited
No
Not in CISA's catalog
Weakness
CWE-193 Off-by-one Error
Fix
0.14.3
Upgrade gogs.io/gogs to this version or later

Description

Summary

A repository admin collaborator can escalate their privileges to owner-level access by exploiting an off-by-one error in the ChangeCollaborationAccessMode function.

Vulnerable Code

In internal/database/repo_collaboration.go, line 129:

func (r *Repository) ChangeCollaborationAccessMode(userID int64, mode AccessMode) error {
    // Discard invalid input
    if mode <= AccessModeNone || mode > AccessModeOwner {
        return nil
    }

AccessModeOwner has value 4. The check mode > AccessModeOwner evaluates to 4 > 4 = false, allowing AccessModeOwner to pass through. The correct check should be mode >= AccessModeOwner.

The web route at internal/route/repo/setting.go:413-416 takes the mode as a raw integer from query parameters:

func ChangeCollaborationAccessMode(c *context.Context) {
    if err := c.Repo.Repository.ChangeCollaborationAccessMode(
        c.QueryInt64("uid"),
        database.AccessMode(c.QueryInt("mode"))); err != nil {

This allows an admin collaborator to POST mode=4 and escalate to owner.

Impact

A repository admin collaborator (AccessModeAdmin = 3) can escalate to owner-level access (AccessModeOwner = 4), gaining the ability to:

  • Delete the repository
  • Transfer repository ownership to another user
  • Erase wiki data
  • Perform all other owner-only operations

The access table is also updated (line 181), so the escalated permissions persist across sessions.

Contrast

The API route at internal/route/api/v1/repo_collaborators.go:46 uses ParseAccessMode() which only returns Read, Write, or Admin - never Owner. The API endpoint is not affected.

Steps to Reproduce

  1. User A creates a private repository
  2. User A adds User B as a collaborator with Admin access (mode=3)
  3. User B logs in and navigates to the repository settings collaboration page
  4. User B sends a POST request:
    POST /{owner}/{repo}/settings/collaboration/access_mode?uid={B_uid}&mode=4
    
  5. User B now has Owner access - the "Danger Zone" section appears with "Delete This Repository" and "Transfer Ownership" buttons

Suggested Fix

Change the validation in internal/database/repo_collaboration.go line 129 from:

if mode <= AccessModeNone || mode > AccessModeOwner {

to:

if mode <= AccessModeNone || mode >= AccessModeOwner {

Affected versions

Go

PackageVulnerableFixed in
gogs.io/gogs
< 0.14.3
0.14.3
gogs.io/gogs
all versions
No fix yet

How to fix

Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.

gogs.io/gogs Go → 0.14.3

go
go get gogs.io/gogs@v0.14.3 && go mod tidy

Severity breakdown

CVSS 4.0 0.0

CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P

Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Attack requirements
None
Privileges required
High
User interaction
None
Confidentiality (vulnerable system)
None
Integrity (vulnerable system)
High
Availability (vulnerable system)
High
Confidentiality (subsequent systems)
None
Integrity (subsequent systems)
None
Availability (subsequent systems)
None
Exploit maturity
Proof of concept

Weakness

CWE-193: Off-by-one Error

A product calculates or uses an incorrect maximum or minimum value that is 1 more, or 1 less, than the correct value.

How to prevent it
  • Implementation: When copying character arrays or using character manipulation methods, the correct size parameter must be used to account for the null terminator that needs to be added at the end of the array. Some examples of functions susceptible to this weakness in C include strcpy(), strncpy(), strcat(), strncat(), printf(), sprintf(), scanf() and sscanf().

References

Timeline

  1. Published
  2. Last updated by the source
  3. Latest EPSS score
AdvisorySeverityWhy it's related
GHSA-mq8m-42gh-wq7r
Gogs vulnerable to a bypass of CVE-2024-55947
High Known exploited Also affects gogs.io/gogs
GHSA-3w28-36p9-w929
Gogs's Unauthenticated Jupyter Notebook (ipynb) Sanitizer allows arbitrary data: URIs leading to XSS
Medium Also affects gogs.io/gogs
GHSA-744x-3838-5r56
Gogs Vulnerable to Unauthenticated Organization Teams Information Disclosure via API
Medium Also affects gogs.io/gogs
GHSA-xp79-5mx3-jx52
Gogs has Unauthenticated Asymmetric Denial of Service (DoS) via SSH Handshake Stall (File Descriptor Exhaustion)
Medium Also affects gogs.io/gogs
GHSA-c39w-43gm-34h5
Gogs has Path Traversal in organization name that results in RCE through Git hooks
Critical Also affects gogs.io/gogs
GHSA-6p9m-q3jp-47h4
Gogs: LFS dedupe path leaks private repo content across tenants
High Also affects gogs.io/gogs
GHSA-89mr-xqfv-758m
Gogs: UploadRepoFiles writes outside repo working tree via committed parent sym
Critical Also affects gogs.io/gogs
GHSA-wmfg-5p4h-5fw3
Gogs allows users to write to readonly repositories using receive-pack + service=git-upload-pack confusion
High Also affects gogs.io/gogs
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