GHSA-443g-gwgp-49x4 CVE-2026-104436
zebrad vulnerable to getblocks/getheaders locator CPU amplification via uncapped vector length
- Severity
- 6.3 / 10
- Medium · CVSS 4.0
- Exploit chance (EPSS)
- 0.27%
- Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 19.72% of scored vulnerabilities.
- Known exploited
- No
- Not in CISA's catalog
- Weakness
- CWE-770 Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling
- Fix
- Available
- 2 packages have a fixed version
Description
Am I affected
You are affected if:
- You run
zebradup to and includingv4.4.1. - Your node accepts inbound P2P connections.
Summary
The read_getblocks and read_getheaders codec paths accepted block locator vectors up to approximately 65,535 entries (the generic TrustedPreallocate ceiling derived from MAX_PROTOCOL_MESSAGE_LEN), rather than the protocol-specification limit of 101 entries (matching zcashd's MAX_LOCATOR_SZ). Each entry in the locator vector triggers a per-hash chain lookup (HashMap::contains_key + RocksDB::contains_hash) in find_chain_intersection on a tokio blocking-pool thread.
A single maximally-sized getblocks message occupies one blocking-pool thread for approximately 10–65ms. Under sustained load from multiple peers, this can degrade state-read performance for block validation, RPC, and mempool lookups.
Details
The read_headers codec path already implements the correct pattern: it reads the CompactSize count, validates against MAX_HEADERS_PER_MESSAGE = 160 before deserialization, and rejects oversized messages. The read_getblocks and read_getheaders paths were missing this pre-deserialization count check and instead relied on the generic block::Hash::max_allocation() bound, which allows (MAX_PROTOCOL_MESSAGE_LEN - 1) / 32 = 65,535 hashes.
A legitimate block locator is logarithmic in chain length (approximately 30 hashes for the current ~3M-block Zcash chain). Zebra's own send-side cap is MAX_FIND_BLOCK_HASHES_RESULTS = 500.
The practical impact requires significant attacker bandwidth (approximately 2 MiB per request) and multiple Sybil peers to meaningfully degrade the blocking pool, which limits real-world exploitability.
Patches
Patched in Zebra 4.4.2. The fix caps block::Hash::max_allocation() at MAX_BLOCK_LOCATOR_LENGTH = 101, matching zcashd's MAX_LOCATOR_SZ. This causes the deserializer to reject oversized locators before any allocation or iteration occurs.
Workarounds
No specific workaround is needed. Existing backpressure mechanisms (load shedding, sequential per-peer message processing, connection limits) constrain the practical impact.
Impact
Under sustained load from multiple Sybil peers, oversized locator vectors can occupy blocking-pool threads and degrade state-read performance. The effect is bounded by connection limits and requires significant attacker bandwidth.
Credit
Vulnerability identified by @dingledropper, who submitted the fix in PR #10570. Downstream CPU/blocking-pool impact analysis contributed by @ouicate.
Affected versions
crates.io
| Package | Vulnerable | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| zebra-chain | < 8.0.0 |
8.0.0 |
| zebrad | < 4.5.0 |
4.5.0 |
How to fix
Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.
zebra-chain crates.io → 8.0.0
- cargo
cargo update -p zebra-chain --precise 8.0.0
zebrad crates.io → 4.5.0
- cargo
cargo update -p zebrad --precise 4.5.0
Severity breakdown
CVSS 4.0 6.3
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- High
- Attack requirements
- Present
- Privileges required
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Confidentiality (vulnerable system)
- None
- Integrity (vulnerable system)
- None
- Availability (vulnerable system)
- Low
- Confidentiality (subsequent systems)
- None
- Integrity (subsequent systems)
- None
- Availability (subsequent systems)
- None
- Exploit maturity
- Not defined
- Scope
- X
CVSS 3.1 3.7
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- High
- Privileges required
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- None
- Integrity
- None
- Availability
- Low
Weakness
CWE-770: Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling
The product allocates a reusable resource or group of resources on behalf of an actor without imposing any intended restrictions on the size or number of resources that can be allocated.
How to prevent it
- Requirements: Clearly specify the minimum and maximum expectations for capabilities, and dictate which behaviors are acceptable when resource allocation reaches limits.
- Architecture and Design: Limit the amount of resources that are accessible to unprivileged users. Set per-user limits for resources. Allow the system administrator to define these limits. Be careful to avoid CWE-410.
- Architecture and Design: Design throttling mechanisms into the system architecture. The best protection is to limit the amount of resources that an unauthorized user can cause to be expended. A strong authentication and access control model will help prevent such attacks from occurring in the first place, and it will help the administrator to identify who is committing the abuse. The login application should be protected against DoS attacks as much as possible. Limiting the database access, perhaps by caching result sets, can help minimize the resources expended. To further limit the potential for a DoS attack, consider tracking the rate of requests received from users and blocking requests that exceed a defined rate threshold.
- Implementation: Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does. When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue." Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
- Architecture and Design: For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
- Architecture and Design: Mitigation of resource exhaustion attacks requires that the target system either: recognizes the attack and denies that user further access for a given amount of time, typically by using increasing time delays uniformly throttles all requests in order to make it more difficult to consume resources more quickly than they can again be freed. The first of these solutions is an issue in itself though, since it may allow attackers to prevent the use of the system by a particular valid user. If the attacker impersonates the valid user, they may be able to prevent the user from accessing the server in question. The second solution can be difficult to effectively institute -- and even when properly done, it does not provide a full solution. It simply requires more resources on the part of the attacker.
- Architecture and Design: Ensure that protocols have specific limits of scale placed on them.
- Architecture and Design, Implementation: If the program must fail, ensure that it fails gracefully (fails closed). There may be a temptation to simply let the program fail poorly in cases such as low memory conditions, but an attacker may be able to assert control before the software has fully exited. Alternately, an uncontrolled failure could cause cascading problems with other downstream components; for example, the program could send a signal to a downstream process so the process immediately knows that a problem has occurred and has a better chance of recovery. Ensure that all failures in resource allocation place the system into a safe posture.
- Operation, Architecture and Design: Use quotas or other resource-limiting settings provided by the operating system or environment. For example, when managing system resources in POSIX, setrlimit() can be used to set limits for certain types of resources, and getrlimit() can determine how many resources are available. However, these functions are not available on all operating systems. When the current levels get close to the maximum that is defined for the application (see CWE-770), then limit the allocation of further resources to privileged users; alternately, begin releasing resources for less-privileged users. While this mitigation may protect the system from attack, it will not necessarily stop attackers from adversely impacting other users. Ensure that the application performs the appropriate error checks and error handling in case resources become unavailable (CWE-703).
References
Packages
Other links
Timeline
- Published
- Last updated by the source
- Latest EPSS score
Related advisories
| Advisory | Severity | Why it's related |
|---|---|---|
| GHSA-ww9q-8r59-xv46 Zebra: Missing copy constraint in halo2_gadgets variable-base scalar multiplication allows under-constrained base, breaking Orchard Action circuit soundness | Critical | Also affects zebrad |
| GHSA-63wg-wjjj-7cp8 Zebra Address Book Aborted by IPv4-Mapped Mempool Misbehavior Update | High | Also affects zebrad |
| GHSA-65jj-fmw8-468q zebrad has unbounded memory leak in mempool download pipeline via timeout path cancel_handles retention | Medium | Also affects zebrad |
| GHSA-2gf8-q9rr-jq3h zebrad has persistent on-disk corruption of Sapling/Orchard subtree roots after chain fork via pop_tip | Medium | Also affects zebrad |
| GHSA-hhm7-qrv5-h4r6 Zebra: Repeated Non-Finalized Shielded Transaction Aborts Zebra Before Duplicate-Nullifier Rejection | Medium | Also affects zebrad |
| GHSA-w834-cf6p-9m9w Zebra: Finalized address balance credit-first overflow on consensus-valid blocks | Medium | Also affects zebrad |
| GHSA-gvjc-3w7c-92jx Zebra has sync restart poisoning from single unauthenticated peer via above-lookahead block | Medium | Also affects zebrad |
| GHSA-gf9r-m956-97qx zebrad has consensus divergence via P2SH sigop undercount in pure-Rust disabled-opcode parser | Critical | Also affects zebrad |
MergeHarbor checks every repository's dependencies against this database, ranks what matters by exploitability and reachability, routes it to the owning team and opens the fix pull request.
Check your repos with MergeHarbor