GHSA-3qq3-668m-v9mj CVE-2025-64719 GO-2026-5098

Gogs has a Denial of Service in repository/wiki file listing web pages

Medium Go

Severity: 4.9 / 10; Medium · CVSS 3.1
Exploit chance (EPSS): 0.44%; Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 38.28% of scored vulnerabilities.
Known exploited: No; Not in CISA's catalog
Weakness: CWE-20 Improper Input Validation
Fix: 0.14.3; Upgrade gogs.io/gogs to this version or later

Description

Summary

A malicious user with rights to create a new file on a repository or wiki page can trigger a denial of service condition in which the pages containing the listing of files will return HTTP error 500 and render the web interface unusable for the repository or wiki.

Details

The issue is present in file internal/route/repo/wiki.go and internal/route/repo/view.go where the pages try to recover commit information. If errors are returned while recovering commit information, the page will return a 500 error and stop rendering, resulting in a denial of service. In view.go the issue occurs at line 56 while a slightly different issue occurs in wiki.go at line 174 where commits[0] is dereferenced without checking if it contains value. It is possible to trigger issues in assigning the correct value to variable commits by using a specific string as part of the page title. The issue is linked to the fact that file names can contain special characters such as *, ?, [, ], etc. that will be interpreted as git's pathspec instead of a simple string. So crafting a name containing an incomplete pathspec sequence will trigger this error.

PoC

As a proof of concept consider the file name "[] and how it affects repository and wiki pages. In the following images it is shown how pages are created, the error shown in the web page right after creation and the error as logged in the console.

Figure 1: Creation of malicious file in repository

Figure 2: Malicious file in repository causes error 500

Figure 3: Console error caused by malicious file in repository

Figure 4: Creation of malicious file in wiki

Figure 5: Malicious file in wiki causes error 500

Figure 6: Console error caused by malicious file in wiki

Impact

The repository and wiki pages will not render when files named with the payload are present in the repository or in the wiki. This condition will be present as long as the malicious file is present in the repository or wiki. The issue will not cause a DoS condition when using the server via CLI.

Affected versions

Go

Package	Vulnerable	Fixed in
gogs.io/gogs	`< 0.14.3`	`0.14.3`
gogs.io/gogs	`all versions`	No fix yet

How to fix

Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.

gogs.io/gogs Go → `0.14.3`

go

go get gogs.io/gogs@v0.14.3 && go mod tidy

Severity breakdown

CVSS 3.1 4.9

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

Attack vector: Network
Attack complexity: Low
Privileges required: High
User interaction: None
Scope: Unchanged
Confidentiality: None
Integrity: None
Availability: High

Weakness

CWE-20: Improper Input Validation

The product receives input or data, but it does not validate or incorrectly validates that the input has the properties that are required to process the data safely and correctly.

How to prevent it

Architecture and Design: Consider using language-theoretic security (LangSec) techniques that characterize inputs using a formal language and build "recognizers" for that language. This effectively requires parsing to be a distinct layer that effectively enforces a boundary between raw input and internal data representations, instead of allowing parser code to be scattered throughout the program, where it could be subject to errors or inconsistencies that create weaknesses. [REF-1109] [REF-1110] [REF-1111]
Architecture and Design: Use an input validation framework such as Struts or the OWASP ESAPI Validation API. Note that using a framework does not automatically address all input validation problems; be mindful of weaknesses that could arise from misusing the framework itself (CWE-1173).
Architecture and Design, Implementation: Understand all the potential areas where untrusted inputs can enter the product, including but not limited to: parameters or arguments, cookies, anything read from the network, environment variables, reverse DNS lookups, query results, request headers, URL components, e-mail, files, filenames, databases, and any external systems that provide data to the application. Remember that such inputs may be obtained indirectly through API calls.
Implementation: Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does. When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue." Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
Architecture and Design: For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server. Even though client-side checks provide minimal benefits with respect to server-side security, they are still useful. First, they can support intrusion detection. If the server receives input that should have been rejected by the client, then it may be an indication of an attack. Second, client-side error-checking can provide helpful feedback to the user about the expectations for valid input. Third, there may be a reduction in server-side processing time for accidental input errors, although this is typically a small savings.
Implementation: When your application combines data from multiple sources, perform the validation after the sources have been combined. The individual data elements may pass the validation step but violate the intended restrictions after they have been combined.
Implementation: Be especially careful to validate all input when invoking code that crosses language boundaries, such as from an interpreted language to native code. This could create an unexpected interaction between the language boundaries. Ensure that you are not violating any of the expectations of the language with which you are interfacing. For example, even though Java may not be susceptible to buffer overflows, providing a large argument in a call to native code might trigger an overflow.
Implementation: Directly convert your input type into the expected data type, such as using a conversion function that translates a string into a number. After converting to the expected data type, ensure that the input's values fall within the expected range of allowable values and that multi-field consistencies are maintained.
Implementation: Inputs should be decoded and canonicalized to the application's current internal representation before being validated (CWE-180, CWE-181). Make sure that your application does not inadvertently decode the same input twice (CWE-174). Such errors could be used to bypass allowlist schemes by introducing dangerous inputs after they have been checked. Use libraries such as the OWASP ESAPI Canonicalization control. Consider performing repeated canonicalization until your input does not change any more. This will avoid double-decoding and similar scenarios, but it might inadvertently modify inputs that are allowed to contain properly-encoded dangerous content.
Implementation: When exchanging data between components, ensure that both components are using the same character encoding. Ensure that the proper encoding is applied at each interface. Explicitly set the encoding you are using whenever the protocol allows you to do so.

References

Advisories

nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-64719

Packages

github.com/gogs/gogs

Timeline

Jun 22, 2026 Published
Oct 12, 2026 Last updated by the source
Oct 31, 2026 Latest EPSS score

Advisory	Severity	Why it's related
GHSA-mq8m-42gh-wq7r Gogs vulnerable to a bypass of CVE-2024-55947	High Known exploited	Also affects gogs.io/gogs
GHSA-3w28-36p9-w929 Gogs's Unauthenticated Jupyter Notebook (ipynb) Sanitizer allows arbitrary data: URIs leading to XSS	Medium	Also affects gogs.io/gogs
GHSA-744x-3838-5r56 Gogs Vulnerable to Unauthenticated Organization Teams Information Disclosure via API	Medium	Also affects gogs.io/gogs
GHSA-xp79-5mx3-jx52 Gogs has Unauthenticated Asymmetric Denial of Service (DoS) via SSH Handshake Stall (File Descriptor Exhaustion)	Medium	Also affects gogs.io/gogs
GHSA-c39w-43gm-34h5 Gogs has Path Traversal in organization name that results in RCE through Git hooks	Critical	Also affects gogs.io/gogs
GHSA-6p9m-q3jp-47h4 Gogs: LFS dedupe path leaks private repo content across tenants	High	Also affects gogs.io/gogs
GHSA-89mr-xqfv-758m Gogs: UploadRepoFiles writes outside repo working tree via committed parent sym	Critical	Also affects gogs.io/gogs
GHSA-wmfg-5p4h-5fw3 Gogs allows users to write to readonly repositories using receive-pack + service=git-upload-pack confusion	High	Also affects gogs.io/gogs

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