GHSA-3hpf-ff72-j67p
shared_preferences_android vulnerability
- Severity
- 3.0 / 10
- Low · CVSS 3.1
- Exploit chance (EPSS)
- —
- No score published
- Known exploited
- No
- Not in CISA's catalog
- Weakness
- CWE-502 Deserialization of Untrusted Data
- Fix
2.3.4- Upgrade shared_preferences_android to this version or later
Description
Impact
Due to some data types not being natively representable for the available storage options, shared_preferences_android serializes and deserializes special string prefixes to store these unrepresentable data types. This allows arbitrary classes to be deserialized leading to arbitrary code execution.
As a result, Files containing the preferences can be overwritten with a malicious one with a deserialization payload that triggers as soon as the data is loaded from the disk.
Patches
2.3.4
Workarounds
Update to the latest version of shared_preferences_android that contains the changes to address this vulnerability.
References
TBD
For more information
See our community page to find ways to contact the team.
Thanks
Thank you so much to Oskar Zeino-Mahmalat from sonarsource for finding and reporting this issue!
Affected versions
Pub
| Package | Vulnerable | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| shared_preferences_android | >= 2.3.3, < 2.3.4 |
2.3.4 |
How to fix
Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.
shared_preferences_android Pub → 2.3.4
- dart
dart pub add shared_preferences_android:^2.3.4
Severity breakdown
CVSS 3.1 3.0
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L
- Attack vector
- Local
- Attack complexity
- High
- Privileges required
- High
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- None
- Integrity
- Low
- Availability
- Low
Weakness
CWE-502: Deserialization of Untrusted Data
The product deserializes untrusted data without sufficiently ensuring that the resulting data will be valid.
How to prevent it
- Architecture and Design, Implementation: If available, use the signing/sealing features of the programming language to assure that deserialized data has not been tainted. For example, a hash-based message authentication code (HMAC) could be used to ensure that data has not been modified.
- Implementation: When deserializing data, populate a new object rather than just deserializing. The result is that the data flows through safe input validation and that the functions are safe.
- Implementation: Explicitly define a final object() to prevent deserialization.
- Architecture and Design, Implementation: Make fields transient to protect them from deserialization. An attempt to serialize and then deserialize a class containing transient fields will result in NULLs where the transient data should be. This is an excellent way to prevent time, environment-based, or sensitive variables from being carried over and used improperly.
- Implementation: Avoid having unnecessary types or gadgets (a sequence of instances and method invocations that can self-execute during the deserialization process, often found in libraries) available that can be leveraged for malicious ends. This limits the potential for unintended or unauthorized types and gadgets to be leveraged by the attacker. Add only acceptable classes to an allowlist. Note: new gadgets are constantly being discovered, so this alone is not a sufficient mitigation.
- Architecture and Design, Implementation: Employ cryptography of the data or code for protection. However, it's important to note that it would still be client-side security. This is risky because if the client is compromised then the security implemented on the client (the cryptography) can be bypassed.
- Operation: Use an application firewall that can detect attacks against this weakness. It can be beneficial in cases in which the code cannot be fixed (because it is controlled by a third party), as an emergency prevention measure while more comprehensive software assurance measures are applied, or to provide defense in depth [REF-1481].
References
Packages
Other links
Timeline
- Published
Related advisories
| Advisory | Severity | Why it's related |
|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-110879 jackson-databind validates the outer class of a class-name type ID but accepts attacker-selected classes inside its generic arguments, even when those classes… | Critical | Same weakness, CWE-502 |
| GHSA-6757-hggm-hp2w vLLM: Public multimodal SHM handle forgery reaches worker-side `pickle.loads()` with insecure serialization disabled | High | Same weakness, CWE-502 |
| GHSA-673q-mjm6-r5xr Next.js: Unauthenticated Remote Code Execution in `use cache` functions returning typed arrays | Critical | Same weakness, CWE-502 |
| GHSA-c27m-942f-rcfh Microsoft Security Advisory CVE-2026-87697 - .NET and Visual Studio Remote Code Execution Vulnerability | High | Same weakness, CWE-502 |
| GHSA-4w5f-7jp2-w48g Microsoft Security Advisory CVE-2026-83520 - .NET and Visual Studio Remote Code Execution Vulnerability | High | Same weakness, CWE-502 |
| GHSA-4j9v-h7pp-725h Microsoft Security Advisory CVE-2026-70035 - .NET and Visual Studio Remote Code Execution Vulnerability | High | Same weakness, CWE-502 |
| GHSA-gqvg-gmmx-x4hm MLFLOW_ALLOW_PICKLE_DESERIALIZATION=False safety control bypassed by mlflow.statsmodels flavor — RCE via crafted model artifact | High | Same weakness, CWE-502 |
| GHSA-gx83-3vf8-gh7j jackson-databind: Comparable missing from DefaultBaseTypeLimitingValidator's unsafe base types (incomplete PolymorphicTypeValidator denylist) | Medium | Same weakness, CWE-502 |
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