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GHSA-3hhc-qp5v-9p2j CVE-2022-32224

Active Record RCE bug with Serialized Columns

Critical RubyGems
Severity
9.8 / 10
Critical · CVSS 3.1
Exploit chance (EPSS)
2.60%
Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 85.36% of scored vulnerabilities.
Known exploited
No
Not in CISA's catalog
Weakness
CWE-502 Deserialization of Untrusted Data
Fix
7.0.3.1
Upgrade activerecord to this version or later

Description

When serialized columns that use YAML (the default) are deserialized, Rails uses YAML.unsafe_load to convert the YAML data in to Ruby objects. If an attacker can manipulate data in the database (via means like SQL injection), then it may be possible for the attacker to escalate to an RCE.

There are no feasible workarounds for this issue, but other coders (such as JSON) are not impacted.

Affected versions

RubyGems

PackageVulnerableFixed in
activerecord
>= 7.0.0, < 7.0.3.1
7.0.3.1
activerecord
>= 6.1.0, < 6.1.6.1
6.1.6.1
activerecord
>= 6.0.0, < 6.0.5.1
6.0.5.1
activerecord
< 5.2.8.1
5.2.8.1

How to fix

Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.

activerecord RubyGems → 7.0.3.1

bundler
bundle update activerecord # Gemfile: gem "activerecord", ">= 7.0.3.1"

Severity breakdown

CVSS 3.1 9.8

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Privileges required
None
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
High
Integrity
High
Availability
High

Weakness

CWE-502: Deserialization of Untrusted Data

The product deserializes untrusted data without sufficiently ensuring that the resulting data will be valid.

How to prevent it
  • Architecture and Design, Implementation: If available, use the signing/sealing features of the programming language to assure that deserialized data has not been tainted. For example, a hash-based message authentication code (HMAC) could be used to ensure that data has not been modified.
  • Implementation: When deserializing data, populate a new object rather than just deserializing. The result is that the data flows through safe input validation and that the functions are safe.
  • Implementation: Explicitly define a final object() to prevent deserialization.
  • Architecture and Design, Implementation: Make fields transient to protect them from deserialization. An attempt to serialize and then deserialize a class containing transient fields will result in NULLs where the transient data should be. This is an excellent way to prevent time, environment-based, or sensitive variables from being carried over and used improperly.
  • Implementation: Avoid having unnecessary types or gadgets (a sequence of instances and method invocations that can self-execute during the deserialization process, often found in libraries) available that can be leveraged for malicious ends. This limits the potential for unintended or unauthorized types and gadgets to be leveraged by the attacker. Add only acceptable classes to an allowlist. Note: new gadgets are constantly being discovered, so this alone is not a sufficient mitigation.
  • Architecture and Design, Implementation: Employ cryptography of the data or code for protection. However, it's important to note that it would still be client-side security. This is risky because if the client is compromised then the security implemented on the client (the cryptography) can be bypassed.
  • Operation: Use an application firewall that can detect attacks against this weakness. It can be beneficial in cases in which the code cannot be fixed (because it is controlled by a third party), as an emergency prevention measure while more comprehensive software assurance measures are applied, or to provide defense in depth [REF-1481].

References

Timeline

  1. Published
  2. Last updated by the source
  3. Latest EPSS score
AdvisorySeverityWhy it's related
GHSA-76r7-hhxj-r776
Active Record logging vulnerable to ANSI escape injection
Medium Also affects activerecord
GHSA-579w-22j4-4749
Denial of Service Vulnerability in ActiveRecord's PostgreSQL adapter
High Also affects activerecord
GHSA-hq7p-j377-6v63
SQL Injection Vulnerability via ActiveRecord comments
High Also affects activerecord
GHSA-f57c-hx33-hvh8
Active Record component in Ruby on Rails has a data-type injection vulnerability
Critical Also affects activerecord
GHSA-8hc4-xxm3-5ppp
Active Record subject to Regular Expression Denial-of-Service (ReDoS)
High Also affects activerecord
GHSA-xf96-32q2-9rw2
Rails ActiveRecord gem vulnerable to SQL injection
High Also affects activerecord
GHSA-jmm9-2p29-vh2w
activerecord vulnerable to SQL Injection
High Also affects activerecord
GHSA-h6w6-xmqv-7q78
activerecord vulnerable to SQL Injection
High Also affects activerecord
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