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GHSA-3g33-6vg6-27m8 CVE-2026-46614 GO-2026-5082

Fission router exposes /fission-function/<ns>/<name> on its public listener, allowing invocation of any function without an HTTPTrigger

Critical Go
Severity
9.8 / 10
Critical · CVSS 3.1
Exploit chance (EPSS)
0.35%
Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 28.98% of scored vulnerabilities.
Known exploited
No
Not in CISA's catalog
Weakness
CWE-284 Improper Access Control
CWE-862 Missing Authorization
Fix
1.23.0
Upgrade github.com/fission/fission to this version or later

Description

Summary

The Fission router registers an internal-style route — /fission-function/<name> and /fission-function/<ns>/<name> — for every Function object, independent of whether any HTTPTrigger exists for that function. The route was mounted on the same listener as user-defined HTTPTriggers (svc/router, port 8888), so any caller who could reach the router could invoke any function by guessing its metadata.name (and namespace), bypassing the host / path / method / method-allow-list restrictions encoded in HTTPTrigger objects.

Affected component

  • pkg/router/httpTriggers.go:280-284 — internalRoute registration via utils.UrlForFunction(fn.Name, fn.Namespace), bound to the function handler.

Impact

An external caller who reaches the public router could:

  1. Invoke functions that the operator intentionally did not publish through an HTTPTrigger (e.g. functions used only as Kubewatcher / Timer / MessageQueue trigger targets, internal helpers, or sample functions).
  2. Bypass HTTPTrigger-level restrictions: a function published only on POST /api/v2/foo could still be invoked as GET /fission-function/<ns>/<name> with arbitrary headers and body.
  3. Enumerate function names by probing the response semantics (404 vs 200 vs 502 from cold start).

In multi-tenant deployments this also crosses tenant boundaries when functions in tenant namespace B are reachable from tenant A's pods (or from anywhere on the internet if the router is ingress-exposed).

Root cause

/fission-function/... was historically used by internal trigger sources (timer, kubewatcher, mqtrigger) that share the cluster network with the router, but the route was registered on the public listener that also serves user HTTPTriggers. The two audiences were never separated.

Fix

Released in v1.23.0:

  • PR #3369 (commit 814d232c): the router now runs two listeners — a public listener (port 8888, svc/router) that serves only user-defined HTTPTriggers, /router-healthz, and /_version, and an internal listener (port 8889, svc/router-internal, ClusterIP-only) that exclusively serves /fission-function/<ns>/<name>. The internal listener is wrapped with the pkg/auth/hmac.ServiceVerifier using the ServiceRouterInternal derived key — internal trigger sources sign their requests with a per-service HKDF-derived key from a cluster master secret. Empty master secret falls back to pass-through (preserves compatibility for clusters not yet rotating in a secret).
  • PR #3365 (commit 0aa24788): added per-service NetworkPolicy resources to charts/fission-all, ensuring svc/router-internal is only reachable from kubewatcher, timer, mqtrigger, and mqt-keda pods inside the release namespace.
  • The internal-listener path itself is still /fission-function/<ns>/<name> — only its location moved.

Mitigation (until upgrade)

  1. Apply a NetworkPolicy to the Fission namespace that allows ingress to svc/router (port 8888) only from the consuming project's ingress controller, and blocks /fission-function/... at the ingress layer (path-based filter on the ingress).
  2. Avoid exposing the router directly via LoadBalancer/NodePort; front it with an ingress that path-filters /fission-function/.
  3. Treat function metadata.name as not a secret — names should not be the access control boundary.

Affected versions

Go

PackageVulnerableFixed in
github.com/fission/fission
< 1.23.0
1.23.0

How to fix

Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.

github.com/fission/fission Go → 1.23.0

go
go get github.com/fission/fission@v1.23.0 && go mod tidy

Severity breakdown

CVSS 3.1 9.8

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Privileges required
None
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
High
Integrity
High
Availability
High

Weakness

CWE-284: Improper Access Control

The product does not restrict or incorrectly restricts access to a resource from an unauthorized actor.

How to prevent it
  • Architecture and Design, Operation: Very carefully manage the setting, management, and handling of privileges. Explicitly manage trust zones in the software.
  • Architecture and Design: Compartmentalize the system to have "safe" areas where trust boundaries can be unambiguously drawn. Do not allow sensitive data to go outside of the trust boundary and always be careful when interfacing with a compartment outside of the safe area. Ensure that appropriate compartmentalization is built into the system design, and the compartmentalization allows for and reinforces privilege separation functionality. Architects and designers should rely on the principle of least privilege to decide the appropriate time to use privileges and the time to drop privileges.

CWE-862: Missing Authorization

The product does not perform an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action.

How to prevent it
  • Architecture and Design: Divide the product into anonymous, normal, privileged, and administrative areas. Reduce the attack surface by carefully mapping roles with data and functionality. Use role-based access control (RBAC) [REF-229] to enforce the roles at the appropriate boundaries. Note that this approach may not protect against horizontal authorization, i.e., it will not protect a user from attacking others with the same role.
  • Architecture and Design: Ensure that access control checks are performed related to the business logic. These checks may be different than the access control checks that are applied to more generic resources such as files, connections, processes, memory, and database records. For example, a database may restrict access for medical records to a specific database user, but each record might only be intended to be accessible to the patient and the patient's doctor [REF-7].
  • Architecture and Design: Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid. For example, consider using authorization frameworks such as the JAAS Authorization Framework [REF-233] and the OWASP ESAPI Access Control feature [REF-45].
  • Architecture and Design: For web applications, make sure that the access control mechanism is enforced correctly at the server side on every page. Users should not be able to access any unauthorized functionality or information by simply requesting direct access to that page. One way to do this is to ensure that all pages containing sensitive information are not cached, and that all such pages restrict access to requests that are accompanied by an active and authenticated session token associated with a user who has the required permissions to access that page.
  • System Configuration, Installation: Use the access control capabilities of your operating system and server environment and define your access control lists accordingly. Use a "default deny" policy when defining these ACLs.

References

Timeline

  1. Published
  2. Last updated by the source
  3. Latest EPSS score
AdvisorySeverityWhy it's related
GHSA-7m8x-qg2j-4m3v
Fission: MessageQueueTrigger scaler manager materializes Secret values into Deployment envvars and accepts arbitrary user PodSpec
High Also affects github.com/fission/fission
GHSA-qf5v-m7p4-95rp
Fission: Incomplete capability denylist in Environment/Function PodSpec validation allows tenant-added CAP_SYS_TIME and cross-tenant node wall-clock corruption
High Also affects github.com/fission/fission
GHSA-vchh-r53j-8mpw
Fission: HTTPTrigger admission omits RelativeURL / Prefix validation; kubectl apply bypasses CLI checks
Medium Also affects github.com/fission/fission
GHSA-r5jh-q2mw-gcx4
Fission: SanitizeFilePath lexical HasPrefix bypass permits sibling-directory escape
Low Also affects github.com/fission/fission
GHSA-q6vm-xqc9-v3ff
Fission: Zip Slip in pkg/utils/zip.go:Unarchive allows fetcher to write outside the destination directory
High Also affects github.com/fission/fission
GHSA-m63v-2g9w-2w6v
Fission: Environment Runtime.Container and Builder.Container SecurityContext bypass allows privileged pod creation
Critical Also affects github.com/fission/fission
GHSA-8wcj-mfrc-jx5q
Fission builder pods auto-mount the fission-builder ServiceAccount token in the user-supplied builder container
Medium Also affects github.com/fission/fission
GHSA-gx55-f84r-v3r7
Fission Environment CRD podspec passthrough enables hostPID/hostNetwork/privileged pods, node escape
Critical Also affects github.com/fission/fission
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