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EEF-CVE-2026-73829 CVE-2026-73829 GHSA-w8j7-7qc3-5f24

Non-atomic hash-credential dedup in mpp Tempo allows replay of a confirmed payment under a concurrent race

Low Hex
Severity
0.0 / 10
Low · CVSS 4.0
Exploit chance (EPSS)
0.32%
Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 25.32% of scored vulnerabilities.
Known exploited
No
Not in CISA's catalog
Weakness
CWE-367 Time-of-check Time-of-use (TOCTOU) Race Condition
Fix
0.6.1
Upgrade mpp to this version or later

Description

Summary

Time-of-check Time-of-use (TOCTOU) Race Condition in ZenHive mpp allows an unauthenticated remote client to redeem one confirmed on-chain payment for multiple paid-resource accesses.

The type="hash" credential path in MPP.Methods.Tempo.verify/2 guards against replay with a non-atomic check-then-mark sequence: check_hash_unused/2 reads the dedup store, an eth_getTransactionReceipt round trip verifies the payment on chain, and only then does mark_hash_used/2 write the mark. Concurrent requests carrying the same settled payment hash all pass the read before any of them writes, so each is issued a receipt. The store's atomic check_and_mark/2 primitive is available and used by the type="transaction" path, but the hash path calls plain get and put even when the configured store implements it. Exploitation requires a dedup store to be configured; the default nil store is stateless and documented as offering no replay protection at all.

This issue affects mpp: from 0.2.0 before 0.6.1.

Configurations

The race is only reachable when MPP.Methods.Tempo is configured with a dedup store ("store" in method_config). The default is nil, which runs the library statelessly and provides no application-level replay protection at all, a documented property rather than part of this issue.

Affected versions

Hex

PackageVulnerableFixed in
mpp
>= 0.2.0, < 0.6.1
0.6.1

How to fix

Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.

mpp Hex → 0.6.1

mix
{:mpp, "~> 0.6.1"} # then: mix deps.update mpp

Severity breakdown

CVSS 4.0 0.0

CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Attack requirements
Present
Privileges required
None
User interaction
None
Confidentiality (vulnerable system)
None
Integrity (vulnerable system)
Low
Availability (vulnerable system)
None
Confidentiality (subsequent systems)
None
Integrity (subsequent systems)
None
Availability (subsequent systems)
None

CVSS 3.1 3.7

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N

Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
High
Privileges required
None
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
None
Integrity
Low
Availability
None

Weakness

CWE-367: Time-of-check Time-of-use (TOCTOU) Race Condition

The product checks the state of a resource before using that resource, but the resource's state can change between the check and the use in a way that invalidates the results of the check.

How to prevent it
  • Implementation: The most basic advice for TOCTOU vulnerabilities is to not perform a check before the use. This does not resolve the underlying issue of the execution of a function on a resource whose state and identity cannot be assured, but it does help to limit the false sense of security given by the check.
  • Implementation: When the file being altered is owned by the current user and group, set the effective gid and uid to that of the current user and group when executing this statement.
  • Architecture and Design: Limit the interleaving of operations on files from multiple processes.
  • Implementation, Architecture and Design: If you cannot perform operations atomically and you must share access to the resource between multiple processes or threads, then try to limit the amount of time (CPU cycles) between the check and use of the resource. This will not fix the problem, but it could make it more difficult for an attack to succeed.
  • Implementation: Recheck the resource after the use call to verify that the action was taken appropriately.
  • Architecture and Design: Ensure that some environmental locking mechanism can be used to protect resources effectively.
  • Implementation: Ensure that locking occurs before the check, as opposed to afterwards, such that the resource, as checked, is the same as it is when in use.

References

Timeline

  1. Published
  2. Last updated by the source
  3. Latest EPSS score
AdvisorySeverityWhy it's related
EEF-CVE-2026-87119
mpp Tempo subscription key authorization is not bound to the issuing challenge, allowing a captured activation credential to be replayed
Not rated yet Also affects mpp
EEF-CVE-2026-89420
Session voucher adding no new funds is accepted without a charge in mpp, serving paid resources for free
Not rated yet Also affects mpp
EEF-CVE-2026-88255
mpp Tempo keys its pre-broadcast dedup reserve on the caller-supplied transaction encoding, so a re-encoded signed transaction reserves a second slot
Not rated yet Also affects mpp
EEF-CVE-2026-89186
mpp writes Payment-Receipt and Cache-Control before the wrapped application runs, letting a consumer's own Cache-Control expose paid responses to shared caches
Not rated yet Also affects mpp
EEF-CVE-2026-82750
Unbounded EIP-7702 authorization list in mpp Tempo fee-payer sponsorship inflates gas cost and sponsors account delegation
Not rated yet Also affects mpp
EEF-CVE-2026-82751
Unbounded key authorization in mpp Tempo fee-payer sponsorship inflates gas cost and sponsors access-key provisioning
Not rated yet Also affects mpp
EEF-CVE-2026-67581
On-chain transfer proof is not single-use in mpp EVM payment method, enabling cross-challenge replay
High Also affects mpp
EEF-CVE-2026-73541
Tempo fee sponsorship in mpp bounds each transaction but not aggregate exposure, allowing concurrent sponsor-wallet drain
High Also affects mpp

Credits: E.FU, Jonatan Männchen / EEF

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