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EEF-CVE-2026-82750 CVE-2026-82750 GHSA-5qrp-r24c-w6jr

Unbounded EIP-7702 authorization list in mpp Tempo fee-payer sponsorship inflates gas cost and sponsors account delegation

Not rated yet Hex
Severity
0.0 / 10
Unknown · CVSS 4.0
Exploit chance (EPSS)
0.52%
Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 44.44% of scored vulnerabilities.
Known exploited
No
Not in CISA's catalog
Weakness
CWE-1284 Improper Validation of Specified Quantity in Input
Fix
0.16.1
Upgrade mpp to this version or later

Description

Summary

Improper Validation of Specified Quantity in Input in ZenHive mpp allows an unauthenticated remote client to inflate the fee-payer's gas cost per sponsored payment by a large multiplier and to have the sponsor pay for EIP-7702 account delegations of the client's choosing.

When the server sponsors Tempo payments, MPP.Methods.Tempo.FeePayerPolicy.measure/3 in lib/mpp/methods/tempo/fee_payer_policy.ex bounds the gas fields, the fee budget, the validity window and the access list of the client-signed 0x76 envelope, but never reads its aa_authorization_list field. Every signed delegation in that list is charged as intrinsic gas before the payment call runs, so a client attaching delegations from throwaway authority keys makes the sponsor pay for them within the default gas_limit ceiling. At the reporter's default of seven entries the sponsored cost rises from about 46,575 gas to about 1,884,087 gas. Because each entry is applied as a persistent set-code delegation, a client can also upgrade its own accounts to delegated code at the sponsor's expense.

This issue affects mpp: from 0.2.0 before 0.16.1.

Workarounds

Disable Tempo fee sponsorship by leaving "fee_payer" at its default of false and setting no fee_payer_url, so the client pays its own gas. Where sponsorship must stay enabled, lower the max_gas override in fee_payer_policy to just above what a legitimate sponsored payment needs (a TIP-20 transfer is roughly 50,000 gas), so an envelope padded with delegations either fails the policy or runs out of gas at a bounded cost. This bounds the inflation without closing it.

Configurations

Only deployments that enable Tempo server-side fee sponsorship are affected, through "fee_payer" => true in method_config with either local co-signing (fee_payer_private_key) or hosted sponsorship (fee_payer_url). Sponsorship is disabled by default.

Affected versions

Hex

PackageVulnerableFixed in
mpp
>= 0.2.0, < 0.16.1
0.16.1

How to fix

Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.

mpp Hex → 0.16.1

mix
{:mpp, "~> 0.16.1"} # then: mix deps.update mpp

Severity breakdown

CVSS 4.0 0.0

CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Attack requirements
Present
Privileges required
None
User interaction
None
Confidentiality (vulnerable system)
None
Integrity (vulnerable system)
High
Availability (vulnerable system)
Low
Confidentiality (subsequent systems)
None
Integrity (subsequent systems)
None
Availability (subsequent systems)
None

Weakness

CWE-1284: Improper Validation of Specified Quantity in Input

The product receives input that is expected to specify a quantity (such as size or length), but it does not validate or incorrectly validates that the quantity has the required properties.

How to prevent it
  • Implementation: Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does. When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue." Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.

References

Timeline

  1. Published
  2. Last updated by the source
  3. Latest EPSS score
AdvisorySeverityWhy it's related
EEF-CVE-2026-87119
mpp Tempo subscription key authorization is not bound to the issuing challenge, allowing a captured activation credential to be replayed
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EEF-CVE-2026-89420
Session voucher adding no new funds is accepted without a charge in mpp, serving paid resources for free
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EEF-CVE-2026-88255
mpp Tempo keys its pre-broadcast dedup reserve on the caller-supplied transaction encoding, so a re-encoded signed transaction reserves a second slot
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EEF-CVE-2026-89186
mpp writes Payment-Receipt and Cache-Control before the wrapped application runs, letting a consumer's own Cache-Control expose paid responses to shared caches
Not rated yet Also affects mpp
EEF-CVE-2026-82751
Unbounded key authorization in mpp Tempo fee-payer sponsorship inflates gas cost and sponsors access-key provisioning
Not rated yet Also affects mpp
EEF-CVE-2026-67581
On-chain transfer proof is not single-use in mpp EVM payment method, enabling cross-challenge replay
High Also affects mpp
EEF-CVE-2026-73541
Tempo fee sponsorship in mpp bounds each transaction but not aggregate exposure, allowing concurrent sponsor-wallet drain
High Also affects mpp
EEF-CVE-2026-73136
Static memo configuration in mpp Tempo disables per-challenge attribution binding, enabling third-party replay
High Also affects mpp

Credits: E.FU, Jonatan Männchen / EEF, Kian Kai Ang

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