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CVE-2026-93952

VeloCloud Orchestrator (VCO) on-prem has a security issue where this issue may allow a remote attacker to access privileged internal functionality and impact…

Critical Known exploited
Severity
9.5 / 10
Critical · CVSS 4.0
Exploit chance (EPSS)
1.38%
Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 72.21% of scored vulnerabilities.
Known exploited
Yes
In CISA's catalog since Sep 22, 2026
Weakness
CWE-20 Improper Input Validation
Fix
None yet
No fixed version published
Exploited in the wild. Arista VeloCloud Orchestrator Improper Input Validation Vulnerability (Arista VeloCloud Orchestrator). Required action: Apply mitigations in accordance with vendor instructions, ensuring compliance with CISA’s BOD 26-04 Prioritizing Security Updates Based on Risk (see URL in Notes) guidance and CISA’s “Forensics Triage Requirements” (see URL in Notes). Follow applicable BOD 26-04 guidance for cloud services or discontinue use of the product if mitigations are unavailable. Stakeholders are responsible for evaluating each asset's internet exposure and ensuring adherence to BOD 26-04 patching guidelines. Due for U.S. federal agencies by Sep 25, 2026.

Description

VeloCloud Orchestrator (VCO) on-prem has a security issue where this issue may allow a remote attacker to access privileged internal functionality and impact the VCO host. Successful exploitation may compromise the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the orchestrator and data managed by the orchestrator.

Hosted, including Dedicated, versions of VCO were impacted and have already been patched.

How to fix

No fixed version has been published yet. Until one is, remove or replace the package, or turn off or isolate the affected feature. This page updates when a fix ships.

Severity breakdown

CVSS 4.0 9.5

CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X

Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
High
Attack requirements
None
Privileges required
None
User interaction
None
Confidentiality (vulnerable system)
High
Integrity (vulnerable system)
High
Availability (vulnerable system)
High
Confidentiality (subsequent systems)
High
Integrity (subsequent systems)
High
Availability (subsequent systems)
High
Exploit maturity
Not defined
Scope
X

CVSS 3.1 10.0

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H

Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Privileges required
None
User interaction
None
Scope
Changed
Confidentiality
High
Integrity
High
Availability
High

Weakness

CWE-20: Improper Input Validation

The product receives input or data, but it does not validate or incorrectly validates that the input has the properties that are required to process the data safely and correctly.

How to prevent it
  • Architecture and Design: Consider using language-theoretic security (LangSec) techniques that characterize inputs using a formal language and build "recognizers" for that language. This effectively requires parsing to be a distinct layer that effectively enforces a boundary between raw input and internal data representations, instead of allowing parser code to be scattered throughout the program, where it could be subject to errors or inconsistencies that create weaknesses. [REF-1109] [REF-1110] [REF-1111]
  • Architecture and Design: Use an input validation framework such as Struts or the OWASP ESAPI Validation API. Note that using a framework does not automatically address all input validation problems; be mindful of weaknesses that could arise from misusing the framework itself (CWE-1173).
  • Architecture and Design, Implementation: Understand all the potential areas where untrusted inputs can enter the product, including but not limited to: parameters or arguments, cookies, anything read from the network, environment variables, reverse DNS lookups, query results, request headers, URL components, e-mail, files, filenames, databases, and any external systems that provide data to the application. Remember that such inputs may be obtained indirectly through API calls.
  • Implementation: Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does. When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue." Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
  • Architecture and Design: For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server. Even though client-side checks provide minimal benefits with respect to server-side security, they are still useful. First, they can support intrusion detection. If the server receives input that should have been rejected by the client, then it may be an indication of an attack. Second, client-side error-checking can provide helpful feedback to the user about the expectations for valid input. Third, there may be a reduction in server-side processing time for accidental input errors, although this is typically a small savings.
  • Implementation: When your application combines data from multiple sources, perform the validation after the sources have been combined. The individual data elements may pass the validation step but violate the intended restrictions after they have been combined.
  • Implementation: Be especially careful to validate all input when invoking code that crosses language boundaries, such as from an interpreted language to native code. This could create an unexpected interaction between the language boundaries. Ensure that you are not violating any of the expectations of the language with which you are interfacing. For example, even though Java may not be susceptible to buffer overflows, providing a large argument in a call to native code might trigger an overflow.
  • Implementation: Directly convert your input type into the expected data type, such as using a conversion function that translates a string into a number. After converting to the expected data type, ensure that the input's values fall within the expected range of allowable values and that multi-field consistencies are maintained.
  • Implementation: Inputs should be decoded and canonicalized to the application's current internal representation before being validated (CWE-180, CWE-181). Make sure that your application does not inadvertently decode the same input twice (CWE-174). Such errors could be used to bypass allowlist schemes by introducing dangerous inputs after they have been checked. Use libraries such as the OWASP ESAPI Canonicalization control. Consider performing repeated canonicalization until your input does not change any more. This will avoid double-decoding and similar scenarios, but it might inadvertently modify inputs that are allowed to contain properly-encoded dangerous content.
  • Implementation: When exchanging data between components, ensure that both components are using the same character encoding. Ensure that the proper encoding is applied at each interface. Explicitly set the encoding you are using whenever the protocol allows you to do so.

References

Timeline

  1. Added to CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog
  2. Published
  3. Last updated by the source
  4. Remediation due for U.S. federal agencies
  5. Latest EPSS score
AdvisorySeverityWhy it's related
GHSA-m665-v7pm-7grj
zip: Critical Parser Differential & Security Control Bypass via Dual-Header Inconsistencies (Zip Cloaking) Leading to Arbitrary File Overwrite & RCE
Critical Same weakness, CWE-20
GHSA-g5ff-637f-6q2m
LiteLLM: internal_user_viewer arbitrary local file read via `vertex_ai_credentials`
High Same weakness, CWE-20
GHSA-h3rc-j82p-2c3h
vLLM: Untrusted EPS inputs can trigger denial of service or Ghostscript RCE
High Same weakness, CWE-20
GHSA-8c8m-p3m8-cjg8
Nodemailer: A nested comment ends early in addressparser, releasing the rest of the comment as a recipient
Medium Same weakness, CWE-20
GHSA-m943-m63m-w62w
Nodemailer: A ";" inside a quoted string or comment ends an address group early in addressparser, turning display text into a recipient
Medium Same weakness, CWE-20
GHSA-85x2-q946-cp5h
Nodemailer: A ">" inside a quoted local part ends an angle-addr early in addressparser, delivering to a domain the header does not name
Medium Same weakness, CWE-20
GHSA-5hx5-vpf9-5wcv
pypdf: Unvalidated JPEG image data loading
Low Same weakness, CWE-20
GHSA-wjr9-j795-jxcr
fast-uri vulnerable to host confusion via unchecked WHATWG host canonicalization
Medium Same weakness, CWE-20
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