GHSA-m943-m63m-w62w
Nodemailer: A ";" inside a quoted string or comment ends an address group early in addressparser, turning display text into a recipient
- Severity
- 6.5 / 10
- Medium · CVSS 3.1
- Exploit chance (EPSS)
- —
- No score published
- Known exploited
- No
- Not in CISA's catalog
- Fix
10.1.4- Upgrade nodemailer to this version or later
Description
Vulnerability summary
addressparser ends an RFC 5322 group at the first ;, including one inside a quoted display name or a comment. The text after it is parsed again as top level recipients with the quoting flipped, so text that every conformant parser reads as a display name or comment becomes a live address. G: (a; <evil@evil.com>) <v@victim.com>; names only v@victim.com, and Nodemailer read it as the single recipient evil@evil.com. Affected: 3.0.0 through 10.1.3.
Attacker capabilities
The attacker controls the text of an address field that an application passes to Nodemailer, or the header of an inbound message parsed with mailparser. No access to the application, its configuration or its credentials is needed. The value is a syntactically valid RFC 5322 group that conformant parsers accept without defects.
Realistic exploitation scenario
An application validates the recipients of a submitted address list with a conformant parser and only allows addresses at its own domain. The attacker submits G: (a; <evil@evil.com>) <v@victim.com>;. The validator sees one mailbox, v@victim.com, and approves it. Nodemailer delivers to evil@evil.com only. The same works through a quoted display name, G: "a;" "<evil@evil.com>" <v@victim.com>;. The boundary crossed is the application's recipient allow list.
Proof of concept
const addressparser = require('nodemailer/lib/addressparser');
console.log(addressparser("G: (a; <evil@evil.com>) <v@victim.com>;"));
// [ { name: 'G', group: [ [Object] ] }, { address: 'evil@evil.com', name: ') v@victim.com' } ]
Python's email._header_value_parser.get_address_list reads the same value as the single mailbox v@victim.com, with no defects reported.
The envelope a message gets is built from the same parse, so sendMail({ to: "G: (a; <evil@evil.com>) <v@victim.com>;" }) issues the RCPT TO shown above.
Security impact
Mail that an application intends for an approved recipient goes to a recipient chosen by the attacker, which discloses its content, and the intended recipient never receives it. The misreading only occurs on values a conformant validator approves, so correct validation is bypassed, which makes it a security issue rather than a parsing bug. Affected are applications that pass user influenced address lists to Nodemailer and consumers of the standalone parser such as mailparser.
The fix tracks quoted strings and comments inside a group and reads only a ; outside them.
Found in an internal review of addressparser on 2026-10-18. Verified on 3.0.0, 6.9.16 and 10.1.3.
Affected versions
npm
| Package | Vulnerable | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| nodemailer | >= 3.0.0, < 10.1.4 |
10.1.4 |
How to fix
Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.
nodemailer npm → 10.1.4
- npm
npm install nodemailer@10.1.4- yarn
yarn add nodemailer@10.1.4- pnpm
pnpm add nodemailer@10.1.4
Severity breakdown
CVSS 3.1 6.5
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- High
- Privileges required
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- Low
- Availability
- None
Weakness
CWE-20: Improper Input Validation
The product receives input or data, but it does not validate or incorrectly validates that the input has the properties that are required to process the data safely and correctly.
How to prevent it
- Architecture and Design: Consider using language-theoretic security (LangSec) techniques that characterize inputs using a formal language and build "recognizers" for that language. This effectively requires parsing to be a distinct layer that effectively enforces a boundary between raw input and internal data representations, instead of allowing parser code to be scattered throughout the program, where it could be subject to errors or inconsistencies that create weaknesses. [REF-1109] [REF-1110] [REF-1111]
- Architecture and Design: Use an input validation framework such as Struts or the OWASP ESAPI Validation API. Note that using a framework does not automatically address all input validation problems; be mindful of weaknesses that could arise from misusing the framework itself (CWE-1173).
- Architecture and Design, Implementation: Understand all the potential areas where untrusted inputs can enter the product, including but not limited to: parameters or arguments, cookies, anything read from the network, environment variables, reverse DNS lookups, query results, request headers, URL components, e-mail, files, filenames, databases, and any external systems that provide data to the application. Remember that such inputs may be obtained indirectly through API calls.
- Implementation: Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does. When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue." Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
- Architecture and Design: For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server. Even though client-side checks provide minimal benefits with respect to server-side security, they are still useful. First, they can support intrusion detection. If the server receives input that should have been rejected by the client, then it may be an indication of an attack. Second, client-side error-checking can provide helpful feedback to the user about the expectations for valid input. Third, there may be a reduction in server-side processing time for accidental input errors, although this is typically a small savings.
- Implementation: When your application combines data from multiple sources, perform the validation after the sources have been combined. The individual data elements may pass the validation step but violate the intended restrictions after they have been combined.
- Implementation: Be especially careful to validate all input when invoking code that crosses language boundaries, such as from an interpreted language to native code. This could create an unexpected interaction between the language boundaries. Ensure that you are not violating any of the expectations of the language with which you are interfacing. For example, even though Java may not be susceptible to buffer overflows, providing a large argument in a call to native code might trigger an overflow.
- Implementation: Directly convert your input type into the expected data type, such as using a conversion function that translates a string into a number. After converting to the expected data type, ensure that the input's values fall within the expected range of allowable values and that multi-field consistencies are maintained.
- Implementation: Inputs should be decoded and canonicalized to the application's current internal representation before being validated (CWE-180, CWE-181). Make sure that your application does not inadvertently decode the same input twice (CWE-174). Such errors could be used to bypass allowlist schemes by introducing dangerous inputs after they have been checked. Use libraries such as the OWASP ESAPI Canonicalization control. Consider performing repeated canonicalization until your input does not change any more. This will avoid double-decoding and similar scenarios, but it might inadvertently modify inputs that are allowed to contain properly-encoded dangerous content.
- Implementation: When exchanging data between components, ensure that both components are using the same character encoding. Ensure that the proper encoding is applied at each interface. Explicitly set the encoding you are using whenever the protocol allows you to do so.
CWE-436: Interpretation Conflict
Product A handles inputs or steps differently than Product B, which causes A to perform incorrect actions based on its perception of B's state.
References
Packages
Other links
Timeline
- Published
- Last updated by the source
Related advisories
| Advisory | Severity | Why it's related |
|---|---|---|
| GHSA-8c8m-p3m8-cjg8 Nodemailer: A nested comment ends early in addressparser, releasing the rest of the comment as a recipient | Medium | Also affects nodemailer |
| GHSA-85x2-q946-cp5h Nodemailer: A ">" inside a quoted local part ends an angle-addr early in addressparser, delivering to a domain the header does not name | Medium | Also affects nodemailer |
| GHSA-4g23-2xm8-66gc Nodemailer: Quadratic (O(n^2)) SMTP client reply parsing lets a malicious server or MITM cause a pre-auth remote denial of service | High | Also affects nodemailer |
| GHSA-39m8-27wv-hr27 Nodemailer: Quadratic (O(n^2)) DKIM header unfolding lets a large folded header cause remote denial of service during signing | High | Also affects nodemailer |
| GHSA-g73g-hqqh-jr95 Nodemailer: RFC 5322 comment inside an angle-bracket address is never stripped | Medium | Also affects nodemailer |
| GHSA-4ffr-jq9g-5ffx Nodemailer: Quadratic backtracking in SMTP AUTH mechanism detection regexes allows pre-auth remote denial of service | High | Also affects nodemailer |
| GHSA-8vvx-rff5-p5rq Nodemailer: Nested structured recipient arrays bypass the parser depth limit and cause stack exhaustion DoS | High | Also affects nodemailer |
| GHSA-6vj9-mwq6-2f5v Nodemailer: Process-global DNS cache reuses TLS `servername` across transports, enabling cross-tenant SMTP credential disclosure | Medium | Also affects nodemailer |
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