CVE-2025-14611
Gladinet CentreStack and Triofox prior to version 16.12.10420.56791 used hardcoded values for their implementation of the AES cryptoscheme.
High
Known exploited
- Severity
- 7.1 / 10
- High · CVSS 4.0
- Exploit chance (EPSS)
- 53.30%
- Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 98.98% of scored vulnerabilities.
- Known exploited
- Yes
- In CISA's catalog since Dec 15, 2025
- Weakness
- CWE-798 Use of Hard-coded Credentials
- Fix
- None yet
- No fixed version published
Exploited in the wild. Gladinet CentreStack and Triofox Hard Coded Cryptographic Vulnerability (Gladinet CentreStack and Triofox). Required action: Apply mitigations per vendor instructions, follow applicable BOD 22-01 guidance for cloud services, or discontinue use of the product if mitigations are unavailable. Due for U.S. federal agencies by Jan 5, 2026.
Description
Gladinet CentreStack and Triofox prior to version 16.12.10420.56791 used hardcoded values for their implementation of the AES cryptoscheme. This degrades security for public exposed endpoints that may make use of it and may offer arbitrary local file inclusion when provided a specially crafted request without authentication. This opens the door for future exploitation and can be leveraged with previous vulnerabilities to gain a full system compromise.
How to fix
No fixed version has been published yet. Until one is, remove or replace the package, or turn off or isolate the affected feature. This page updates when a fix ships.
Severity breakdown
CVSS 4.0 7.1
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H/E:A/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- High
- Attack requirements
- None
- Privileges required
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Confidentiality (vulnerable system)
- Low
- Integrity (vulnerable system)
- None
- Availability (vulnerable system)
- None
- Confidentiality (subsequent systems)
- High
- Integrity (subsequent systems)
- High
- Availability (subsequent systems)
- High
- Exploit maturity
- Attacked
- Scope
- X
CVSS 3.1 9.8
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Privileges required
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- High
Weakness
CWE-798: Use of Hard-coded Credentials
The product contains hard-coded credentials, such as a password or cryptographic key.
How to prevent it
- Architecture and Design: For outbound authentication: store passwords, keys, and other credentials outside of the code in a strongly-protected, encrypted configuration file or database that is protected from access by all outsiders, including other local users on the same system. Properly protect the key (CWE-320). If you cannot use encryption to protect the file, then make sure that the permissions are as restrictive as possible [REF-7]. In Windows environments, the Encrypted File System (EFS) may provide some protection.
- Architecture and Design: For inbound authentication: Rather than hard-code a default username and password, key, or other authentication credentials for first time logins, utilize a "first login" mode that requires the user to enter a unique strong password or key.
- Architecture and Design: If the product must contain hard-coded credentials or they cannot be removed, perform access control checks and limit which entities can access the feature that requires the hard-coded credentials. For example, a feature might only be enabled through the system console instead of through a network connection.
- Architecture and Design: For inbound authentication using passwords: apply strong one-way hashes to passwords and store those hashes in a configuration file or database with appropriate access control. That way, theft of the file/database still requires the attacker to try to crack the password. When handling an incoming password during authentication, take the hash of the password and compare it to the saved hash. Use randomly assigned salts for each separate hash that is generated. This increases the amount of computation that an attacker needs to conduct a brute-force attack, possibly limiting the effectiveness of the rainbow table method.
- Architecture and Design: For front-end to back-end connections: Three solutions are possible, although none are complete. The first suggestion involves the use of generated passwords or keys that are changed automatically and must be entered at given time intervals by a system administrator. These passwords will be held in memory and only be valid for the time intervals. Next, the passwords or keys should be limited at the back end to only performing actions valid for the front end, as opposed to having full access. Finally, the messages sent should be tagged and checksummed with time sensitive values so as to prevent replay-style attacks.
References
Advisories
Other links
Timeline
- Published
- Added to CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog
- Remediation due for U.S. federal agencies
- Last updated by the source
- Latest EPSS score
Related advisories
| Advisory | Severity | Why it's related |
|---|---|---|
| PYSEC-2026-3768 openssl_encrypt versions before 1.4.0 contain hardcoded default JWT signing secrets in config.py that pass validation checks. | High | Same weakness, CWE-798 |
| PYSEC-2026-3746 openssl_encrypt versions before 1.4.0 contain a hardcoded default secret key in the standalone telemetry server configuration that is used for API key hashing. | High | Same weakness, CWE-798 |
| PYSEC-2026-3767 openssl_encrypt versions before 1.4.0 contain hardcoded database credentials in standalone server configuration files. | Critical | Same weakness, CWE-798 |
| GHSA-jphh-m39h-6gwx 9router's Hardcoded Default fallback JWT Secret Allows Authentication Bypass | Critical | Same weakness, CWE-798 |
| GHSA-cwj8-7gp2-ggcw praisonai-platform: default JWT signing secret 'dev-secret-change-me' enables token forgery | Critical | Same weakness, CWE-798 |
| GHSA-f38v-77qj-h4jq praisonai-platform 0.1.4 still boots on the hardcoded JWT secret dev-secret-change-me (default-open production guard) | Critical | Same weakness, CWE-798 |
| GHSA-qhr7-h655-pw6r Apache Solr has hardcoded credentials in the Basic Authentication setup tool | Critical | Same weakness, CWE-798 |
| GHSA-3qg8-5g3r-79v5 praisonai-platform: JWT signing key defaults to hardcoded "dev-secret-change-me", allowing token forgery for any user when PLATFORM_ENV is unset | Critical | Same weakness, CWE-798 |
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