CVE-2023-28461
Array Networks Array AG Series and vxAG (9.4.0.481 and earlier) allow remote code execution.
- Severity
- 9.8 / 10
- Critical · CVSS 3.1
- Exploit chance (EPSS)
- 68.08%
- Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 99.33% of scored vulnerabilities.
- Known exploited
- Yes
- In CISA's catalog since Nov 25, 2024
- Fix
- None yet
- No fixed version published
Description
Array Networks Array AG Series and vxAG (9.4.0.481 and earlier) allow remote code execution. An attacker can browse the filesystem on the SSL VPN gateway using a flags attribute in an HTTP header without authentication. The product could then be exploited through a vulnerable URL. The 2023-03-09 vendor advisory stated "a new Array AG release with the fix will be available soon."
How to fix
No fixed version has been published yet. Until one is, remove or replace the package, or turn off or isolate the affected feature. This page updates when a fix ships.
Severity breakdown
CVSS 3.1 9.8
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Privileges required
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- High
Weakness
CWE-287: Improper Authentication
When an actor claims to have a given identity, the product does not prove or insufficiently proves that the claim is correct.
How to prevent it
- Architecture and Design: Use an authentication framework or library such as the OWASP ESAPI Authentication feature.
CWE-306: Missing Authentication for Critical Function
The product does not perform any authentication for functionality that requires a provable user identity or consumes a significant amount of resources.
How to prevent it
- Architecture and Design: Divide the software into anonymous, normal, privileged, and administrative areas. Identify which of these areas require a proven user identity, and use a centralized authentication capability. Identify all potential communication channels, or other means of interaction with the software, to ensure that all channels are appropriately protected, including those channels that are assumed to be accessible only by authorized parties. Developers sometimes perform authentication at the primary channel, but open up a secondary channel that is assumed to be private. For example, a login mechanism may be listening on one network port, but after successful authentication, it may open up a second port where it waits for the connection, but avoids authentication because it assumes that only the authenticated party will connect to the port. In general, if the software or protocol allows a single session or user state to persist across multiple connections or channels, authentication and appropriate credential management need to be used throughout.
- Architecture and Design: For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
- Architecture and Design: Where possible, avoid implementing custom, "grow-your-own" authentication routines and consider using authentication capabilities as provided by the surrounding framework, operating system, or environment. These capabilities may avoid common weaknesses that are unique to authentication; support automatic auditing and tracking; and make it easier to provide a clear separation between authentication tasks and authorization tasks. In environments such as the World Wide Web, the line between authentication and authorization is sometimes blurred. If custom authentication routines are required instead of those provided by the server, then these routines must be applied to every single page, since these pages could be requested directly.
- Architecture and Design: Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid. For example, consider using libraries with authentication capabilities such as OpenSSL or the ESAPI Authenticator [REF-45].
- Implementation, System Configuration, Operation: When storing data in the cloud (e.g., S3 buckets, Azure blobs, Google Cloud Storage, etc.), use the provider's controls to require strong authentication for users who should be allowed to access the data [REF-1297] [REF-1298] [REF-1302].
References
Advisories
Other links
Timeline
- Published
- Added to CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog
- Remediation due for U.S. federal agencies
- Last updated by the source
- Latest EPSS score
Related advisories
| Advisory | Severity | Why it's related |
|---|---|---|
| GHSA-f9x3-7vq9-cph6 Laravel TokenGuard authentication bypass through non-string API credentials | Critical | Same weakness, CWE-287 |
| GHSA-r4xp-prcw-77qf better-auth: OAuth Proxy lets an attacker sign in as another user | Critical | Same weakness, CWE-287 |
| GHSA-965c-763c-88jm better-auth: OAuth state can be used as a Magic Link to sign in as another user | Critical | Same weakness, CWE-287 |
| GO-2026-6773 Nginx UI: Casdoor SSO callback uses a constant `state` parameter (login CSRF) | High | Same weakness, CWE-287 |
| GO-2026-6786 Nginx UI: TOTP / passkey enrolment requires no re-authentication, enabling persistent account takeover | High | Same weakness, CWE-287 |
| GHSA-xv7q-fvmc-jx96 Vikunja: OIDC email-fallback account linking ignores email_verified, enabling local-account takeover | High | Same weakness, CWE-287 |
| GHSA-68w4-83fh-f2w8 pyload-ng: getUserData/get_userdata exposed at Perms.ANY allow any authenticated account to brute-force the administrator password | High | Same weakness, CWE-287 |
| GHSA-r44w-v6gf-x3p6 pyLoad has an authentication bypass in API key validation (check_apikey cache) | High | Same weakness, CWE-287 |
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