GHSA-xjhv-v822-pf94 CVE-2026-27195 RUSTSEC-2026-0022
Wasmtime is vulnerable to panic when dropping a `[Typed]Func::call_async` future
- Severity
- 0.0 / 10
- High · CVSS 4.0
- Exploit chance (EPSS)
- 0.41%
- Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 35.47% of scored vulnerabilities.
- Known exploited
- No
- Not in CISA's catalog
- Weakness
- CWE-755 Improper Handling of Exceptional Conditions
- Fix
40.0.4- Upgrade wasmtime to this version or later
Description
The affected versions of Wasmtime can panic if the host embedder drops the future returned by wasmtime::component::[Typed]Func::call_async before it resolves.
Details
Starting with Wasmtime 39.0.0, the component-model-async feature became the default, which brought with it a new implementation of [Typed]Func::call_async which made it capable of calling async-typed guest export functions. However, that implementation had a bug leading to a panic under certain circumstances:
- The host embedding calls
[Typed]Func::call_asyncon a function exported by a component, polling the returnedFutureonce. - The component function yields control to the async runtime (e.g. Tokio), e.g. due to a call to host function registered using
LinkerInstance::func_wrap_asyncwhich yields, or due an epoch interruption. - The host embedding drops the
Futureafter polling it once. This leaves the component instance in a non-reenterable state since the call never had a chance to complete. - The host embedding calls
[Typed]Func::call_asyncagain, polling the returnedFuture. Since the component instance cannot be entered at this point, the call traps, but not before allocating a task and thread for the call. - The host embedding ignores the trap and drops the
Future. This panics due to the runtime attempting to dispose of the task created above, which panics since the thread has not yet exited.
Impact
When a host embedder using the affected versions of Wasmtime calls wasmtime::component::[Typed]Func::call_async on a guest export and then drops the returned future without waiting for it to resolve, and then does so again with the same component instance, Wasmtime will panic. Embeddings that have the component-model-async compile-time feature disabled are unaffected.
Patches
Wasmtime 40.0.4 and 41.0.4 have been patched to fix this issue. Versions 42.0.0 and later are not affected.
Workarounds
If an embedding is not actually using any component-model-async features then disabling the component-model-async Cargo feature can work around this issue. This issue can also be worked around by either ensuring every call_async future is awaited until it completes or refraining from using the Store again after dropping a not-yet-resolved call_async future.
Resources
This was first reported in https://bytecodealliance.zulipchat.com/#narrow/channel/206238-general/topic/Panic.20in.20Wasmtime.2041.2E0.2E3.20.28runtime.2Fconcurrent.2Fcomponent.29
Affected versions
crates.io
| Package | Vulnerable | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| wasmtime | >= 39.0.0, < 40.0.4 |
40.0.4 |
| wasmtime | >= 41.0.0, < 41.0.4 |
41.0.4 |
| wasmtime | >= 39.0.0, < 40.0.4>= 41.0.0, < 41.0.4 |
40.0.441.0.4 |
How to fix
Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.
wasmtime crates.io → 40.0.4
- cargo
cargo update -p wasmtime --precise 40.0.4
Severity breakdown
CVSS 4.0 0.0
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:L/UI:P/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:H
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- High
- Attack requirements
- Present
- Privileges required
- Low
- User interaction
- Passive
- Confidentiality (vulnerable system)
- None
- Integrity (vulnerable system)
- None
- Availability (vulnerable system)
- High
- Confidentiality (subsequent systems)
- None
- Integrity (subsequent systems)
- None
- Availability (subsequent systems)
- High
CVSS 3.1 7.5
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Privileges required
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- None
- Integrity
- None
- Availability
- High
Weakness
CWE-755: Improper Handling of Exceptional Conditions
The product does not handle or incorrectly handles an exceptional condition.
References
Advisories
Packages
Other links
- github.com/bytecodealliance/wasmtime/security/advisories/GHSA-xjhv-v822-pf94
- github.com/bytecodealliance/wasmtime/commit/9e51c0d9a240a9613d279c061f82286bd11…
- github.com/bytecodealliance/wasmtime/commit/d86b00736b9ece60b3c81e52f7a7e4cdd9f…
- bytecodealliance.zulipchat.com
- github.com/bytecodealliance/wasmtime/releases/tag/v40.0.4
- github.com/bytecodealliance/wasmtime/releases/tag/v41.0.4
- rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2026-0022.html
Timeline
- Published
- Last updated by the source
- Latest EPSS score
Related advisories
| Advisory | Severity | Why it's related |
|---|---|---|
| RUSTSEC-2026-0424 Unchecked memory usage in transferring borrowed resources between components | Not rated yet | Also affects wasmtime |
| RUSTSEC-2026-0423 Cross-engine type confusion with host-created struct-types-with-supertypes | Not rated yet | Also affects wasmtime |
| RUSTSEC-2026-0422 Typed functions with `i31` or `nullref` arguments may panic due to insufficient type-check | Low | Also affects wasmtime |
| RUSTSEC-2026-0379 Wasmtime: Cranelift backend on aarch64 can jump to incorrect target on large Wasm `br_table` instruction | Critical | Also affects wasmtime |
| GHSA-9pvw-hwfg-92h5 Wasmtime: Panic lowering a host-created component model stream into a guest that expects a different payload type | Medium | Also affects wasmtime |
| GHSA-897f-g5gm-fmxm Wasmtime: Bit-packing in Cranelift compiler causes silent overflow and miscompilation | Critical | Also affects wasmtime |
| RUSTSEC-2026-0364 Exception tags can cause host data structures to be unaligned | Not rated yet | Also affects wasmtime |
| RUSTSEC-2026-0363 Component-model handle tables are capped only per instance and charged to no limit | Medium | Also affects wasmtime |
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