Skip to content

GHSA-xcjm-wqff-m669 CVE-2026-49219

ImageMagick: Policy Bypass can read disallowed files via symlink

Medium NuGet
Severity
5.5 / 10
Medium · CVSS 3.1
Exploit chance (EPSS)
0.18%
Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 7.23% of scored vulnerabilities.
Known exploited
No
Not in CISA's catalog
Weakness
CWE-200 Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor
CWE-22 Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')
CWE-78 Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection')
CWE-863 Incorrect Authorization
Fix
Available
17 packages have a fixed version

Description

An incorrect parsing of the filename can result in a policy bypass and read files disallowed by a security policy using a symlink.

Affected versions

NuGet

PackageVulnerableFixed in
Magick.NET-Q16-AnyCPU
< 14.14.0
14.14.0
Magick.NET-Q16-HDRI-AnyCPU
< 14.14.0
14.14.0
Magick.NET-Q16-HDRI-OpenMP-arm64
< 14.14.0
14.14.0
Magick.NET-Q16-HDRI-arm64
< 14.14.0
14.14.0
Magick.NET-Q16-HDRI-x64
< 14.14.0
14.14.0
Magick.NET-Q16-HDRI-x86
< 14.14.0
14.14.0
Magick.NET-Q16-OpenMP-arm64
< 14.14.0
14.14.0
Magick.NET-Q16-OpenMP-x64
< 14.14.0
14.14.0
Magick.NET-Q16-arm64
< 14.14.0
14.14.0
Magick.NET-Q16-x64
< 14.14.0
14.14.0
Magick.NET-Q16-x86
< 14.14.0
14.14.0
Magick.NET-Q8-AnyCPU
< 14.14.0
14.14.0
Magick.NET-Q8-OpenMP-arm64
< 14.14.0
14.14.0
Magick.NET-Q8-OpenMP-x64
< 14.14.0
14.14.0
Magick.NET-Q8-arm64
< 14.14.0
14.14.0
Magick.NET-Q8-x64
< 14.14.0
14.14.0
Magick.NET-Q8-x86
< 14.14.0
14.14.0

How to fix

Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.

Magick.NET-Q16-AnyCPU NuGet → 14.14.0

dotnet
dotnet add package Magick.NET-Q16-AnyCPU --version 14.14.0

Magick.NET-Q16-HDRI-AnyCPU NuGet → 14.14.0

dotnet
dotnet add package Magick.NET-Q16-HDRI-AnyCPU --version 14.14.0

Magick.NET-Q16-HDRI-OpenMP-arm64 NuGet → 14.14.0

dotnet
dotnet add package Magick.NET-Q16-HDRI-OpenMP-arm64 --version 14.14.0

Magick.NET-Q16-HDRI-arm64 NuGet → 14.14.0

dotnet
dotnet add package Magick.NET-Q16-HDRI-arm64 --version 14.14.0

Magick.NET-Q16-HDRI-x64 NuGet → 14.14.0

dotnet
dotnet add package Magick.NET-Q16-HDRI-x64 --version 14.14.0

Magick.NET-Q16-HDRI-x86 NuGet → 14.14.0

dotnet
dotnet add package Magick.NET-Q16-HDRI-x86 --version 14.14.0

Magick.NET-Q16-OpenMP-arm64 NuGet → 14.14.0

dotnet
dotnet add package Magick.NET-Q16-OpenMP-arm64 --version 14.14.0

Magick.NET-Q16-OpenMP-x64 NuGet → 14.14.0

dotnet
dotnet add package Magick.NET-Q16-OpenMP-x64 --version 14.14.0

Magick.NET-Q16-arm64 NuGet → 14.14.0

dotnet
dotnet add package Magick.NET-Q16-arm64 --version 14.14.0

Magick.NET-Q16-x64 NuGet → 14.14.0

dotnet
dotnet add package Magick.NET-Q16-x64 --version 14.14.0

Magick.NET-Q16-x86 NuGet → 14.14.0

dotnet
dotnet add package Magick.NET-Q16-x86 --version 14.14.0

Magick.NET-Q8-AnyCPU NuGet → 14.14.0

dotnet
dotnet add package Magick.NET-Q8-AnyCPU --version 14.14.0

Magick.NET-Q8-OpenMP-arm64 NuGet → 14.14.0

dotnet
dotnet add package Magick.NET-Q8-OpenMP-arm64 --version 14.14.0

Magick.NET-Q8-OpenMP-x64 NuGet → 14.14.0

dotnet
dotnet add package Magick.NET-Q8-OpenMP-x64 --version 14.14.0

Magick.NET-Q8-arm64 NuGet → 14.14.0

dotnet
dotnet add package Magick.NET-Q8-arm64 --version 14.14.0

Magick.NET-Q8-x64 NuGet → 14.14.0

dotnet
dotnet add package Magick.NET-Q8-x64 --version 14.14.0

Magick.NET-Q8-x86 NuGet → 14.14.0

dotnet
dotnet add package Magick.NET-Q8-x86 --version 14.14.0

Severity breakdown

CVSS 3.1 5.5

CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N

Attack vector
Local
Attack complexity
Low
Privileges required
Low
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
High
Integrity
None
Availability
None

Weakness

CWE-200: Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor

The product exposes sensitive information to an actor that is not explicitly authorized to have access to that information.

How to prevent it
  • Architecture and Design: Compartmentalize the system to have "safe" areas where trust boundaries can be unambiguously drawn. Do not allow sensitive data to go outside of the trust boundary and always be careful when interfacing with a compartment outside of the safe area. Ensure that appropriate compartmentalization is built into the system design, and the compartmentalization allows for and reinforces privilege separation functionality. Architects and designers should rely on the principle of least privilege to decide the appropriate time to use privileges and the time to drop privileges.

CWE-22: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')

The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory.

How to prevent it
  • Implementation: Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does. When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue." Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright. When validating filenames, use stringent allowlists that limit the character set to be used. If feasible, only allow a single "." character in the filename to avoid weaknesses such as CWE-23, and exclude directory separators such as "/" to avoid CWE-36. Use a list of allowable file extensions, which will help to avoid CWE-434. Do not rely exclusively on a filtering mechanism that removes potentially dangerous characters. This is equivalent to a denylist, which may be incomplete (CWE-184). For example, filtering "/" is insufficient protection if the filesystem also supports the use of "\" as a directory separator. Another possible error could occur when the filtering is applied in a way that still produces dangerous data (CWE-182). For example, if "../" sequences are removed from the ".../...//" string in a sequential fashion, two instances of "../" would b
  • Architecture and Design: For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
  • Implementation: Inputs should be decoded and canonicalized to the application's current internal representation before being validated (CWE-180). Make sure that the application does not decode the same input twice (CWE-174). Such errors could be used to bypass allowlist validation schemes by introducing dangerous inputs after they have been checked. Use a built-in path canonicalization function (such as realpath() in C) that produces the canonical version of the pathname, which effectively removes ".." sequences and symbolic links (CWE-23, CWE-59). This includes: realpath() in C getCanonicalPath() in Java GetFullPath() in ASP.NET realpath() or abs_path() in Perl realpath() in PHP
  • Architecture and Design: Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid [REF-1482].
  • Operation: Use an application firewall that can detect attacks against this weakness. It can be beneficial in cases in which the code cannot be fixed (because it is controlled by a third party), as an emergency prevention measure while more comprehensive software assurance measures are applied, or to provide defense in depth [REF-1481].
  • Architecture and Design, Operation: Run your code using the lowest privileges that are required to accomplish the necessary tasks [REF-76]. If possible, create isolated accounts with limited privileges that are only used for a single task. That way, a successful attack will not immediately give the attacker access to the rest of the software or its environment. For example, database applications rarely need to run as the database administrator, especially in day-to-day operations.
  • Architecture and Design: When the set of acceptable objects, such as filenames or URLs, is limited or known, create a mapping from a set of fixed input values (such as numeric IDs) to the actual filenames or URLs, and reject all other inputs. For example, ID 1 could map to "inbox.txt" and ID 2 could map to "profile.txt". Features such as the ESAPI AccessReferenceMap [REF-185] provide this capability.
  • Architecture and Design, Operation: Run the code in a "jail" or similar sandbox environment that enforces strict boundaries between the process and the operating system. This may effectively restrict which files can be accessed in a particular directory or which commands can be executed by the software. OS-level examples include the Unix chroot jail, AppArmor, and SELinux. In general, managed code may provide some protection. For example, java.io.FilePermission in the Java SecurityManager allows the software to specify restrictions on file operations. This may not be a feasible solution, and it only limits the impact to the operating system; the rest of the application may still be subject to compromise. Be careful to avoid CWE-243 and other weaknesses related to jails.
  • Architecture and Design, Operation: Store library, include, and utility files outside of the web document root, if possible. Otherwise, store them in a separate directory and use the web server's access control capabilities to prevent attackers from directly requesting them. One common practice is to define a fixed constant in each calling program, then check for the existence of the constant in the library/include file; if the constant does not exist, then the file was directly requested, and it can exit immediately. This significantly reduces the chance of an attacker being able to bypass any protection mechanisms that are in the base program but not in the include files. It will also reduce the attack surface.
  • Implementation: Ensure that error messages only contain minimal details that are useful to the intended audience and no one else. The messages need to strike the balance between being too cryptic (which can confuse users) or being too detailed (which may reveal more than intended). The messages should not reveal the methods that were used to determine the error. Attackers can use detailed information to refine or optimize their original attack, thereby increasing their chances of success. If errors must be captured in some detail, record them in log messages, but consider what could occur if the log messages can be viewed by attackers. Highly sensitive information such as passwords should never be saved to log files. Avoid inconsistent messaging that might accidentally tip off an attacker about internal state, such as whether a user account exists or not. In the context of path traversal, error messages which disclose path information can help attackers craft the appropriate attack strings to move through the file system hierarchy.
  • Operation, Implementation: When using PHP, configure the application so that it does not use register_globals. During implementation, develop the application so that it does not rely on this feature, but be wary of implementing a register_globals emulation that is subject to weaknesses such as CWE-95, CWE-621, and similar issues.

CWE-78: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection')

The product constructs all or part of an OS command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended OS command when it is sent to a downstream component.

How to prevent it
  • Architecture and Design: If at all possible, use library calls rather than external processes to recreate the desired functionality.
  • Architecture and Design, Operation: Run the code in a "jail" or similar sandbox environment that enforces strict boundaries between the process and the operating system. This may effectively restrict which files can be accessed in a particular directory or which commands can be executed by the software. OS-level examples include the Unix chroot jail, AppArmor, and SELinux. In general, managed code may provide some protection. For example, java.io.FilePermission in the Java SecurityManager allows the software to specify restrictions on file operations. This may not be a feasible solution, and it only limits the impact to the operating system; the rest of the application may still be subject to compromise. Be careful to avoid CWE-243 and other weaknesses related to jails.
  • Architecture and Design: For any data that will be used to generate a command to be executed, keep as much of that data out of external control as possible. For example, in web applications, this may require storing the data locally in the session's state instead of sending it out to the client in a hidden form field.
  • Architecture and Design: For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
  • Architecture and Design: Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid. For example, consider using the ESAPI Encoding control [REF-45] or a similar tool, library, or framework. These will help the programmer encode outputs in a manner less prone to error.
  • Implementation: While it is risky to use dynamically-generated query strings, code, or commands that mix control and data together, sometimes it may be unavoidable. Properly quote arguments and escape any special characters within those arguments. The most conservative approach is to escape or filter all characters that do not pass an extremely strict allowlist (such as everything that is not alphanumeric or white space). If some special characters are still needed, such as white space, wrap each argument in quotes after the escaping/filtering step. Be careful of argument injection (CWE-88).
  • Implementation: If the program to be executed allows arguments to be specified within an input file or from standard input, then consider using that mode to pass arguments instead of the command line.
  • Architecture and Design: If available, use structured mechanisms that automatically enforce the separation between data and code. These mechanisms may be able to provide the relevant quoting, encoding, and validation automatically, instead of relying on the developer to provide this capability at every point where output is generated. Some languages offer multiple functions that can be used to invoke commands. Where possible, identify any function that invokes a command shell using a single string, and replace it with a function that requires individual arguments. These functions typically perform appropriate quoting and filtering of arguments. For example, in C, the system() function accepts a string that contains the entire command to be executed, whereas execl(), execve(), and others require an array of strings, one for each argument. In Windows, CreateProcess() only accepts one command at a time. In Perl, if system() is provided with an array of arguments, then it will quote each of the arguments.
  • Implementation: Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does. When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue." Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright. When constructing OS command strings, use stringent allowlists that limit the character set based on the expected value of the parameter in the request. This will indirectly limit the scope of an attack, but this technique is less important than proper output encoding and escaping. Note that proper output encoding, escaping, and quoting is the most effective solution for preventing OS command injection, although input validation may provide some defense-in-depth. This is because it effectively limits what will appear in output. Input validation will not always prevent OS command injection, especially if you are required to support free-form text fields that could contain arbitrary characters. For example, when invoking a mail program, you might need to allow the subject field to contain otherwise-dangerous inputs like ";" and ">" characters, which would ne
  • Architecture and Design: When the set of acceptable objects, such as filenames or URLs, is limited or known, create a mapping from a set of fixed input values (such as numeric IDs) to the actual filenames or URLs, and reject all other inputs.
  • Operation: Run the code in an environment that performs automatic taint propagation and prevents any command execution that uses tainted variables, such as Perl's "-T" switch. This will force the program to perform validation steps that remove the taint, although you must be careful to correctly validate your inputs so that you do not accidentally mark dangerous inputs as untainted (see CWE-183 and CWE-184).
  • Operation: Run the code in an environment that performs automatic taint propagation and prevents any command execution that uses tainted variables, such as Perl's "-T" switch. This will force the program to perform validation steps that remove the taint, although you must be careful to correctly validate your inputs so that you do not accidentally mark dangerous inputs as untainted (see CWE-183 and CWE-184).
  • Implementation: Ensure that error messages only contain minimal details that are useful to the intended audience and no one else. The messages need to strike the balance between being too cryptic (which can confuse users) or being too detailed (which may reveal more than intended). The messages should not reveal the methods that were used to determine the error. Attackers can use detailed information to refine or optimize their original attack, thereby increasing their chances of success. If errors must be captured in some detail, record them in log messages, but consider what could occur if the log messages can be viewed by attackers. Highly sensitive information such as passwords should never be saved to log files. Avoid inconsistent messaging that might accidentally tip off an attacker about internal state, such as whether a user account exists or not. In the context of OS Command Injection, error information passed back to the user might reveal whether an OS command is being executed and possibly which command is being used.
  • Operation: Use runtime policy enforcement to create an allowlist of allowable commands, then prevent use of any command that does not appear in the allowlist. Technologies such as AppArmor are available to do this.
  • Operation: Use an application firewall that can detect attacks against this weakness. It can be beneficial in cases in which the code cannot be fixed (because it is controlled by a third party), as an emergency prevention measure while more comprehensive software assurance measures are applied, or to provide defense in depth [REF-1481].
  • Architecture and Design, Operation: Run your code using the lowest privileges that are required to accomplish the necessary tasks [REF-76]. If possible, create isolated accounts with limited privileges that are only used for a single task. That way, a successful attack will not immediately give the attacker access to the rest of the software or its environment. For example, database applications rarely need to run as the database administrator, especially in day-to-day operations.
  • Operation, Implementation: When using PHP, configure the application so that it does not use register_globals. During implementation, develop the application so that it does not rely on this feature, but be wary of implementing a register_globals emulation that is subject to weaknesses such as CWE-95, CWE-621, and similar issues.

CWE-863: Incorrect Authorization

The product performs an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action, but it does not correctly perform the check.

How to prevent it
  • Architecture and Design: Divide the product into anonymous, normal, privileged, and administrative areas. Reduce the attack surface by carefully mapping roles with data and functionality. Use role-based access control (RBAC) [REF-229] to enforce the roles at the appropriate boundaries. Note that this approach may not protect against horizontal authorization, i.e., it will not protect a user from attacking others with the same role.
  • Architecture and Design: Ensure that access control checks are performed related to the business logic. These checks may be different than the access control checks that are applied to more generic resources such as files, connections, processes, memory, and database records. For example, a database may restrict access for medical records to a specific database user, but each record might only be intended to be accessible to the patient and the patient's doctor [REF-7].
  • Architecture and Design: Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid. For example, consider using authorization frameworks such as the JAAS Authorization Framework [REF-233] and the OWASP ESAPI Access Control feature [REF-45].
  • Architecture and Design: For web applications, make sure that the access control mechanism is enforced correctly at the server side on every page. Users should not be able to access any unauthorized functionality or information by simply requesting direct access to that page. One way to do this is to ensure that all pages containing sensitive information are not cached, and that all such pages restrict access to requests that are accompanied by an active and authenticated session token associated with a user who has the required permissions to access that page.
  • System Configuration, Installation: Use the access control capabilities of your operating system and server environment and define your access control lists accordingly. Use a "default deny" policy when defining these ACLs.

References

Timeline

  1. Published
  2. Last updated by the source
  3. Latest EPSS score
AdvisorySeverityWhy it's related
GHSA-j7hp-h8jx-5ppr
libwebp: OOB write in BuildHuffmanTable
High Known exploited Also affects magick.net-q16-anycpu
GHSA-cvhv-g4rq-3hmw
ImageMagick: Memory Leak when providing invalid options to the cli
Medium Also affects Magick.NET-Q16-AnyCPU
GHSA-h22j-f9xw-xjjm
ImageMagick: Integer Overflow in JNX decoder causes heap buffer over-write when processing extremly large files on 32-bit builds
Medium Also affects Magick.NET-Q16-AnyCPU
GHSA-422r-8c97-xcg4
ImageMagick: Heap Buffer Over-Write in fx operation
Medium Also affects Magick.NET-Q16-AnyCPU
GHSA-f5m7-cqgw-8hm7
ImageMagick: Heap Buffer Over-Write in morphology operation when an invalid kernel is provided
Medium Also affects Magick.NET-Q16-AnyCPU
GHSA-hc76-7mpc-qjqh
ImageMagick: Code injection in HTML encoder due to incomplete fix of CVE-2026-25797
Medium Also affects Magick.NET-Q16-AnyCPU
GHSA-56m6-8q75-f2rw
ImageMagick: Policy Bypass due to an incomplete fix of CVE-2026-49219
Medium Also affects Magick.NET-Q16-AnyCPU
GHSA-h5r4-w88w-7ccr
ImageMagick: Memory Leak in TIFF encoder when invalid tiff:tile-geometry is specified
Low Also affects Magick.NET-Q16-AnyCPU
Is this in your code?

MergeHarbor checks every repository's dependencies against this database, ranks what matters by exploitability and reachability, routes it to the owning team and opens the fix pull request.

Check your repos with MergeHarbor