GHSA-wpg9-4g4v-f9rc CVE-2026-32035
OpenClaw: Discord voice transcript owner-flag omission could expose owner-only tools in mixed-trust channels
- Severity
- 0.0 / 10
- High · CVSS 4.0
- Exploit chance (EPSS)
- 0.14%
- Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 3.70% of scored vulnerabilities.
- Known exploited
- No
- Not in CISA's catalog
- Fix
2026.3.2- Upgrade openclaw to this version or later
Description
Summary
In openclaw@2026.3.1, the Discord voice transcript path called agentCommand(...) without senderIsOwner, and agentCommand defaults missing senderIsOwner to true.
This could allow a non-owner voice participant in the same channel to reach owner-only tool surfaces (gateway, cron) during voice transcript turns.
Security model note
OpenClaw’s documented trust model is a personal assistant model (one trusted operator), not an adversarial multi-user boundary.
- OpenClaw does not treat one shared gateway/chat surface as a hardened per-user auth boundary.
- Mixed-trust deployments (mutually untrusted users sharing one gateway/channel) are outside recommended deployment boundaries.
This report is treated as a valid hardening/authorization bug because owner-only tool policy should still be applied consistently across chat-driven turns, including Discord voice transcript ingress.
Details
Relevant path:
- Voice transcript run omitted
senderIsOwnerin Discord voice manager. - Missing
senderIsOwnerdefaulted totrueinagentCommand. - Owner-only tool policy is keyed on
senderIsOwner. gatewayandcronare owner-only tools.
Impact
- Affects deployments where Discord voice is enabled and the bot is present in channels with non-owner participants.
- No gateway-auth boundary bypass was required.
- Practical risk depends strongly on whether the deployment is single-trust (recommended) or mixed-trust (not recommended).
Severity rationale
Downgraded from high to medium to align with OpenClaw’s trust model and deployment assumptions:
- Requires participation in the same voice environment as the trusted operator workflow.
- Requires Discord voice path conditions (joined voice channel + transcript flow).
- Does not introduce a new cross-gateway or unauthenticated boundary bypass.
Remediation
- Always pass explicit
senderIsOwnerfrom Discord voice transcript ingress. - Fail closed (
false) when owner status is unknown for non-local/chat ingress paths. - Keep regression tests that verify owner/non-owner voice speaker handling.
Affected Packages / Versions
- Package:
openclaw(npm) - Affected versions:
<= 2026.3.1 - Patched versions:
>= 2026.3.2(released)
Affected versions
npm
| Package | Vulnerable | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| openclaw | < 2026.3.2 |
2026.3.2 |
How to fix
Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.
openclaw npm → 2026.3.2
- npm
npm install openclaw@2026.3.2- yarn
yarn add openclaw@2026.3.2- pnpm
pnpm add openclaw@2026.3.2
Severity breakdown
CVSS 4.0 0.0
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:L/UI:A/VC:L/VI:H/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- High
- Attack requirements
- Present
- Privileges required
- Low
- User interaction
- Active
- Confidentiality (vulnerable system)
- Low
- Integrity (vulnerable system)
- High
- Availability (vulnerable system)
- Low
- Confidentiality (subsequent systems)
- None
- Integrity (subsequent systems)
- None
- Availability (subsequent systems)
- None
- Exploit maturity
- Not defined
- Scope
- X
CVSS 3.1 5.9
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:L
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- High
- Privileges required
- Low
- User interaction
- Required
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- Low
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- Low
Weakness
CWE-269: Improper Privilege Management
The product does not properly assign, modify, track, or check privileges for an actor, creating an unintended sphere of control for that actor.
How to prevent it
- Architecture and Design, Operation: Very carefully manage the setting, management, and handling of privileges. Explicitly manage trust zones in the software.
- Architecture and Design: Follow the principle of least privilege when assigning access rights to entities in a software system.
- Architecture and Design: Consider following the principle of separation of privilege. Require multiple conditions to be met before permitting access to a system resource.
CWE-863: Incorrect Authorization
The product performs an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action, but it does not correctly perform the check.
How to prevent it
- Architecture and Design: Divide the product into anonymous, normal, privileged, and administrative areas. Reduce the attack surface by carefully mapping roles with data and functionality. Use role-based access control (RBAC) [REF-229] to enforce the roles at the appropriate boundaries. Note that this approach may not protect against horizontal authorization, i.e., it will not protect a user from attacking others with the same role.
- Architecture and Design: Ensure that access control checks are performed related to the business logic. These checks may be different than the access control checks that are applied to more generic resources such as files, connections, processes, memory, and database records. For example, a database may restrict access for medical records to a specific database user, but each record might only be intended to be accessible to the patient and the patient's doctor [REF-7].
- Architecture and Design: Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid. For example, consider using authorization frameworks such as the JAAS Authorization Framework [REF-233] and the OWASP ESAPI Access Control feature [REF-45].
- Architecture and Design: For web applications, make sure that the access control mechanism is enforced correctly at the server side on every page. Users should not be able to access any unauthorized functionality or information by simply requesting direct access to that page. One way to do this is to ensure that all pages containing sensitive information are not cached, and that all such pages restrict access to requests that are accompanied by an active and authenticated session token associated with a user who has the required permissions to access that page.
- System Configuration, Installation: Use the access control capabilities of your operating system and server environment and define your access control lists accordingly. Use a "default deny" policy when defining these ACLs.
References
Advisories
Packages
Other links
Timeline
- Published
- Last updated by the source
- Latest EPSS score
Related advisories
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|---|---|---|
| GHSA-3x84-qq85-fj65 OpenClaw: Browser CDP discovery could accept blocked WebSocket URLs | High | Also affects openclaw |
| GHSA-9c3v-684m-579c OpenClaw MCP SSE redirects could forward Authorization headers | Medium | Also affects openclaw |
| GHSA-f397-5vjw-v2c2 OpenClaw: Shell inline-command parsing could miss an allowlist check | High | Also affects openclaw |
| GHSA-rx78-29qr-5hq8 OpenClaw: Workspace-derived service PATH could influence trash command selection | High | Also affects openclaw |
| GHSA-ccwh-wwpp-6wg5 OpenClaw: Host environment sanitizer missed two Node.js control variables | High | Also affects openclaw |
| GHSA-985f-72mj-8gf7 OpenClaw: Tool group policy callers could accept unvalidated group IDs | Medium | Also affects openclaw |
| GHSA-9v8j-9c9g-w66c OpenClaw: Bootstrap token replay could widen pending pairing scopes | Medium | Also affects openclaw |
| GHSA-c226-q6fx-6j6c OpenClaw: macOS Swift exec allowlist missed combined POSIX inline flags | Medium | Also affects openclaw |
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