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GHSA-whr7-m3f8-mpm8 CVE-2023-34448

Grav Server-side Template Injection (SSTI) via Twig Default Filters

High Packagist
Severity
7.2 / 10
High · CVSS 3.1
Exploit chance (EPSS)
4.52%
Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 91.52% of scored vulnerabilities.
Known exploited
No
Not in CISA's catalog
Weakness
CWE-1336 Improper Neutralization of Special Elements Used in a Template Engine
CWE-20 Improper Input Validation
Fix
1.7.42
Upgrade getgrav/grav to this version or later

Description

Hi,

actually we have sent the bug report to security@getgrav.org on 27th March 2023 and on 10th April 2023.

Grav Server-side Template Injection (SSTI) via Twig Default Filters

Summary:

Product Grav CMS
Vendor Grav
Severity High - Users with login access to Grav Admin panel and page creation/update permissions are able to obtain remote code/command execution
Affected Versions <= v1.7.40 (Commit 685d762) (Latest version as of writing)
Tested Versions v1.7.40
Internal Identifier STAR-2023-0008
CVE Identifier TBD
CWE(s) CWE-184: Incomplete List of Disallowed Inputs, CWE-1336: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements Used in a Template Engine

CVSS3.1 Scoring System:

Base Score: 7.2 (High)
Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Metric Value
Attack Vector (AV) Network
Attack Complexity (AC) Low
Privileges Required (PR) High
User Interaction (UI) None
Scope (S) Unchanged
Confidentiality (C) High
Integrity (I) High
Availability (A) High

Product Overview:

Grav is a PHP-based flat-file content management system (CMS) designed to provide a fast and simple way to build websites. It supports rendering of web pages written in Markdown and Twig expressions, and provides an administration panel to manage the entire website via an optional Admin plugin.

Vulnerability Summary:

The patch for CVE-2022-2073, a server-side template injection vulnerability in Grav leveraging the default filter() function, did not block other built-in functions exposed by Twig's Core Extension that could be used to invoke arbitrary unsafe functions, thereby allowing for remote code execution.

Vulnerability Details:

Twig comes with an extension known as the Core Extension that is enabled by default when initialising a new Twig environment. Twig's Core Extension provides multiple built-in filters, such as the filter() function, which can be used in Twig templates.

CVE-2022-2073 leverages the default filter() filter function in Twig to invoke arbitrary unsafe functions. This was patched by overriding the default filter() filter function in commit 9d6a2d of Grav v1.7.34 to perform validation checks on the arguments passed to filter():

...
class GravExtension extends AbstractExtension implements GlobalsInterface
{
    ...
    public function getFilters(): array
    {
        return [
            ...
            // Security fix
+           new TwigFilter('filter', [$this, 'filterFilter'], ['needs_environment' => true]),
        ];
    }
    
    ...

+   /**
+    * @param Environment $env
+    * @param array $array
+    * @param callable|string $arrow
+    * @return array|CallbackFilterIterator
+    * @throws RuntimeError
+    */
+   function filterFilter(Environment $env, $array, $arrow)
+   {
+       if (is_string($arrow) && Utils::isDangerousFunction($arrow)) {
+           throw new RuntimeError('Twig |filter("' . $arrow . '") is not allowed.');
+       }
+
+       return \twig_array_filter($env, $array, $arrow);
+   }
}

However, looking at the source code of /src/Extension/CoreExtension.php of Twig, alternative default Twig filters could also be used invoke arbitrary functions:

...
class CoreExtension extends AbstractExtension
{
    ...
    public function getFilters(): array
    {
        return [
            ...
            // array helpers
            ...
            new TwigFilter('filter', 'twig_array_filter', ['needs_environment' => true]), // unsafe
            new TwigFilter('map', 'twig_array_map', ['needs_environment' => true]), // unsafe
            new TwigFilter('reduce', 'twig_array_reduce', ['needs_environment' => true]), // unsafe
        ];
    }

The three filter functions above respectively call array_filter(), array_map() and array_reduce(). Since only filter() is being overriden by Grav to ensure that the callable passed to filter() does not result in the invocation of an unsafe function, the other two functions (i.e. map() and reduce()) could be used by an authenticated attacker that is able to inject and render malicious templates to gain remote code execution.

Exploit Conditions:

This vulnerability can be exploited if the attacker has access to:

  1. an administrator account, or
  2. a non-administrator, user account that are granted the following permissions:
    • login access to Grav admin panel, and
    • page creation or update rights

Reproduction Steps:

  1. Log in to Grav Admin using an administrator account.
  2. Navigate to Accounts > Add, and ensure that the following permissions are assigned when creating a new low-privileged user:
    • Login to Admin - Allowed
    • Page Update - Allowed
  3. Log out of Grav Admin, and log back in using the account created in step 2.
  4. Navigate to http://<grav_installation>/admin/pages/home.
  5. Click the Advanced tab and select the checkbox beside Twig to ensure that Twig processing is enabled for the modified webpage.
  6. Under the Content tab, insert the following payload within the editor:
    {{ ['id'] | map('system') }}
    {{ ['id'] | reduce('system') }}
    
  7. Click the Preview button. Observe that the output of the id shell command is returned in the preview.

Suggested Mitigations:

Override the built-in Twig map() and reduce() filter functions in system/src/Grav/Common/Twig/Extension/GravExtension.php to validate the argument passed to the filter in $arrow.

For example:

...
class GravExtension extends AbstractExtension implements GlobalsInterface
{
    ...
    public function getFilters(): array
    {
        return [
            ...
            // Security fix
            new TwigFilter('filter', [$this, 'filterFilter'], ['needs_environment' => true]),
+           new TwigFilter('map', [$this, 'mapFilter'], ['needs_environment' => true]),
+           new TwigFilter('reduce', [$this, 'reduceFilter'], ['needs_environment' => true]),
        ];
    }

    ...
+   /**
+    * @param Environment $env
+    * @param array $array
+    * @param callable|string $arrow
+    * @return array|CallbackFilterIterator
+    * @throws RuntimeError
+    */
+   function mapFilter(Environment $env, $array, $arrow)
+   {
+       if (!$arrow instanceof Closure && !is_string($arrow) || Utils::isDangerousFunction($arrow)) {
+           throw new RuntimeError('Twig |map("' . $arrow . '") is not allowed.');
+       }
+
+       return \twig_array_map($env, $array, $arrow);
+   }
+ 
+   /**
+    * @param Environment $env
+    * @param array $array
+    * @param callable|string $arrow
+    * @return array|CallbackFilterIterator
+    * @throws RuntimeError
+    */
+   function reduceFilter(Environment $env, $array, $arrow)
+   {
+       if (!$arrow instanceof Closure && !is_string($arrow) || Utils::isDangerousFunction($arrow)) {
+           throw new RuntimeError('Twig |reduce("' . $arrow . '") is not allowed.');
+       }
+
+       return \twig_array_reduce($env, $array, $arrow);
+   }
}

Detection Guidance:

The following strategies may be used to detect potential exploitation attempts.

  1. Searching within Markdown pages using the following shell command:
    grep -Priz -e '\|\s*(map|reduce)\s*\(' /path/to/webroot/user/pages/
  2. Searching within Doctrine cache data using the following shell command:
    grep -Priz -e '\|\s*(map|reduce)\s*\(' --include '*.doctrinecache.data' /path/to/webroot/cache/
  3. Searching within Twig cache using the following shell command:
    grep -Priz -e 'twig_array_(map|reduce)' /path/to/webroot/cache/twig/
  4. Searching within compiled Twig template files using the following shell command:
    grep -Priz -e '\|\s*(map|reduce)\s*\(' /path/to/webroot/cache/compiled/files/

Note that it is not possible to detect indicators of compromise reliably using the Grav log file (located at /path/to/webroot/logs/grav.log by default), as successful exploitation attempts do not generate any additional logs. However, it is worthwhile to examine any PHP errors or warnings logged to determine the existence of any failed exploitation attempts.

Credits:

Ngo Wei Lin (@Creastery) & Wang Hengyue (@w_hy_04) of STAR Labs SG Pte. Ltd. (@starlabs_sg)

Vulnerability Disclosure:

This vulnerability report is subject to a 120 day disclosure deadline as per STAR Labs SG Pte. Ltd.'s Vulnerability Disclosure Policy. After 120 days have elapsed, the vulnerability report will be published to the public by STAR Labs SG Pte. Ltd. (STAR Labs).

The scheduled disclosure date is 25th July, 2023. Disclosure at an earlier date is also possible if agreed upon by all parties.

Kindly note that STAR Labs reserved and assigned the following CVE identifiers to the respective vulnerabilities presented in this report:

  1. CVE-2023-30596 Server-side Template Injection (SSTI) in getgrav/grav <= v1.7.40 allows Grav Admin users with page creation or update rights to bypass the dangerous functions denylist check in GravExtension.filterFilter() and to achieve remote code execution via Twig's default filters map() and reduce(). This is a bypass of CVE-2022-2073.

Affected versions

Packagist

PackageVulnerableFixed in
getgrav/grav
< 1.7.42
1.7.42

How to fix

Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.

getgrav/grav Packagist → 1.7.42

composer
composer require getgrav/grav:^1.7.42

Severity breakdown

CVSS 3.1 7.2

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Privileges required
High
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
High
Integrity
High
Availability
High

Weakness

CWE-1336: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements Used in a Template Engine

The product uses a template engine to insert or process externally-influenced input, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements or syntax that can be interpreted as template expressions or other code directives when processed by the engine.

How to prevent it
  • Architecture and Design: Choose a template engine that offers a sandbox or restricted mode, or at least limits the power of any available expressions, function calls, or commands.
  • Implementation: Use the template engine's sandbox or restricted mode, if available.

CWE-20: Improper Input Validation

The product receives input or data, but it does not validate or incorrectly validates that the input has the properties that are required to process the data safely and correctly.

How to prevent it
  • Architecture and Design: Consider using language-theoretic security (LangSec) techniques that characterize inputs using a formal language and build "recognizers" for that language. This effectively requires parsing to be a distinct layer that effectively enforces a boundary between raw input and internal data representations, instead of allowing parser code to be scattered throughout the program, where it could be subject to errors or inconsistencies that create weaknesses. [REF-1109] [REF-1110] [REF-1111]
  • Architecture and Design: Use an input validation framework such as Struts or the OWASP ESAPI Validation API. Note that using a framework does not automatically address all input validation problems; be mindful of weaknesses that could arise from misusing the framework itself (CWE-1173).
  • Architecture and Design, Implementation: Understand all the potential areas where untrusted inputs can enter the product, including but not limited to: parameters or arguments, cookies, anything read from the network, environment variables, reverse DNS lookups, query results, request headers, URL components, e-mail, files, filenames, databases, and any external systems that provide data to the application. Remember that such inputs may be obtained indirectly through API calls.
  • Implementation: Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does. When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue." Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
  • Architecture and Design: For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server. Even though client-side checks provide minimal benefits with respect to server-side security, they are still useful. First, they can support intrusion detection. If the server receives input that should have been rejected by the client, then it may be an indication of an attack. Second, client-side error-checking can provide helpful feedback to the user about the expectations for valid input. Third, there may be a reduction in server-side processing time for accidental input errors, although this is typically a small savings.
  • Implementation: When your application combines data from multiple sources, perform the validation after the sources have been combined. The individual data elements may pass the validation step but violate the intended restrictions after they have been combined.
  • Implementation: Be especially careful to validate all input when invoking code that crosses language boundaries, such as from an interpreted language to native code. This could create an unexpected interaction between the language boundaries. Ensure that you are not violating any of the expectations of the language with which you are interfacing. For example, even though Java may not be susceptible to buffer overflows, providing a large argument in a call to native code might trigger an overflow.
  • Implementation: Directly convert your input type into the expected data type, such as using a conversion function that translates a string into a number. After converting to the expected data type, ensure that the input's values fall within the expected range of allowable values and that multi-field consistencies are maintained.
  • Implementation: Inputs should be decoded and canonicalized to the application's current internal representation before being validated (CWE-180, CWE-181). Make sure that your application does not inadvertently decode the same input twice (CWE-174). Such errors could be used to bypass allowlist schemes by introducing dangerous inputs after they have been checked. Use libraries such as the OWASP ESAPI Canonicalization control. Consider performing repeated canonicalization until your input does not change any more. This will avoid double-decoding and similar scenarios, but it might inadvertently modify inputs that are allowed to contain properly-encoded dangerous content.
  • Implementation: When exchanging data between components, ensure that both components are using the same character encoding. Ensure that the proper encoding is applied at each interface. Explicitly set the encoding you are using whenever the protocol allows you to do so.

References

Timeline

  1. Published
  2. Last updated by the source
  3. Latest EPSS score
AdvisorySeverityWhy it's related
GHSA-xjw5-q542-3vmr
Grav: config_denied_paths default list omits `system`, exposing real secrets (e.g. system.cache.redis.password) via the Twig sandbox when config_access is enabled
High Also affects getgrav/grav
GHSA-3jhr-mxmx-38cx
Grav: UserInterface offsetget/offsetexists allow-listed in Twig sandbox let editor-authored content leak hashed_password and 2FA secrets via offsetGet()
Medium Also affects getgrav/grav
GHSA-9ccq-2jfg-qw33
Grav: Origin validation bypass in Uri::referrer() and Pages::referrerRoute() via unanchored prefix match
Critical Also affects getgrav/grav
GHSA-38p6-h87p-r4cg
Grav: Non constant time nonce comparison in Utils::verifyNonce() used for CSRF protection
Medium Also affects getgrav/grav
GHSA-p597-crqc-m349
Grav: The system, site, and theme Twig variables bypass the content sandbox entirely and are never covered by config_denied_paths
Medium Also affects getgrav/grav
GHSA-47ch-6w46-6xm7
Grav: media_directory() Twig function allows filesystem path traversal and file content disclosure from sandboxed page content
Medium Also affects getgrav/grav
GHSA-jq29-c7v8-rg55
Grav: Path Traversal in MediaUploadTrait::deleteFile() Allows Arbitrary File Deletion
High Also affects getgrav/grav
GHSA-8hgv-xc77-jmcr
Grav: Page editors can inject arbitrary script into rendered pages via the Twig sandbox's assets.addJs/addCss allowlist, escalating to super-admin
Medium Also affects getgrav/grav
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