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GHSA-wf9g-rh76-6jvr CVE-2017-2612

Incorrect Permission Assignment for Critical Resource in Jenkins

Medium Maven
Severity
5.4 / 10
Medium · CVSS 3.0
Exploit chance (EPSS)
1.49%
Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 74.13% of scored vulnerabilities.
Known exploited
No
Not in CISA's catalog
Weakness
CWE-732 Incorrect Permission Assignment for Critical Resource
Fix
2.32.2
Upgrade org.jenkins-ci.main:jenkins-core to this version or later

Description

In Jenkins before versions 2.44, 2.32.2 low privilege users were able to override JDK download credentials (SECURITY-392), resulting in future builds possibly failing to download a JDK.

Affected versions

Maven

PackageVulnerableFixed in
org.jenkins-ci.main:jenkins-core
< 2.32.2
2.32.2
org.jenkins-ci.main:jenkins-core
>= 2.34, < 2.44
2.44

How to fix

Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.

org.jenkins-ci.main:jenkins-core Maven → 2.32.2

maven
<dependency><groupId>org.jenkins-ci.main</groupId><artifactId>jenkins-core</artifactId><version>2.32.2</version></dependency>
gradle
implementation("org.jenkins-ci.main:jenkins-core:2.32.2")

Severity breakdown

CVSS 3.0 5.4

CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L

Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Privileges required
Low
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
None
Integrity
Low
Availability
Low

Weakness

CWE-732: Incorrect Permission Assignment for Critical Resource

The product specifies permissions for a security-critical resource in a way that allows that resource to be read or modified by unintended actors.

How to prevent it
  • Implementation: When using a critical resource such as a configuration file, check to see if the resource has insecure permissions (such as being modifiable by any regular user) [REF-62], and generate an error or even exit the software if there is a possibility that the resource could have been modified by an unauthorized party.
  • Architecture and Design: Divide the software into anonymous, normal, privileged, and administrative areas. Reduce the attack surface by carefully defining distinct user groups, privileges, and/or roles. Map these against data, functionality, and the related resources. Then set the permissions accordingly. This will allow you to maintain more fine-grained control over your resources. [REF-207]
  • Architecture and Design, Operation: Run the code in a "jail" or similar sandbox environment that enforces strict boundaries between the process and the operating system. This may effectively restrict which files can be accessed in a particular directory or which commands can be executed by the software. OS-level examples include the Unix chroot jail, AppArmor, and SELinux. In general, managed code may provide some protection. For example, java.io.FilePermission in the Java SecurityManager allows the software to specify restrictions on file operations. This may not be a feasible solution, and it only limits the impact to the operating system; the rest of the application may still be subject to compromise. Be careful to avoid CWE-243 and other weaknesses related to jails.
  • Implementation, Installation: During program startup, explicitly set the default permissions or umask to the most restrictive setting possible. Also set the appropriate permissions during program installation. This will prevent you from inheriting insecure permissions from any user who installs or runs the program.
  • System Configuration: For all configuration files, executables, and libraries, make sure that they are only readable and writable by the software's administrator.
  • Documentation: Do not suggest insecure configuration changes in documentation, especially if those configurations can extend to resources and other programs that are outside the scope of the application.
  • Installation: Do not assume that a system administrator will manually change the configuration to the settings that are recommended in the software's manual.
  • Operation, System Configuration: Ensure that the software runs properly under the United States Government Configuration Baseline (USGCB) [REF-199] or an equivalent hardening configuration guide, which many organizations use to limit the attack surface and potential risk of deployed software.
  • Implementation, System Configuration, Operation: When storing data in the cloud (e.g., S3 buckets, Azure blobs, Google Cloud Storage, etc.), use the provider's controls to disable public access.

References

Timeline

  1. Published
  2. Last updated by the source
  3. Latest EPSS score
AdvisorySeverityWhy it's related
GHSA-6f9g-cxwr-q5jr
Arbitrary file read vulnerability through the Jenkins CLI can lead to RCE
Critical Known exploited Also affects org.jenkins-ci.main:jenkins-core
GHSA-8pqx-3rxx-f5pm
Jenkins discloses project names via fingerprints
High Known exploited Also affects org.jenkins-ci.main:jenkins-core
GHSA-26wc-3wqp-g3rp
Deserialization of Untrusted Data in Jenkins
Critical Known exploited Also affects org.jenkins-ci.main:jenkins-core
CVE-2018-1000861
Deserialization of Untrusted Data in Jenkins
Critical Known exploited Also affects org.jenkins-ci.main:jenkins-core
GHSA-m6wv-wh8g-64xc
Jenkins does not encrypt secrets from POST config.xml submissions before storing them in job configurations
Medium Also affects org.jenkins-ci.main:jenkins-core
GHSA-93qh-vwrm-c5pw
Jenkins: Stored XSS vulnerability in node offline cause description
Medium Also affects org.jenkins-ci.main:jenkins-core
GHSA-92m7-4fpw-2wxm
Jenkins: Open Redirect phishing attacks possible via "from" parameter in "Delegate to servlet container"
Medium Also affects org.jenkins-ci.main:jenkins-core
GHSA-g28p-6mcc-v4rv
Jenkins exposes other users' timezone and view names to users with Overall/Read permission
Medium Also affects org.jenkins-ci.main:jenkins-core
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